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Preface 
Many books about hunger have been published in recent years, 
reflecting the deep concern that people have for those who suffer 
from hunger. Many feel uneasy and diminished by the knowledge 
that in spite of the unprecedented progress in modern science and 
technology, hunger still persists. It also generates a sense of frustra- 
tion that despite the global consensus on the need to eliminate 
hunger, and despite the actions of many well-meaning individuals, 
organizations, and governments we have been unable to solve such a 
basic problem. 
What can one more book on hunger contribute? How is this 
report different from many that have been published? Here we 
report the findings of a research study addressed to understand the 
nature of the world food system and to explore policies that could 
make it work better. We have examined the issue, we hope, with 
academic objectivity and theoretical rigor in an empirically descrip- 
tive, quantitative way. The persistence of hunger amidst global and 
local abundance suggests that food and agricultural systems are 
hard to manage and that effective food policies are difficult to for- 
mulate. Better tools to analyze and evaluate national agricultural 
policies could help to improve them. 
The work reported here differs from many others in that the 
analysis of policies is based on a common integrated framework. It 
shows why hunger persists, why many policies advanced in popular 
literature do not work, and what kind of policies can work. 
Although based on analyses using a quantitative, sophisticated sys- 
tem of models, the book is addressed to the nontechnical layman 
and to the general reader. Also, our arguments go beyond merely 
iv Preface 
economic and technical analysis. Hunger is not just an economic 
issue, it is also a political and a moral one. 
We show that solutions that rely only on the market mechan- 
ism do not work to eliminate hunger rapidly enough. Hence, the 
title of this report. Adam Smith used the metaphor of the "invisible 
handn that guides a competitive market to an equilibrium that can- 
not be changed without making someone in the economy worse off. 
The invisible hand is an efficient mechanism for allocating resources 
for economic activities. In fact, our analysis shows that even policies 
that try to intervene, modify, and distort the markets do not help to 
reduce hunger effectively if they rely on the market mechanism. A 
more accurate, but more technical and less evocative title would 
have been: "Hunger: Beyond the Reach of Market Interventions." 
Our analytical tool, a set of linked models, covers the world's agri- 
culture. The model system, developed by the Food and Agriculture 
Program (F AP) of the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) in cooperation with the Centre for World Food 
Studies (SOW) in Amsterdam, is called the Basic Linked System 
(BLS) . 
To be operationally useful in an international policy debate, a 
simulation model should reflect more explicitly the concerns of pol- 
icy analysts in the countries involved. This led IIASA to establish 
the Food and Agriculture Program. The idea was that detailed 
national models be developed by teams in the countries themselves. 
IIASA provided the participating teams with a common framework, 
software, and system specifications that could eventually link the 
individual models. Each national team did most of the empirical 
work, leading to the development of a network of collaborating insti- 
tutions. At the same time, the Centre for World Food Studies was 
set up in the Netherlands to pursue research concerning food policies 
at the national and international levels. IIASA and SOW agreed to 
cooperate in the formulation and elaboration of the common frame- 
work and software. Moreover, SOW would assist developing coun- 
tries in building policy models that would eventually be linked. This 
cooperation resulted in the formulation and operational implementa- 
tion of an applied general equilibrium (AGE) approach. In parallel, 
the international network was built and empirical elaboration of the 
national models initiated. This process started in 1976. 
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It was clear from the outset that not all the detailed national 
models would be operational at  the same time. Moreover, network 
participants expressed the wish to receive a simplified version of the 
linked system of models that could serve as an international environ- 
ment for their own detailed models. In response to this need, IIASA 
decided to develop simplified national models that could be built 
from internationally available statistics (from UN, FAO, and World 
Bank sources) and connected to constitute the Basic Linked System. 
Thus, the Basic Linked System was meant to contain detailed 
national models, as well as simplified ones, using the same methodol- 
ogy, to permit consistent linkage. In summary, three tasks were 
begun almost simultaneously: methodology and software develop- 
ment, the construction of detailed national models, and the con- 
struction of simplified national models. 
The first and the third tasks proceeded well, and in 1979 the 
first results were presented from a system of linked simplified 
models. The development of detailed national models proceeded as 
planned for several countries, but some others were delayed. It was 
then decided to focus a t  IIASA on the upgrading of the simplified 
national models toward what was to become a Standard National 
Model. 
The system was used to address two policy issues: the 
effectiveness of alternative policies to eliminate hunger and the 
potential impacts of agricultural trade liberalization. The notion of 
agricultural trade liberalization involved the removal of all border 
protection measures, such as tariffs and quotas. As is usual in pol- 
icy analysis with models, the results of a scenario specifying a 
change in policy were compared with those of a reference scenario. 
Some of the highlights of our findings are as follows: 
(1) Existing national and international economic policies will not 
lead to the eradication of hunger and poverty in our lifetime, 
even if the world economy were to exhibit sustained growth 
over the coming decades. In fact, they will continue to leave 
large numbers of people suffering from chronic hunger well into 
the next century. 
(2) Some policy alternatives for developing countries could help to 
reduce hunger more rapidly, but these would either retard 
overall economic growth or require substantially larger 
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external aid flows. Without such aid, progress in reducing 
hunger will remain slow, even if the governments of poor coun- 
tries were to give priority to meeting food needs. 
(3) More liberal agricultural trade policies in developed countries 
with market economies alone would have only a marginal 
significance for the hunger problem and would have mixed 
effects on developing countries, actually increasing hunger in 
many food-importing developing countries. 
(4) More liberal agricultural trade policies by the developing coun- 
tries themselves will reduce hunger marginally, but will hurt 
the economies of some of those developing countries exporting 
agricultural products. 
(5) Liberalized international movements of labor can drastically 
reduce hunger, but this is obviously not a realistic alternative 
in the present world. High-income countries maintain higher 
wages by restricting labor movements, and the poor countries 
have lower wage rates than would prevail were labor services 
to be freely traded in the world. This provides an argument 
for aid flows to compensate for the restriction of free trade of 
labor services. 
(6) Additional aid by the developed countries to finance domestic 
redistributive programs by poor developing countries could vir- 
tually eradicate hunger by the end of this century. 
Details of these findings can be found in two IIASA publications: 
Toward Free Trade in Agriculture (Parikh et al., 1988), which is 
about trade liberalization in agriculture, and this report. Apart 
from its substantive applications for policy analysis, the develop- 
ment of the BLS generated a number of methodological contribu- 
tions and innovations. These are reported in a third volume, Linked 
National Models: A Tool for International Food Policy Analysis. 
The development of the BLS has involved many people in 
IIASA's Food and Agriculture Program and its network of colla- 
borating institutions. As with any large project that takes many 
years, it is virtually impossible to give individual credit to all those 
who have contributed; yet one must try. The core group consisted 
of the following: Kirit Parikh (Program Leader 1980-1986), Ferenc 
Rabar (Program Leader 1976-1980, 1986-1987), Giinther Fischer, 
Klaus Frohberg, and Michiel Keyzer. The members of the program 
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core have been responsible for all aspects of model development and 
analysis. Conception of the system and development of the algo- 
rithms for the computation of national and international equilibria 
were done by Michiel Keyzer. 
Other program participants who have contributed to the 
development of various aspects of the BLS are Michael Abkin, Tom 
Christensen, Csaba Csaki, Odd Gulbrandsen, Janos Hrabovszky, 
Gerhard KrBmer, Bozena Lopuch, Douglas Maxwell, Donald 
Mitchell, Jan Morovic, Nanduri Narayana, Martha Neunteufel, Karl 
Ortner, Gerald Robertson, Ralph Seeley, Mahendra Shah, Ulrike 
Sichra, T.N. Srinivasan, Wouter Tims, Eric Wailes, David Watt, 
Chris Wolf, and Laszlo Zeold. 
Many others were involved in the program, particularly for the 
development of detailed national policy analysis models for specific 
countries. Though several of these models have been used in a 
number of countries, not all of them are currently available as a part 
of the BLS. Naturally, the study has benefited from the country- 
specific knowledge and evaluations made by many researchers. 
Other researchers have also commented constructively on vari- 
ous aspects of the system methodology and behavior. Among them 
are, in alphabetical order, the following: Reinaldo Adams, Harold 
Carter, Hartwig de Haen, Jerrie de Hoogh, Uwe FLrber, Bruce 
Gardner, Erik Geyskens, John Graham, John Guiset, Werner Giith, 
Bruce Huff, Vladimir Iakimets, Raul Jorge, Werner Kiene, Hans 
Linnemann, F. Desmond McCarthy, Constantine Meghir, Haruo 
Onishi, Brian Parmenter, Pierpaolo Pierani, Leon Podkaminer, Mar- 
cel Pommee, Todor Popovt, Alberto Portugal, Allan N. Rae, Bruno 
Raguet, Sudhaker Rao, E. George Rossmiller, Kozo Sasaki, Stephen 
Schmidt, Peter Michael Schmitz, Jorg-Volker Schrader, Taisto Son- 
nenson, Valter Jose Stiilp, Stefan Tangermann, Robert Thompson, 
Anton Timman, Paul J. J .  Veenendaal, Anton Visser, Matthias von 
Oppen, Jean Waelbroek, Anton Wagemeyer, and Cheryl William- 
son. Several tables in this report were produced by Maarten van't 
Riet . 
It is my privilege to acknowledge with gratitude the many con- 
tributions of all my colleagues at IIASA and the various program 
participants in the many collaborating institutions. A great deal of 
credit goes to them. 
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In addition, the authors of this study express their sincere 
thanks to Janos Hrabovszky , Hans Linnemann, Shlomo Reutlinger, 
Paul Streeten, and T.N. Srinivasan for their constructive comments 
on an earlier draft. Their comments have greatly improved the 
book. Needless to  add, the authors alone are responsible for the 
errors that remain and views expressed. 
Finally, the authors wish to acknowledge with thanks Lilo 
Roggenland for typing and correcting numerous drafts of this report. 
Kirit Parikh 
Program Leader 
Food and Agriculture Program 
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CHAPTER 1 
Hunger 
1.1. Though No One Wants it, Hunger Persists 
How can hunger be eliminated? Are there means to accelerate its 
eradication? Why does hunger persist in the midst of plenty? What 
can be done to eliminate hunger and unwanted surpluses in a rea- 
sonable time? These are the issues addressed in this book. 
Everyone would like to eradicate hunger. All nations, at  least 
those who have signed the UN charter, subscribe to the belief that 
all human beings have a right to food. Despite this, and the fact 
that globally, and even regionally, adequate food is produced, 
several hundred million people are suffering from chronic undernu- 
trition, i.e., from hunger. Definitions vary and statistical measure- 
ments are far from satisfactory, but all indicators point toward the 
large extent of deprivation in terms of food, measured by the 
numbers of people affected. Moreover, their numbers are still 
increasing, even though their share in the populations of developing 
countries, and of the world, continues to decline. Women appear 
more affected than men; a large proportion are children. The Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates on the basis of 
calorie intake norms established jointly by the F A 0  and the WHO 
given in Table 1.1 show the present situation. 
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Table 1.1. The undernourished. 
1969-1971 1979-1981 1983-1985 
Num- % of Num- % of Num- % of 
bers popu- bers popu- bers POPU- 
Region (million) lation (million) lation (million) lation 
Africa (subsaharan) 86 32.6 110 30.6 142 35.2 
Near East/North Africa 41 22.9 25 10.8 24 9.1 
Asia 281 28.7 288 23.5 291 21.8 
Latin America 51 18.5 52 14.6 55 14.2 
Total 459 27.0 475 21.8 512 21.5 
Sources: FAO, 1987, 1988. 
Human nutritional requirement norms are derived from the 
basal metabolic rate (BMR), which mainly depends on age, sex, 
body weight, and climatic conditions. (BMR is defined as the 
calories required by a person at rest, but awake.) It must be recog- 
nized that no agreement exists with respect to the norm below 
which a person can be said to be hungry, i.e., cannot undertake a 
reasonable amount of physical effort without loss of body weight. 
Disagreement here (see Kakwani 1986; McNeil and Payne, 1985; 
Srinivasan, 1980, 1983, 1987; Sukhatme and Margen, 1978; 
Sukhatme, 1982; WHO, 1985) is not surprising, since this norm indi- 
cates a cutoff point below which one can call the situation critical. 
Setting such a cutoff point is a political as well as a biomedical issue. 
How much physical effort should be considered reasonable? Should 
recreational activities be included, and if so, how much? On the 
other hand, the measurement of food consumption is also prob- 
lematic. For a nation as a whole, estimates of food production may 
be obtained from measurements in the field and the net food inflow 
from customs records. This determines total food availability, but 
not its distribution. What happens to this food? Is it fed to animals 
and, to the extent that it does reach households, how is it distri- 
buted among and within households throughout the year? What is 
the role of disease and of ignorance of methods of food preparation 
to preserve nutritional benefits from available supplies? 
Settling these issues to allow a more precise assessment are 
immense tasks, on which specialized organizations have spent con- 
siderable resources over the past decades. Significant advances have 
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been made, and this report could not have been written without 
them, yet by the nature of the issue itself, a high degree of impreci- 
sion is bound to remain. 
Almost 60% of the world's malnourished peoples live in the 
Indian subcontinent: in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, India, 
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In the 37 countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa the food situation has been deteriorating, and these countries 
now account for 20% of the hungry. The remaining 20% are 
diffused widely over several developing countries. 
Globally, although as a percentage of population the numbers 
of hungry are decreasing, in absolute term they are increasing. 
Nearly 500 million people, or about 10% of the world's population, 
are suffering from hunger. Not that the remaining 90% all have 
ample food supplies all the time; many of them live at the limits of 
subsistence. Their diets are monotonous and lack variety so that, 
while not undernourished in terms of calorie intake, they are mal- 
nourished and are thus susceptible to diseases and infections. They 
maintain a precarious balance of food supplies at the margin of ade- 
quacy and need to be provided with additional food to give them a 
reasonable degree of food security. 
The vulnerability of this balance to the vagaries of weather 
and to the risks of improper policies has been amply demonstrated 
over the past 25 years. In India, for example, successive years of 
unfavorable weather in the late 1960s and early 1970s required large 
imports of grain to counter a serious threat to food supplies for a 
major part of its population. More recently, Bangladesh, the Sahel, 
and East Africa have provided similar examples. In China, in the 
early 1960s, overambitious policies, a breakdown in communications, 
and serious production shortfalls due to weather combined to create 
a disastrous situation which probably caused the largest loss of life 
(estimates of deaths during the 1960-1962 famine vary from 16 mil- 
lion to 30 million) for one single calamity in all of the world's his- 
tory. 
The persistence of hunger on this scale can be seen as a sign of 
the failure of humanity's development, but we may also look at the 
progress that has been made. Only a few centuries ago, hunger was 
a daily reality for the majority. Today a large part of the world's 
population enjoys secure and adequate food supplies. Progress in 
providing food security for a major part of a much larger world 
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population is one of the outstanding achievements of our times, and 
the situation is improving. 
Other indicators also suggest an overall improvement in the 
human condition. Life expectancy at birth in developing countries 
has increased from less than 40 years to approximately 55 years over 
the last three decades. Several developing countries have joined the 
ranks of developed countries in this period. These long-term trends 
seem to justify a degree of optimism for the future: freedom from 
hunger appears to be a goal that is within the world's reach. The 
search for an answer as to how to achieve that goal is the theme of 
this book. But we must first try to understand why so many people 
are undernourished, or malnourished, while at the same time mil- 
lions of others have more than plenty to eat. In other words, what 
is the nature of the hunger problem? 
1.2. The Nature of the Hunger Problem 
Underlying the problem of the chronic undernutrition is the problem 
of poverty. The chronically hungry are, by and large, people whose 
incomes are too low to allow them to buy all the food they need. 
Their incomes are low because they own too few productive 
resources of capital, land, and skills for production activities to gen- 
erate incomes, which in turn are used to obtain a final consumption 
bundle of goods and services, including food items. 
This implies that the poor are barely able to meet their food 
needs and when prices of what they buy increase relative to what 
they have to sell, their purchasing power is further reduced. The 
problem of poverty and malnutrition is perpetuated because the 
poor have no better place to go - there is today no New World to 
welcome them as migrants - so that the problem of poverty has to 
be resolved within their own country. 
Thus, hunger is a normative concept that involves political 
issues and may play a role in politics. It is an indicator that can, if 
adequately measured, be used as a criterion to assess the perfor- 
mance of an economic system, be it at the level of a family, a village, 
a country, or the world as a whole. Yet hunger is absent from the 
sphere of economic exchange. That is precisely why a solution of 
the hunger problem through the working of the economic system 
Hunger 5 
would be accidental and, as we shall argue, unlikely. The increased 
free play of economic forces may under certain conditions improve 
economic efficiency, but it does not ensure poverty alleviation. In 
the market, only the dissatisfaction of those who possess purchasing 
power matters. The suffering of the poor is irrelevant as long as the 
others do not care. When the silent operation of market forces can- 
not be expedited to solve this problem, the silence must be broken to 
bring the hunger issue to the top of the world's political agenda. At 
the same time it is not sufficient for researchers to say that hunger 
prevails and may persist in the future when only economic forces are 
taken into consideration. They should also explain why interven- 
tions from the political sphere such as development aid have been 
unable to resolve the problem. 
1.3. Resolving the Hunger Problem 
Suggestions of ways to end hunger have not been lacking and have 
been the topic of intense debate over a considerable time. Some are 
briefly presented here. 
1.3.1. Some ways to deal with hunger 
Redistribution through Revolution 
Different views are expressed, sometimes forcefully, with respect to 
the causes of hunger and ways to overcome it. The defenders of 
those views often claim that other recipes will not work because they 
fail to recognize the basic nature of the problem. Some argue, for 
instance, that hunger is caused by the social system, and that only a 
redistribution of assets, possibly through revolutionary changes in 
government, will help. In the meantime, all foreign aid simply 
strengthens the position of the ruling elite and postpones the day of 
salvation. Aid reduces social unrest and thus the pace of social 
change. 
There have been undeniable successes in several countries in 
reducing exploitation and removing other impediments to more 
equitable growth, such as the revolutions in France in the eighteenth 
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century or China in the twentieth. Nevertheless, the cost of revolu- 
tions in terms of human suffering cannot be overemphasized. The 
example of Ethiopia shows that more than a popular revolution is 
needed to resolve the problems of poverty and hunger. Whether 
redistribution of wealth will make the poor significantly better off 
will depend on the absolute level of the wealth of the rich. If they 
are only very few, redistribution may not achieve much. Moreover, 
the rich may perform important functions in commerce that would 
not be easily taken over by the revolutionaries. Thus, the view that 
hunger is a problem of income distribution that requires revolutions 
and is therefore better left alone to resolve itself is not really con- 
vincing. 
Malthusianism: Will the Problem Take Care of Itself? 
The Malthusian position also advocates nonintervention. In this 
view people will die when sufficient pressure is allowed to build up, 
allowing the food problem to be resolved by the natural biological 
mechanisms. Proponents of this view argue that the food problem is 
caused largely by population growth which became possible through 
improved health care, leading to a drop in death rates without a 
corresponding drop in birth rates (see Figure 1.1 and Table 1.2). If 
one were to accept this argument, one would not help the poor but 
let them die today so that fewer people would suffer from poverty 
and hunger in the future. Although this view is in some sense tauto- 
logical, because it resolves the hunger problem by allowing people to 
die, one might argue that it is better to let one person die today 
than hundreds in the next century. 
Minimal Government: Do as Little as Possible 
A third noninterventionist line argument is that hunger is caused by 
the failure of government policies. In this view governments distort 
the economic environment to the benefit of specific lobbies. Only a 
free market can get prices right. A first objection to this view, 
which is admittedly given here in an extreme form, is that govern- 
ment has to perform more tasks than price setting alone. Apart 
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I Developing countries Birth ratea Death ratea 1 
Rate of population increase = birth rate - death rate 
Figure 1.1. Trends in birth and death rates, 1775-2050 (births and 
deaths per 1000 inhabitants). 
'crude birth and death rates. The increases projected in death rates after about 
1980 reflect the rising proportion of older people in the population. 
'1nclude industrialized countries, the USSR, and Eastern Europe. 
Source: World Development Report, 1980. 
Table 1.2. Demographic transition. 
Percentage change in: 
Crude Crude Total 
birth rate death rate fertility rate 
Type of economy 1965-1987 1965-1987 1987 2000 
Low-income economies -26.2 -37.5 4.0 3.3 
Middle-income economies -21.1 -38.5 3.9 3.1 
Industrial market economies -26.3 -10.0 1 .O 1.9 
Source: World Development Report 1989, Indicators Table 27 'Demography and 
Fertility." 
from maintaining national defense, justice, and law and order, there 
is obviously also a role for government in providing education and 
infrastructure investments, such as public works in agriculture. 
8 Hunger - Beyond the Reach of the Invisible Hand 
If government does not play an active role in developing agri- 
cultural infrastructure, agricultural output and incomes will remain 
low, often leading to hunger. However, in the absence of adequate 
influence of all those involved, a government may develop such 
infrastructure, an irrigation system here, a marketing system some- 
where else, in such a way that only the richer and larger farmers 
reap their benefits, leading to greater inequity and maybe even 
increased hunger. The role of a minimal government is not obvious. 
We shall return to this later. 
Individual farmers cannot set up irrigation systems easily. 
They may form collectives to arrange water distribution, but these 
collectives will have to negotiate with farmers upstream and down- 
stream. Unfortunately these negotiations will tend to be uneven 
because the farmers downstream have little to offer. Moreover, as 
soon as one landowner refuses to have canals on his land, the system 
may fall apart. Clearly this type of infrastructure facility, involving 
large investments and requiring the consent and cooperation of 
many, would require a public body to manage it. 
Land is often accepted as private property but a river is not, a 
lake again is but a sea is not. Thus it seems to be an inherent role 
of government to constrain the sphere in which private property 
may be bought and sold, while enforcing an equitable distribution of 
non-private property such as water. Even a minimal government 
should do this. 
Vegetarianism: Reduce Consumption b y  the Rich 
A simple way to reduce malnutrition would seem to be to reduce the 
demand for food by the rich. This demand is largely channeled 
through the intermediary of livestock production. Livestock eat 
fodder and feed, and the rich eat livestock products. Vegetarianism 
would reduce livestock production and would thus free land and 
farm labor resources for the production of other, staple crops for the 
poor. This would, in turn, reduce the prices of these staple crops to 
allow the poor to buy more food. 
Here again there are several problems. Will the land no longer 
needed to produce animal feed be allocated to staple foods and, if so, 
will the poor benefit? If they live in rural areas, reduced prices may 
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be passed on to those who produce these staple foods themselves. 
Then, to the extent that they produce for the market, they will be 
affected negatively, and not at  all if they meet their needs from their 
own production. Thus here again the outcome is not clear. Pro- 
ponents of vegetarianism could argue that food aid could be given to 
compensate the losers and indeed, if the money not spent on meat 
could be used for aid, vast resources would become available for 
poverty alleviation. But does food aid help, or does it compete with 
local farm production? At a more general level, is increased aid 
desirable or does it create dependence and distortions? 
Increase Production in Developed Countries 
Rich countries tend to generate agricultural surpluses in the sense 
that they produce more than they consume and that they cannot 
easily find customers abroad who are willing to buy excess produc- 
tion at profitable prices. So, their governments subsidize exports, 
and this is a costly proposition. At the same time, yields continue to 
grow through advances in agricultural and processing technologies. 
To limit government budget outlays, acreage restrictions and pro- 
duction quotas are imposed. Would relaxation of these restrictions 
help the poor, allowing more food to be produced? Would techno- 
logical advances, such as in the field of bioengineering help? The 
answer is the same as in the case of vegetarianism. It is hard to take 
a position without further analysis. The poor may not have 
sufficient purchasing power to "attractn the increased production. 
Large farmers may be helped more than the poor. Monocultures 
that cause environmental degradation may be favored. Countries 
may have to run into debt to finance the necessary investments, and 
farmers may become dependent on purchases of hybrid seeds and 
other inputs; some call this modernizing hunger (Raikes, 1988). 
Defenders of the view that technology can bring the solution could 
add that increased production would allow increased food aid, as 
with vegetarianism, but this case is weaker because it does not indi- 
cate the source of funds for the food aid. 
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Reduce Production in Developed Countries 
Developed countries do not only incur costs from agricultural sur- 
pluses because their disposal is costly. Intensified agricultural and 
livestock production is also causing increasing environmental prob- 
lems and may even contribute to climatic changes (see Brown, 
1988). The circumstances under which animals are reared in 
developed countries are being increasingly criticized, and have led to 
calls for the further reduction of agricultural production, or at least 
of its growth, mainly through constraints on yields per hectare and 
the number of animals kept. After the discussion of the earlier cases 
it is not so clear that such a move would help the hungry elsewhere. 
More Aid 
To the extent hunger emanates from poverty, the most direct way to 
combat hunger in the short run would be to transfer income to the 
poor and, in the long run, to equip the poor with more personal and 
material endowments to enable them to earn higher incomes. 
This is now a widely held opinion. It appears that even 
bumper crops may coincide with famines (Sen, 1981; Drkze, 1988) 
unless the income entitlements of the poor are maintained and pro- 
tected. Giving food aid only, say grain, may in this connection be 
counterproductive because it may reduce purchases of food on the 
domestic grain market and thus reduce incomes and production 
incentives for the farmers (von Braun and Huddleston, 1988). More- 
over, as food aid makes people less poor it will lead to increased pur- 
chases of other commodities as well, and these may to a certain 
extent have to be imported. Thus, food aid must be given as an 
income transfer to the poor and must be supplemented by balance of 
payments support (for some suggested schemes see Reutlinger, 1988; 
Peterson 1988). In reality, food aid is often used to pay civil ser- 
vants or is sold on the open market to finance government expendi- 
ture. If the funds obtained in this way are used appropriately (such 
as for infrastructural investment), this is not objectionable, but 
there is only a thin line from there to pure corruption, where govern- 
ment officials appropriate foreign aid to supplement their own 
incomes. Thus, aid utilization needs to be carefully monitored and 
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food aid in particular given only on the condition that  it is used well 
and accompanied by specified domestic reform (Srinivasan, 1989). 
However, in specifying such conditions more is needed than a 
simple statement that  the aid should not be misused. For aid to 
alleviate poverty in the long run, it must be invested well and this 
requires detailed knowledge of the economic environment of the 
country in which one is operating. The study reported here is far 
too crude to deliver such investment scenarios. All it can do is to 
assess the contribution that  increased foreign aid can make to allevi- 
ate the hunger problem and point to findings of more detailed 
studies. The issue to be focused upon is whether solutions such as 
those listed above could work without increased foreign aid in the 
"trade not aid" tradition of Prebisch (1964) and, if this is not so, 
what broad levels of aid are required and what would be their 
impact on food and agricultural markets a t  large? 
Aid in Cash and Kind to Target Groups 
Hunger does not always stem from insufficient income. Low stan- 
dards of hygiene and traditional attitudes toward women or children 
may result in hunger even when purchasing power is increased (see 
Payne, 1985; Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988). It then becomes imperative 
to  monitor where hunger actually occurs and why. Recent empirical 
evidence suggests that  for the very poor (i.e., those who receive less 
than 80% of their caloric requirements and who spend more than 
80% of their incomes on food), calorie intakes may not improve very 
much with increased incomes (Behrman, 1988; Lipton, 1988). This 
may be due in part to adaptive behavior; the very poor may work 
less hard and need fewer calories as they receive more income, or 
they may assign higher priority to  other needs such as shelter or 
clothing. At any rate, if the hungry spend a large part of their extra 
incomes on nonfood items, as appears to be the case, it may become 
quite expensive for the aid donors to improve nutrition via higher 
income transfers. Thus targeted measures to increase the nutri- 
tional intakes of only those who need them - such as price subsidies 
on the foods that  only the poor consume or school meal programs - 
may be more cost-effective than global economic measures. Nutri- 
tionists often take such a curative view and indeed, if scarce aid 
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funds can be used to relieve the hungry, this view has important 
merits. It can yield concrete action with clearly visible results, and 
can proceed in a piecemeal way without having to wait for general 
policy reform at the national and international levels. Nevertheless, 
many 'doctorsn and monitoring agencies will be needed to identify 
the hungry and to implement programs without leakages, although 
this may also generate a significant degree of paternalistic interven- 
tion into hungry people's daily lives. Moreover, increased targeted 
aid may have significant consequences for the economy as a whole 
and may even aggravate the hunger problem if it leads to serious 
deterioration of farm prices. 
This problematique is generally recognized, that overall 
economic interventions do not pay sufficient attention to the partic- 
ulars of weak groups in society and the targeted and curative inter- 
ventions neglect the overall causes and impacts. This dialectic ten- 
sion between two approaches is natural, and possibly healthy, and 
will never be overcome in a completely satisfactory way. 
1.3.2. T h e  need for a n  integrated analysis of policy options 
These suggestions have several elements in common: they have 
some intuitive appeal; they have been voiced in the media; and they 
each contain convincing elements. At the same time, they are con- 
tradictory and only speak about the poor who might gain, and not 
about the poor who might lose. 
It may be true that suggestions have to be simple to be imple- 
mentable. Simple messages are not only useful in communication 
through the mass media; they can also oil the workings of the 
bureaucracies that will have to implement them. Still, the analysis 
underlying such suggestions may not be simplistic. The interests at  
stake are too important for that. 
An integrated view is required, pointing to the relative merits 
and weaknesses of the various opinions. Such a view needs a com- 
mon framework of analysis with which to evaluate the various 
suggestions, and it needs to bring in as many considerations and 
effects, both main and side effects, that are relevant to the analysis. 
It also needs to have more than just rhetorical power. If the 
integrated view has firm theoretical and empirical foundations, i.e., 
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the assumed relationships are in accordance with accepted theory 
and are inferred from observations of reality, the rhetorical power 
may be added to it by some of its readers. The analyst is happy if 
his arguments are convincing, but it must be more important for 
him to be right. It is from that perspective that this study has been 
written. Fortunately, an economic theory that provides an integrat- 
ing framework is available. It provides an overall approach to the 
problem which, when given sufficient empirical elaboration, allows 
positive conclusions to be drawn. These conclusions may not neces- 
sarily be right; they merely follow logically from clearly stated prem- 
ises, according to rules that are not convincingly rejected by the 
empirical evidence. This falsifiability principle has guided the 
research reported here. 
The work has been performed out of the conviction that this 
model-building approach is the scientifically valid way to proceed, 
since it enables statistical data to be integrated with economic 
theory, the relative merits of solutions to be tested, and new sugges- 
tions to be made. It would be too ambitious to claim that this study 
provides a complete integration of the many aspects of policy 
analysis for alleviating hunger. Many dimensions of the evaluation 
of suggested solutions to the hunger problem, such as political 
acceptability, administrative feasibility, or sociological suitability, 
have to be judged outside the analytical framework that has been 
used here. 
1.3.3. The effective use of good intentions 
At this point it may be useful to ask what we actually mean by a 
solution. Each policy suggestion is actually a call for change and 
leads to the question of how to realize this change. For this 
engineers may look to economists, economists to political scientists, 
and political scientists to media experts who then sell the message. 
This is not the line taken here. In our view, the good intentions and 
moral values of individuals both on the receiving end and on the giv- 
ing end are the key agents in resolving the hunger problem. These 
intentions should be served well. Scientific research that provides 
insight into what helps, what is counterproductive, and what is 
ineffective is conducive to putting good intentions to better use. 
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Most of the suggestions presented in this section stem from 
good intentions. Some may show parallel lines of interest between a 
particular lobby and the poor, but the fact that such parallel 
interests are used explicitly by many lobbies proves that the fate of 
the poor does carry political weight. However, conflicting views that 
stem from good intentions can be inhibiting to the point of paralyz- 
ing change. This is why an integrated approach to policy evaluation 
is of more than research interest. 
1.4. Plan of the Book 
In Chapter 2 we attempt to provide broad historical and descriptive 
perspectives to the current problem of poverty and hunger. In 
Chapter 3 the current functioning of the world food system is 
sketched. Chapter 4 introduces the main features of the Basic 
Linked System, an economic simulation model of the world food sys- 
tem. Using this model, scenario simulations were performed to test 
suggestions for alleviating hunger. Those that are meaningful 
without being able to resolve the hunger problem are presented in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the more promising alternatives, 
which appear to involve increased flows of international aid, fol- 
lowed by a discussion on whether such increased aid flows can real- 
istically be expected to occur. Chapter 7 provides a summary and 
conclusions. 
The purpose of this report is to convey our main findings and 
ideas. The technical details of the simulation tools used have been 
documented elsewhere (Fischer e t  al., 1988), as have the main 
findings in the area of trade policy (Parikh e t  al., 1988). This is a 
global study and, as such, it can be expected to be rather crude and 
at times superficial on specific details. The practical implementation 
of policy suggestions cannot be derived from it, nor can commodity- 
market forecasts be obtained. More detailed studies at  country or 
commodity level are bound to receive the criticism of being partial. 
This report builds upon such studies and recognizes their value in 
an attempt to provide an understandable, global picture. 
CHAPTER 2 
Characterization of the 
Food Problem 
2.1. Historical Retrospective 
In searching for the causes of the hunger problem, if one focuses on 
economic statistics one is often restricted to time series going back 
at  most 30 years. By comparing some of these statistical levels and 
trends one may find significant differences, some of which can be 
attributable to processes that  took place within that 30-year period, 
but many others that  can only be understood by going back much 
further. More important, to  understand why some population 
groups today are consistently vulnerable to deprivation one must 
identify not only the forces that account for change but  also those 
that  conserve and maintain the status quo. For this reason we start 
with a historical account, although this can only be cursor and is 
bound to  be biased and impressionistic at  best, and with which 
many historians may disagree. All we will do here is to draw some 
lines from the past to the present, referring the reader for details to 
the literature, such as The Geography of Hunger (JosuC de Castro, 
1954) and A Study of History (one-volume edition, Toynbee, 1972). 
The history of humanity has been successful in the sense that 
population numbers have multiplied at  an  increasing rate (see Table 
2.1). Developments in technology have made it possible for 
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Table 2.1. The doubling time of world population. 
Year 
Population 
(million) 
Growth rate Doubling time 
(years) 
Sources: Ehrlich, 1972; Kuznetz, 1965; and World Bank, 1988. 
humanity to survive in ever-growing numbers. In the early days 
new defense techniques made it possible for the physically relatively 
weak Homo sapiens to hunt rather than to be prey. Fire kept preda- 
tors away and made it possible for humans to survive in cold 
regions. Eventually, the domestication of animals enabled them to 
live in larger concentrations allowing for better defense and division 
of labor, but also for wars among tribes and the development of 
slavery. 
Throughout history technological breakthroughs have found 
applications in the military as well as in the productive spheres. 
This in turn has generated new scarcities and resources that  could 
be owned and accumulated, either privately or publicly. This is 
shown in Table 2.2. World history cannot be summarized in one 
table; all that  we can do is indicate tendencies. The dates may be 
different in various regions of the world but the table nevertheless 
conveys some trends, of which a few may be highlighted. 
Before 1850 
In the course of history, improved technology in agricultural produc- 
tion, storage, and transportation have allowed an increasing number 
of people to abstain from work on the land for a t  least part of the 
year. The newly gained free time was spent only to a small extent 
on cultural activities; most of it was used in military operations. 
Wars were usually followed by the annexation of the resources of the 
conquered peoples, so that  larger, hierarchically structured societies 
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emerged. However, the size of these societies was limited by the 
scope of control of the conquerors and also simply by the limited 
populations in the conquered territories. Some small societies were 
able to survive in silence on the sidelines, but the larger empires 
were highly visible. They were based on sedentary agriculture and 
as such were vulnerable to attacks by nomads; their continued 
existence depended on their capacity to produce or extract food sur- 
pluses to feed their armies. They weakened when the surpluses 
declined due to population growth and the absence of technical p r e  
gress in agriculture, or when farmers rebelled against extortionary 
policies. Each time the sedentary farmers' empires lost their defen- 
sive strength, the nomads who largely depended on the extensive 
livestock grazing were able to tear down fences around the empires, 
invade, and take over the government. However, their limited 
experience in administration forced them either to rely on existing 
elites or to assimilate gradually, and this in turn made them vulner- 
able to new invasions. Such a process of invasion and assimilation 
(or occasionally expulsion) of invaders followed by new invasions has 
occurred in most of the deltaic regions and plains of the world - in 
China, India, Russia, Western Europe, the Middle East, or South 
America. 
The process of recurrent invasions lasted until the greater rich- 
ness of the sedentary population allowed them to develop artillery 
that was heavy enough to withstand attacks and to decimate the 
nomads' light cavalry; in Europe this occurred during the Renais- 
sance. This technological breakthrough thus enabled the farmers to 
take the initiative. Land development and the improvement of 
infrastructure, leading to higher agricultural productivity, could take 
place behind more secure borders and enhanced financial means to 
support government and armies. Wars were no longer fought 
against invaders but between sedentary societies to conquer more 
land and to expand access to financial means. This competition gra- 
dually led to the emergence of nation-states. In the European Mid- 
dle Ages the lack of opportunity for migration forged strong ties 
between farmers and their land, but a national consciousness did not 
yet exist. Languages varied widely within kingdoms; it took in 
Europe until about the nineteenth century to produce a strong sense 
of nationalism, after more struggles between rulers and resulting 
transfers of territories. Until about that time people felt more 
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Table 2.2. Inventions and their consequences in Europe. 
perioda Food technology Military technology 
500000 BC Stoneluse of fire 
40000 Fire making 
7000 Livestock keeping Horses/dogs 
6000 Domestication of 
cereals 
4000 Irrigation works, Copper utensils, wheel, 
draft animals mills, script, infrastructural works 
750 
AD 450 Improved cavalry and navy 
1000 Medieval fortresses 
1400 Tea, spices, tobacco Improved navigation techniques (maps, compass) 
1500 New varieties: maize Heavy artillery 
and potato in Europe; 
wheat in America 
1850 Tractors, fertilizers 
1900 Refrigeration Tanks, trucks, airplanes, machine guns 
1950 High-yield varieties Nuclear weapons, rockets 
pesticides 
1980 Biotechnology 
a ~ h e  dates are only rough approximations. 
Sources: Compiled mainly from Langer 1972; An Emyclopedia of World Hiatory; 
and Grote Spectrum Em yclopedie, 1977. 
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Table 2.2. Continued. 
Other technology Social consequences New resources 
Defense and hunting Labor 
Access to cold areas, survival during 
cold periods, food preparation 
and conservation 
Stock accumulation, need Livestock-grazing 
for larger communities lands 
Pots, textiles Storage and transportation, townships Land 
with specialization: farmers, artisans, 
and soldiers; first taxes on farmers 
Cities, standing armies to protect Access to irrigation 
against nomads and other cities buildings 
Literature and Founding of large empires with inter- Money 
law, money nal trade; colonies finance, government, 
army; army maintains unity 
Intrusion into Europe by Arabs, Huns, 
Normans; great migration, disinte- 
gration of Roman Empire 
Small units led by feudal landlords; 
no migration 
Great discoveries, new 
consumption habits 
Renaissance in Increase in agricultural surplus, 
arts and science migration 
Printing 
Industrial revolu- 
tion, steam engines 
(railroads, ships) 
vaccinations, 
hygienic 
improvements 
Mass production 
Telecommunica- 
tions, computers 
Less need for labor and horses on farm Machines, mines, 
leading to increased farm surplus and markets, land 
labor availability, increased demand in the colonies 
for fuels and minerals (wood & coal), 
industrial inputs such as cotton 
from colonies, more education for 
industrial workers in Europe, 
backwardness in colonies 
World Wars I & 11, freezing natural 
borders, decolonization, strengthening 
of police force inside state 
Frozen international system, multi- Patents for high 
nationals, development aid technology 
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closely associated with cities or regions than with nation-states. 
National passports or visas were nonexistent, and migration was 
possible for those who had the money to move. It took the invention 
of so-called hereditary enemies to give the notion of the nation-state 
a more concrete content. 
In other parts of the world similar processes took place at 
different times. For many centuries China was able to secure its 
borders against most invasions by northern nomads and to 
strengthen its national cohesion for long periods. From the seven- 
teenth century, however, European developments became dominant 
worldwide with the expansion of their nation-states into colonial 
empires and the progressive subjection of other sedentary societies. 
Political and military developments continuously affected 
demography, the supply of farm labor, the availability of rural 
infrastructure, resource distribution, etc. Countries with severe 
food-supply problems tended to be conquered or to conquer their 
neighbors. It may be argued that starvation was to a large extent 
mitigated by the military system, since the poor could enlist as mer- 
cenaries. The starving could also emigrate, as did the Irish from 
1846 to 1851 to escape the famine caused by a potato blight. The 
famine killed about a million people, and some 2 million others 
sought refuge in emigration, particularly to the United States and 
Canada. Foreign aid was nonexistent; emigration was the only way 
out. But such an option is not open today to those who are facing 
starvation in many developing countries. 
After 1850 there was a rise in labor productivity in agriculture and 
a dramatic fall in death rates. This can in part be attributed to 
increased food supplies and to improved hygiene and medical care. 
The increased labor force was largely absorbed in the still highly 
labor-intensive manufacturing sector. Improved transport at ion 
using steam power had shortened the lines of communication 
between the colonies and their motherlands. Until that time, the 
colonies had largely been used as sources of high-value products 
such as precious metals, spices, and slaves; in effect, they were used 
as trading posts, mines, and plantations. The indigenous popula- 
tions of the colonies were largely excluded from the process. To 
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supply the raw materials for the newly emerging industrial powers 
in Europe, this strategy had to change; the local peoples had to  be 
incorporated into the colonial process, and the colonies administered 
more effectively and protected from invasions by jealous competi- 
tors. This was a hard task for the colonial powers. Nations without 
colonies abroad, such as Germany[l] and Japan, could develop 
quickly under the prevailing regime of international free trade. Such 
nations became a permanent threat to the empires of Britain, 
France, the Netherlands, and Portugal, whose colonies were far 
away and had a wealth of resources to offer. Two world wars esta- 
blished that the system was nonviable. A period of frozen borders 
and inward-looking policies followed upon World War I, and by the 
end of World War I1 all of the old colonial empires were in the pro- 
cess of collapsing. 
The victorious powers of World War I1 - the United States and the 
Soviet Union - had the strongest voice in deciding the the fate of 
colonies; they had gained the authority to redraw the political map 
of the world. The USSR (more accurately Russia) had experience 
with administration of adjacent lands in the south and the east in a 
colonial fashion and, it may be fair to  say, chose such an option in 
Eastern Europe also. 
The US was left with the main responsibility for the organiza- 
tion of the rest of the world. Its military successes in the field and 
its use of the atomic bomb had made clear to the world that US 
power was pervasive. However, the US had little experience in the 
formal administration of colonies, although its relations with Latin 
America and the Philippines showed many colonial traits. More- 
over, the majority of Americans felt that it had itself been oppressed 
by colonialism in the past (although Native Americans obviously 
view this somewhat differently). Thus the US called for decoloniza- 
tion. Previously colonized territories were cut loose from their 
motherlands at  an accelerated pace. Power was handed over to 
representatives of local independence movements, who had often 
spent a large part of their lives in prison. Colonial armies that had 
largely performed a role of police and administrators were with- 
drawn in haste. The task thrown upon the new postcolonial 
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governments was difficult, or even impossible in some cases. The 
legacy inherited by these new governments consisted of: 
Frontiers that had been drawn by outsiders on the basis of old 
colonial boundaries. Guaranteed borders under the newly 
created United Nations made these arbitrary frontiers virtually 
immutable, even when they were drawn deliberately to create 
weak nations. Only in few cases were new nations the result of 
long struggles. 
Ethnically diverse populations which happened to live inside 
the borders at the time of independence, often without a com- 
mon history or a joint struggle for independence, so that a 
sense of national identity had insufficient time to develop. 
Little or no experience in self-administration, obstructing the 
way toward nation building and economic development. 
Economic structures geared to the supply of raw materials for 
the former motherlands. 
National integrity that could only be maintained through arms 
purchases abroad. The weapons mainly served to maintain 
law and order domestically, and also established the military 
as the strongest player in the nation in the political arena. 
The principle of national sovereignty over their own popula- 
tions and territory, which blocked traditional migration across 
the new borders and obstructed international capital flows. 
After 1945 nearly all world resources had been assigned to 
their new owners, the nation-states. Only Antarctica, the oceans, 
and outer space had not been allocated. How these new nations 
would fare was considered to be first of all their own responsibility. 
The old colonial powers were preoccupied with their own postwar 
reconstruction and with new crises, this time in the East-West rela- 
tionships. 
The magnitude of the problems thrust upon the new countries 
became clear only slowly. Development assistance began in the 
1960s, but was initially seen as a temporary transitional feature of 
international relations. The plight of newly independent Africa gra- 
dually changed this view, but development assistance has always 
been plagued by doubt about its effectiveness and the dominance of 
donors' other concerns in setting their global priorities. No doubt, 
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the media have helped to increase popular awareness of mass 
poverty and starvation, but it has done little to increase develop- 
ment assistance. Increased awareness of hunger and poverty tends 
to translate into aversion toward nondemocratic regimes in poor 
countries, which seem to care more for themselves than for the 
hungry within their borders. Also, the apparent success stories in 
development seem to relate more to those countries' own efforts 
than to the flow of development assistance and thus add little incen- 
tive for more aid. 
In the race for development the former colonies face many han- 
dicaps. Some can thus perform vastly better than others, particu- 
larly when they are small and well-located. No doubt, policies can 
help if there are resources to be allocated; in that sense aid can help 
too. But for the superficial observer relying on the media, actual per- 
formance and achievement count, not constraints and lack of 
resources. And the success stories of Pakistan in the 1960s, Taiwan 
and South Korea in the 1970s, and Ghana or Turkey in the 1980s 
are held up as examples to be followed. Unfortunately, much of 
what can be learned from those cases has little to do with the stub- 
born problems of development nor of external assistance. 
The Right to  Food 
In recent years there has been growing awareness of the subbornness 
of hunger in many parts of the world and a perception that effective 
measures are available with which to eradicate it. It has been 
observed (see Grigg, 1985) that the hunger problem only began to be 
labeled the "world food problem" after 1945; since then it has been 
seen as a problem in (and of) some countries, rather than as a global 
social problem. 
Nevertheless, the international order envisaged at the start of 
the race for development did recognize poverty and hunger as a 
social problem. This is reflected in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which was adopted and proclaimed on 10 December 
1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Article 25(1) 
of that Declaration reads: 
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Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of liveli- 
hood in circumstances beyond his control. 
The Declaration further demands that member nations should, "by 
progressive measures, national and international, ... secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observancen (see Omavale, 
1984). 
Since 1948 generations of legal experts have further interpreted 
this Declaration. Conventions have been signed by states and 
details have been worked out (see Eide et  al., 1984), but these con- 
ventions do not provide for economic resources with which to exe- 
cute them. The main contribution of the Declaration has been to 
outline what is considered to be just. To turn the aspiration of the 
right to food into an effective instrument, resources must be allo- 
cated. In turn, this depends on international cooperation to give 
shape and content to human solidarity, or may even be based on the 
perceived self-interest of the rich. Individuals may occasionally 
appeal to the Declaration and, more importantly, governments can- 
not openly reject it. The Declaration increases rulers' accountability 
to the public at  large. Nevertheless, for a long time as far as poverty 
is concerned it has been no more than a declaration of intent that is 
alien to day-to-day contracts and exchanges. 
In recognition of the right to food, and realizing that 
insufficient progress can be reported with regard to the hunger prob- 
lem, numerous nongovernmental organizations have been set up 
over the last two decades. Their common objective is to help allevi- 
ate hunger, but it is difficult to measure what impact they have had 
on the developing world. 
2.2. Current Food Supplies and Distribution 
When countries start with widely different resource endowments, it 
is only natural to expect widely different levels of per capita food 
availability. Beyond that, the record of improvements during the 
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past 30 to 40 years shows expectedly wide disparities among coun- 
tries. Development policies pursued during those years can only to 
a limited extent explain the broad range of performance. 
By the early 1960s, when decolonization was largely complete, 
the world had been divided into what became known as developed 
and developing countries. Neither the former nor the latter were 
homogeneous groupings, as gradually became recognized by the 
international organizations that collect and disseminate worldwide 
statistics. In a world consisting of about 170 countries and terri- 
tories, there is a need to aggregate statistical data and for that pur- 
pose several different classifications have been made. Over time 
countries can move from one group to another, and this reduces the 
value of comparisons by country groups over time. Also, at a higher 
level of aggregation, statistics can provide only a cursory view of 
world food and agriculture. Country aggregates also have the disad- 
vantage of not being representative of the economic and political 
bodies that act as players on the global stage. The aggregations 
presented in Table 2.9 are based on those used by the World Bank 
and FAO, with some slight adaptations. 
On average, people in developed countries have higher 
incomes, eat more, and generate agricultural output with fewer peo- 
ple working on the land and tending livestock than in developing 
countries. Within the latter group there are considerable differences 
between country groups, depending on income levels and geographic 
location. Over time, differences appear to have grown except for 
food intake levels, which improved in most developing regions, with 
low-income Africa and India as the clear exception. 
Improvement of the food situation in many parts of the world 
is remarkable when noting the rapid growth of population. Food 
production stayed ahead of increasing populations over the past 20 
years in the developing countries at least in the aggregate, but also 
for the largest ones (particularly China) and for broad groupings of 
the others (see Table 2.4). 
People in developed countries, and to a lesser extent also in 
middle-income developing countries, not only eat significantly more 
than those in the low-income countries, but also enjoy more varied 
diets. Table &.5 shows, for the main country groups, the composi- 
tion of food intakes. It demonstrates the predominance of cereals in 
the diet of the developing countries, which together account for 
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Table 2.3. Main characteristics of world food and agriculture, 1965 and 
1985. 
Population Daily kcal Per capita % of labor 
(million) per capita income ($) in agriculture 
Country group 1965 1985 1965 1985 1965 1985 1965 1985 
World 3,310 4,794 2,400 2,675 605 2,699 58 52 
Developed market 
economies and 
Eastern Europe 693 818 3,120 3,402 2,073 11,167 16 9 
Developed centrally 
planned economies 333 392 3,221 3,388 - - 41 26 
Low-income developing 
countriesa 1,716 2,633 1,973 2,312 90 308 77 7 1 
China 717 1,040 1,932 2,569 90 320 81 74 
India 495 759 2,100 2,132 100 290 73 70 
Other Asia 329 528 1,816 2,192 65 360 72 62 
Africa 175 306 2,072 2,092 94 236 84 78 
Middle-income 
developing countries 532 882 2,337 2,758 299 1,612 56 44 
Asia and Pacific 123 197 2,166 2,609 188 1,414 62 5 1 
Middle East 75 1202,4703,191 202 953 64 50 
Other Africa 92 170 2,109 2,347 153 1,078 69 60 
Latin America 242 395 2,461 2,732 437 1,771 45 32 
Major oil-producing 
countries 36 69 2,388 3,588 544 8,529 55 36 
a~ncome less than US $500 per capita in 1985. 
Sources: World Bank, 1988; and FAO, AGROSTAT, 1988. 
Table 2.4. Population growth and food supplies, 1965-1985, in develop- 
ing countries. 
Population growth Food production 
Country group (%/year) per capita (%/year) 
All developing countries 2.2 0.8 
China 2.0 2.6 
India 2.3 0.4 
Other low-income countries 2.7 0.3 
Middle-income countries 2.4 0.7 
Source: F A 0  Production Yearbook, various years. 
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more than three-quarters of the world's population. Yet they pro- 
duce less than half of the world's grain output. This reflects not 
only their lower per capita food intake, but also the high proportion 
of grains fed to animals in developed countries. In addition, it 
makes clear why developing countries have become major net grain 
importers. Through imports they have been able to increase domes- 
tic food supplies or a t  least have avoided further deterioration in the 
face of rapid population growth (see Table 2.6). 
The high intake of animal products in developed countries - in 
terms of calories, particularly protein - indicates the substantial use 
of grain for livestock feed: in other words, the indirect consumption 
of grains by humans. At the world level, close to 50% of all grains 
are consumed by livestock, indicating the importance of indirect 
grain demand. 
The developing countries started out as exporters of agricul- 
tural products, which had a share of almost 80% in their own sales 
abroad and of 45% in world agricultural trade (both excluding oil). 
In recent years, however, their agricultural imports have caught up 
with sluggish export growth, causing their agricultural trade bal- 
ances to move close to deficit. Food imports, particularly grains, 
have increased rapidly. Grain balances and use are shown in Table 
2.7, where the role of the industrial market economies as the largest 
suppliers of grains to the world market can be noted. 
North America, Oceania, the EC (mainly France and the 
United Kingdom), and South America (mainly Argentina and 
Uruguay) are the main grain-exporting regions. Some exporting 
countries such as Thailand are located in other regions, but by and 
large the important grain exporters have one feature in common: 
they are either European countries or former European colonies in 
temperate zones with fertile land and relatively low population den- 
sities, largely of European origin. Although we only present data for 
grains, for other food commodities the picture is quite similar. 
North America, the EC, and Oceania virtually monopolize the 
export markets for dairy products. With regard to meat and sugar 
Latin America is important as well. Asian and African countries are 
poorly represented in the lists of large food exporters, with Thailand 
as an exception. 
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Table 2.5. Relative contributions of commodity groups in nutrition, 
1983-1985 average. 
Other veg. Animal 
Country group Cereals products products 
% of calories 
Developed market economies 26.1 42.2 31.7 
Developed centrally planned economies 
and Eastern Europe 36.7 35.9 27.4 
Low-income developing countriesa 67.6 25.6 6.8 
Middle-income developing countries 49.5 38.0 12.5 
% of protein 
Developed market economies 24.9 14.5 60.6 
Developed centrally planned economies 
and Eastern Europe 36.8 12.4 51.7 
Low-income developing countriesa 64.1 20.5 15.4 
Middle-income developing countries 48.6 19.4 32.0 
a Income less than US $500 per capita in 1985. 
Source: FAO, AGROSTAT, 1988. 
Table 2.6. Per capita changes in staple food production, imports, and 
consumption in developing countries, 1970-1986. 
Production Imports Consumption 
Country group (%/year) (%/year) (%/year) 
Developing countries 0.71 4.32 1.24 
Low-income food-deficit countriesa 0.81 2.89 1.39 
Africa -1.25 4.82 0.37 
Near East -1.23 7.87 0.78 
Far East 1.22 0.75 1.59 
Latin America -0.66 3.53 0.88 
a Sixty-nine countries with GNP per capita of less than US $940 in 1987, net ce- 
real importers on average from 1983-1984 to 1987-1988. 
Source: FAO, AGROSTAT. 
We now examine the situation from the import side. Table 2.7 
also indicates that for grains the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
are the largest importers (40%) followed by the major oil-producing 
countries (16%), Africa (16%), and Asia and the Pacific (15%). 
Except for Eastern Europe, the large food grain importers are the 
oil-exporting countries in arid zones, city-states (Hong Kong, 
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Singapore), and heavily industrialized countries in Asia (Japan, 
South Korea). The case of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is 
somewhat different. Although rapid government-induced industrial- 
ization in the previous century had led to some neglect of food pro- 
duction, food deficits today are largely due to economic policies 
which since the 1920s have failed to promote food production. 
Developing countries that have experienced food problems over 
the past decades do appear on the list of food importers although 
their role is not predominant. India and China, for example, have 
remained only modest importers. They have deliberately refrained 
from importing more, partly to preserve their foreign exchange for 
capital goods and energy imports, partly to protect their own farm- 
ers, and partly to maintain national security. We shall return to 
this in Chapter 6. Even if these policies had not prevailed, China 
and India would not have had the financial means to import 
amounts of food that would be significant on a per capita basis, and 
this also holds for most of the other countries with food problems. 
The identification of the world's major food importers raises 
the issue of national agricultural policies. It would be simplistic to 
relate food imports directly to the failure of agricultural policies. 
Hong Kong, for example, can afford and can be expected to import 
food, but for less developed countries the need to import food has 
often been regarded as a sign of failure because, with populations 
largely dependent upon agriculture for their livelihoods, it would 
seem that the agricultural surpluses should be sufficient to feed the 
nonfarm sector. However, when the agricultural sector is heavily 
involved in the production of nonfood crops such as cotton or coffee 
for export, this is not obvious, nor is it evident that the land 
resources are necessarily sufficient to feed the population (see FAO, 
1984). 
2.3. Recent Trends 
A look at recent trends in world food production permits further 
differentiation among regions. The clear deterioration in the situa- 
tion in Africa is the main unfavorable development since the mid- 
1970s. Grain yields are low and stagnating (see Table 2.8) while 
populations are growing rapidly, at around 3% per year, and are 
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Table 2.7. The world grain market, 1983-1985 average. 
% of Net 
Production world imports 
Country group (mln tonnes) production (mln tonnes) 
World 1,598 100.0 ( - 1 1 . 5 ) ~  
Developed market economies 553 34.6 -113.2 
Developed centrally planned 
economies and Eastern Europe 257 16.1 41.5 
Low-income developing countriesa 578 36.2 16.6 
China 301 18.9 5.9 
India 146 9.1 1.2 
Other Asia 102 6.4 2.8 
Africa 29 1.8 6.7 
Middle-income developing countries 198 12.4 27.0 
Asia and Pacific 46 2.9 5.5 
Middle East 3 5 2.2 11.4 
Africa 19 1.2 9.7 
Latin America 98 6.1 0.4 
Major oil-producing countries 12 0.7 16.6 
'income less than US $500 in 1985. 
 eman and equals production plus net imports; it includes food, feed, seed, indus- 
trial use, waste, and stock mutations. 
showing no sign of stabilization. In the Far East grain yields have 
increased substantially, largely due to  the expansion of irrigated 
areas under high-yield varieties. The population growth rate is 
about 2.2% per year and is slowly falling. In China the increase in 
grain yields has been accompanied by a significant reduction in birth 
rates, leading to  a population growth rate of about 1.2%. As a 
consequence, per capita food supplies are now adequate. In Latin 
America, where population increases are about 2.3% as opposed to  
2.5% in the 1970s, land resources are often abundant and it is the 
uneven access to  these resources of different population groups that  
has created problems. 
Thus, it seems that some large areas in the world are strug- 
gling their way out of the most critical situations, although the race 
between food production and population has not been won by pro- 
duction as yet. Per capita food consumption in 105 developing 
countries increased on average by only 0.6% per year between 1961 
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Table 2.7. Continued. 
b % of % of Self- Demand world feed in Production Demand sufficiency 
(mln tonnes) demand demand (kglcapita) (kglcapita) ratioC 
Defined as production as percentage of demand. 
d~rnport-export gap in data source caused by statistical discrepancies and 
delivery lags. 
and 1983. Population growth absorbed 80% of the increase in food 
supplies, and 77 countries had lower than average growth in con- 
sumption per capita, and of these 40 had even negative trends 
(IFPRI, 1988). 
It is of little help to say, however rightly, that there is more 
than enough food in the world to feed everyone. This has been the 
case over the past two decades (in the years 1983-1985 average con- 
sumption was 2665 calories per person per day, compared with an 
estimated average need of 2380). Even if this had not been true one 
could still refer to the fact that 46% of grains were consumed by 
livestock. From this point of view, the world today already pro- 
duces enough to feed more than twice its current population, 
although the diets would be less diverse. Many developed countries 
have problems in containing farm production rather than in expand- 
ing it. There is nothing new about this. It has been known for 
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Table 2.8. Some recent trends. 
Index of food production Grain yield (tonnes 
per capita per hectare 
(1979-1981 = 100) harvested) 
1976- 1983- 1969- 1983- 
Country group 1978 1985 1971 1985 
World 99 103 1.81 2.44 
Developed market economies 96 101 2.88 3.58 
Developed centrally planned 
economies and Eastern Europe 108 107 1.65 1.95 
Africa 104 94 0.80 0.85 
Latin America 99 99 1.48 2.03 
Middle East 101 98 1.21 1.46 
Far Eastern market economies 99 107 1.33 1.87 
Asia centrally planned 92 117 2.08 3.71 
Source: FAO, 1985 (statistics for the world as a whole only become available 
with a two- to three-year delay). 
many years that malnutrition results from poverty, and that poverty 
results from lack of access to productive resources. 
2.4. The Occurrence of Hunger 
Trends do not show the most dramatic occurrences of hunger - fam- 
ine. A famine may be viewed as a sudden, epidemic spread of 
hunger, which is such that the population not only functions badly 
due to inadequate diets, but actually dies in large numbers. Famine 
is the less silent form of hunger. Chronic hunger as opposed to fam- 
ine increases infant mortality rates and adult morbidity, but it does 
not necessarily kill and if it does, it is often indirectly through 
related diseases. It maims, physically and mentally. Table 2.9 lists 
the main causes of recent famines. It also shows that government 
policy was related to its causes in only a few cases. 
When a famine is caused by drought or floods, one may speak 
of it as a natural disaster, but it would be too easy to say that 
natural disasters cannot be avoided. For example, in 1987 major 
floods occurred in Bangladesh and a major drought in India, neither 
of which resulted in famines. When food stocks are adequate and 
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Table 2.9. Major famines since 1960. 
Country/ Estimated deaths 
Period Region Main causes (million) 
1959-1961 China Policy, weather 25.00' 
1967-1970 Nigeria Civil war 2 . 5 0 ~  
1971-1972 Bangladesh War 0.43' 
1972 India Drought 0.83' 
1973 Sahel Drought 0 . 1 0 ~  
1972-1974 Ethiopia Drought 0.20; 
1974 Bangladesh Flood 1.50 
1979 Cambodia Policy, war 0.45' 
1979-1981 Uganda Civil war, drought 0 . 2 5 ~  
1983-1985 Ethiopia Policy, civil war, drought 1 .20e 
1988 Sudan Civil war 0 . 2 5 ~  
O~rhun,  1989. In different sources, mortality estimates that differ by wide mar- 
gins - in part due to variations in the number of years included - are also avail- 
able. In Brown et d., 1984, an estimate of 8,890,000 is given for the period 
1960-1961. 
Grolier Academic Encyclopedia, 1983. 
c Brown et d., 1984. 
d~ lamgir ,  1980. 
e Giorgis, 1989. However, widely divergent mortality estimates also exist for this 
famine; Brown et d. ,  1984, give an estimate of 30,000 for 1983. 
~fr ica  South of the Sahara 1990 (p. 959). 
are securely stored for emergencies such as floods, public distribu- 
tion systems may greatly help to avoid famine and foreign aid can 
be used to supplement and replenish the stocks. 
Droughts and floods are often caused by long-term environ- 
mental degradation such as deforestation, which is caused by human 
intervention. Also, even when rainfall or the flow of a river cannot 
be controlled, dams, ponds, pumps, and canals can help stabilize 
water supply throughout the year. Famines are caused by variabil- 
ity in food production and real incomes. Buffer stocks and water 
basins are appropriate ways to stabilize food supplies. More per- 
vasive than famines and more stubborn also is chronic malnutrition 
(see Tablesl.l, 2.10, 2.11, and2.12). 
The data consistently show that sub-Saharan Africa and south 
Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) 
are the most worrisome cases - Africa because the situation is 
deteriorating so rapidly, and south Asia because the scale of the 
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Table 2.10 Prevalence of energy-deficient diets in 87 developing coun- 
tries, 1980. 
Insufficient calories Insufficient calories to  
for an active working prevent stunted growth 
life (below 90% of and serious health risks 
FAO/WHO (below 80% of FAO/ 
requirements) WHO requirements) 
Share in Share in 
Country group population Population population Population 
or regiona (%I (million) (%) (million) 
Developing countries (87) 34 730 16 340 
Sub-Saharan Africa (37) 44 150 2 5 90 
East Asia and Pacific (8) 14 40 7 20 
South Asia (7) 50 470 2 1 200 
Middle East and North 10 20 4 10 
Africa (11) 
Latin America and the 13 50 6 20 
Caribbean (24) 
OThe 87 countries represent 92% of the population in developing countries in 
1980, excluding China. Numbers in parentheses are the number of countries in 
the sample. 
'Wake at this standard is sufficient for a person to function at full capacity in 
all daily activities. 
'intake at this standard is sufficient to prevent high health risks and retardation 
in children. 
d ~ h e  low-income countries had per capita incomes of less than US $400 in 1983; 
the middle-income countries had per capita incomes above US $400 in 1983. 
Source: World Bank, 1986. As the World Bank uses different assumptions in 
relation to income distribution than the FAO, the data shown here give larger 
numbers of undernourished people than Table 1.1. 
problem does not seem to be lessening with time. To explain these 
developments an in-depth analysis is required, but for now we pro- 
pose the following characterization of countries where hunger can be 
found: 
(1) Poor countries with poor land (e.g., the Sahel) and poor coun- 
tries with good land, yet high population density, few mineral 
resources, and an agriculture-based industry or a government- 
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Table 2.11. Changes in the prevalence of energy-deficient diets in 87 
developing countries, 1970-1980. 
Insufficient calories Insufficient calories to 
for an active working prevent stunted growth 
life (below 90% of and serious health risks 
FAO/WHO) (below 80% of FAO/ 
requirements) WHO requirements) 
Change % Change % 
in share change in in share change in 
Country group of popu- number of of popu- number of 
or region lation people lation people 
Developing countries (87) -0.06 +10 -0.02 +14 
Sub-Saharan Africa (37) +0.01 +30 +0.04 +49 
East Asia and Pacific (8) -0.27 -57 -0.14 -57 
South Asia (7) +0.03 +38 +0.02 +47 
Middle East and North -0.25 -62 -0.14 -68 
Africa (11) 
Latin America and the -0.07 -15 -0.04 -2 1 
Caribbean (24) 
See the footnotes to Table 2.10. 
Source: World Bank, 1986. 
Table 2.12. Protein-energy malnutrition among children under the age of 
five in developing countries. 
Country group 
or region 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Near East/North Africa 
South Asia 
Southeast Asia 
China 
Latin America/Caribbean 
Number of children 
(million) 
Percentage of 
age group 
Developing countries 149.3 152.5 157.9 40.0 36.9 34.8 
Source: World Food Council, 1988. 
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controlled internationally weakly competitive manufacturing 
industry (India). 
(2) Countries with adequate resource endowments, but rapid 
population growth rates, inefficient agricultural technology, 
and (frequent) wars and civil unrest (e.g., Southern and East 
Africa). 
(3) Countries with ample resource endowments, yet unevenly dis- 
tributed access to land and education (e.g., Brazil and Colom- 
bia). 
It would be premature to derive policy conclusions from such a 
rough classification, but it seems that for countries in category (1) 
the problems are most clearly economic in nature, relating to 
efficient factor accumulation and allocation, and to poverty allevia- 
tion programs. To resolve these problems, technical and economic 
assistance may help not only in making efficient choices but also in 
showing the world how difficult the problems are and that vast 
amounts of foreign aid may be required to overcome them. 
For many countries in category (2), wars will have to end 
before any significant improvements can occur. It makes no sense to 
build dams or roads that may subsequently be blasted away. Efforts 
to improve education are also disrupted by warfare. On the other 
hand, peace may not ensure freedom from hunger or oppression. 
We have seen earlier that wars have been conducive to creating 
viable political units, allowing for migration and reallocation of land. 
It is hard to believe that this is a historical necessity today; it should 
be possible to obtain viable units by less harmful means. 
Countries in category (3) do not suffer from wars. They have 
ample means but lack adequate social security systems that can act 
as safety nets for people in need. There, as elsewhere, the need to 
respect national sovereignty creates dilemmas; is it acceptable for 
the developed countries to exert political pressure on a government 
or a ruling elite simply because they believe their policies to be 
unacceptable? Would this be moral imperialism, ethnocentrism, 
etc., or simply moral behavior? However relevant this question may 
be, further discussion would mean that we would prejudge the case 
by taking it for a fact that the hunger problem often stems from a 
lack of fair national policies. 
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2.5. Aid and Aid Requirements: 
Some Back-of-the Envelope Calculations 
If all hungry people were living in one single place without any rich 
around them, it would barely take US $21 billion annually to pro- 
vide them with sufficient food.[2] This would amount to a contribu- 
tion of US $20 per capita, or just 0.2% of the total incomes of the 
developed market and centrally planned economies. This is a mod- 
est amount. If, more realistically, it is a matter of supplementing an 
inadequate diet, for example, to the tune of one-quarter or one-third 
of what is deemed adequate, the cost would be reduced to some US 
$5 to 7 billion, which is almost shamefully modest. 
Unfortunately, the poor are not so easy to reach. As a conse- 
quence, the cost may be considerably higher when attempting to 
meet their food needs. They are widely spread throughout the 
world, and the aid given to them also leaks on to richer segments of 
the population unless it is adequately targeted. For example, low 
food prices benefit the rich also; the benefits of improved irrigation 
systems accrue in the first place to those who possess land; producer 
subsidies go to  those who have the capacity to produce. In short, it 
is difficult and costly to design and implement measures that would 
mainly benefit the hungry. Higher levels of aid are needed to com- 
pensate for this "loss factor," which is unfortunate because a higher 
loss factor may reduce donors' willingness to give. 
However, there also seems to exist a misunderstanding in this 
respect, in that the rich may also gain from a specific measure, and 
this fact is not in itself an indicator of a loss. Aid means that goods 
are to be purchased and in some way channeled to the poor. Some- 
one has to sell the goods and services involved; otherwise aid would 
have no cost. Those who sell may gain from it, but, if the prices and 
the quality of those goods are appropriate, there is no loss involved. 
Nevertheless, a loss factor remains. But even if we suppose 
that only one-tenth of the given aid reaches the poor, the amount 
required remains modest. It is only when we take into consideration 
that aid cannot continue to  be given indefinitely, and that invest- 
ments are needed that will enable the poor to become self-reliant in 
the future, that the amount really becomes large, because then it has 
to be multiplied again by a factor of anywhere from 4 to 10. On the 
other hand, future generations of rich people could be asked to 
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contribute as well, implying recourse to capital markets for a 
significant part of the funds, this time with donor governments as 
borrowers rather than the recipients, who would receive the 
amounts borrowed as grants. 
These back-of-the-envelope calculations may give some indica- 
tions of the magnitude of the level of aid involved. Currently, the 
rich give very little to resolve the hunger problem. The rich cannot 
expect this level of aid to resolve the issue, nor can they expect the 
developing countries to resolve all problems by themselves. They 
could give more without impoverishing themselves. We return to 
the question of why the rich should give aid to the poor in Chapter 
6. 
Notes 
[l] Germany became a colonial power relatively late and lost her colonies after 
World War I. 
[2] Assuming that they had no food before, which is pessimistic, but that they 
would be fed with commodities which are priced and have a calorie con- 
tent of wheat (130 million tonnes of wheat priced at US $160 per tonnes 
c.i.f. AsianIAfrican ports. This would give 2400 kcal per day to the 512 
million people estimated by F A 0  to be hungry in 1983-1985, assuming an 
energy content of 3450 kcallkg of wheat). It may be observed that F A 0  
finds a maximal amount of 260 million tonnes after more elaborate calcula- 
tions that take into account a leakage to the nonfood-deficit population, 
the current level of nutrition and the specific requirements of the popula- 
tion in each country (FAO, 1985). 
CHAPTER 3 
Functioning of Food Systems 
3.1. Introduction 
Hunger in the sense that it is a world food problem and a universal 
concern is a recent phenomenon, even though hunger has been with 
humanity throughout its history. This change in the awareness and 
perception of hunger probably has as much to do with the growth of 
communications in the last decades, as with the thought of many 
that it should be possible to do something against it or even to erad- 
icate it. Surpluses produced in the developed countries which go to 
waste or are fed to  animals lead simply and directly to  the question 
why simultaneous chronic hunger elsewhere should be tolerated. 
The factors that  account for disparities in access to  food were 
given a historical setting in Chapter 2; understanding why such a 
situation of global inequity in food distribution has arisen over the 
course of the centuries is, however, only the first step. The next 
step concerns the question of how the system functions within this 
setting. The inheritance handed to present generations and to  their 
governments circumscribes the progress that could (and can) be 
made. One should not underestimate the achievements of some 
countries, nor the worldwide ability to  meet the food needs of most 
of the people that  have been added to our global numbers. 
Nevertheless, the numbers of chronically hungry have risen, slowly 
but steadily, and have accelerated in times of economic distress. 
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To understand the operation of the barriers that stand in the 
way of reaching the hungry, we now describe the system that deter- 
mines food demands and supplies, and which creates hunger and 
gluts simultaneously. The system that causes food demand to differ 
as much as it does, between countries and between people, is also 
capable of shipping large quantities of food across the globe, but 
apparently little to those in most need. Within this system govern- 
ments operate, changing by their policies the availability and alloca- 
tion of food, sometimes outside as well as within their own borders. 
Before suggestions can be given for policy changes that may benefit 
the hungry, even before analytical tools can be usefully built to 
study policy alternatives, one first needs to understand the operation 
of the food system. In the context of this report, views on its opera- 
tion guided the formulation of the analytical tools described in 
Chapter 4 and applied in Chapter 5. 
No attempt is made at  this point to give value judgments and 
moral imperatives, yet it is difficult to avoid indignation when 
describing the inequity with regard to food, or to refrain from 
expressing preferences for some policies and dislike of others, for 
other than purely economic reasons. Nevertheless, that is what this 
chapter will attempt to do, leaving a discussion of relevant moral 
arguments to Chapter 6. 
What constitutes a food system? In an economy where food is 
both produced and consumed, the term conjures up a picture of the 
many activities that make both of these activities possible and in 
fact integrates them. Obviously, transporting, storing, and process- 
ing are part of any food system, but so also are the production and 
acquisition of the implements and inputs for the production and the 
processing of the food itself. 
The traditional rural subsistence household that produces all 
the food it needs, plus a bit more to pay for other needs, thus 
qualifies for the definition of a food system virtually by itself. Iso- 
lated rural villages qualify even more so, as inputs external to the 
household - for production and processing, the hoe and the cooking 
pot - are locally produced in exchange for locally produced food. 
This type of local food system stands in sharp contrast to food sys- 
tems in the industrial countries where local self-sufficiency is no 
longer the aim, nor the imperative. The link between production 
and consumption has become a long and distant one, the producer 
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no longer knows who consumes his or her output and the consumer 
usually has no information about the origin of what is being eaten. 
Nevertheless, a food system exists; for many people, but not for 
all, it has become a world food system, production and consumption 
interacting through worldwide markets. Not so for all, as in many 
developing countries significant parts of production serve to meet 
village or local food demand. And even for those subject to the 
interaction of global markets, most of their food originates within 
their own national boundaries. Out of the total world food produc- 
tion, only about 15% crosses national borders. Within the world 
food system not all people are equally subject to global interaction. 
For some - a declining part - the economic costs of participating in 
wider markets are too high due to distance and an inefficient infra- 
structure. For others - the major part - unhampered participation 
is limited because of government regulation. 
There is also another door through which governments enter 
the scene. Neither the need for food nor its production are static 
over time, as populations and incomes grow, new technologies are 
adopted, and market integration proceeds inside the developing 
countries. Investments are needed to change the world food system 
over time. Many of the services required for agricultural develop- 
ment can only be provided sensibly by collective action, such as 
agricultural research, infrastructure improvements, and education. 
Particularly important are investments in land improvement such as 
leveling and terracing, drainage and flood control, and irrigation. 
Thus, both private and public sectors play a significant role in a 
dynamic world food system. 
Apart from the fact that government efforts in these areas 
determine to a large extent the future growth of agricultural sup- 
plies, such investments also entail a cost to the government, adding 
to those already to be incurred for maintaining national security and 
domestic law and order. These costs need to be recovered and con- 
stitute the justification for taxation. In countries with diversified 
economies the tax burden can be spread over a broad array of collec- 
tion points, but in many developing countries their dominant agri- 
cultural sector is bound to pay a significant part, if not all of it. 
Leaving out the role of governments from a definition of the world 
food system, therefore, appears to be an impermissible omission. 
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As a major part of activity and interaction takes place at the 
national level, food systems are first discussed at  that level (Section 
3.2), after which the international food economy is addressed in Sec- 
tion 3.3. In each section it is asked what people can or cannot do for 
themselves to  gain access to the food they need, and what scope 
exists for governments to influence food availability and its distribu- 
tion. 
3.2. National Food Economies 
National economies can be as different in their food systems as in 
any other economic and social dimensions. Efforts to classify coun- 
tries are the pastime of many analysts. Rather than submit to any 
such rigor, we attempt here to describe some of the general features, 
some major differences, and some options usually considered by 
governments in the formulation of their policies. For specific typolo- 
gies or country references we use the material of Chapter 2. 
In this section we address, in turn, the main economic actors in 
any system, including the food system. First, the determinants of 
food demand are discussed, followed by those pertaining to supply; 
we conclude with a review of the role and objectives of national 
governments. International trade is referred to only in passing, 
since most of that topic comes under the subsequent discussion of 
the international food economy (Section 3.3). 
3.2.1. Food demand 
Incomes 
Food is a basic human need that is indispensable at  some minimum 
level for survival. Poor households may, therefore, need to spend 
80% or more of their incomes to obtain a minimum intake of the 
cheapest available foods. With rising incomes their levels of food 
intake will change, initially by increasing the quantity consumed of 
their usual fare but subsequently by adding to the variety of the diet 
and the addition of more expensive food items. Thus, total expendi- 
tures on food tend to rise with incomes, but the share of food in 
Functioning of Food System 
3 
'? 
m 
CO 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
1::i::::: 
......... ......... ......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
yyi:;:; 
.i ....... ::::::::: 2  
......... ......... 
......... 
:I::::%:: 
......... 
- ....... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
ti::::::: 
....;. ... .ijiifii!; 
......... ......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
........ 
:i:::j::: ......... 
......... . 
:it:::::: 
........ ......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
pfiiiiifi 
..( ...... P""l 
d 
9 
0 
CO 
........ 
......... 
.... -. . 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
........ .I  
......... ......... 
......... 
......... 
......... : '  
......... ......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... ,"...... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
........ I 
......... 
::.:: .... I .... . 
...... t.
......... ......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
... " .... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
........ : 
......... ......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
::::::::: 
........ A:::: ......... 
......... , "* 
9 
m 
w 
........ ......... 
........ 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
......... 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........ 
........  
....... 1 
........ :I.:.::: .. I. ... 
........ 
...: .... :::.::::
........ ........ 
....... 
....... ,  i . 
....... 
:::::::: . ...... 
:i!Xiiii 
........  IYi 
Expenditure ( R ~ / m o n t h / ~ e r s o n )  
Figure 3.1. Perceived adequacy of calorie intake: share of total income 
spent on food in India. 
total expenditures declines at the same time, except at very low lev- 
els of income. In India, for example, it is possible from detailed con- 
sumer and household income surveys to determine the income level 
at which food expenditures begin to show a significant and steady 
decline as a percentage of income. Once people raise their incomes 
above that level, apparently the worst of their food shortage is 
passed and they are in a position to spend an increasing share of 
their higher income on nonfood items (see Parikh and Tims, 1988, 
and Figure 9.1). Although each demarcation line for hunger or for 
poverty is by nature arbitrary, the inflection point in the line 
representing the share of total income spent on food is probably one 
of the best, with people and households with incomes below that 
point being clearly in a position where food shortage is the overrid- 
ing concern. 
With further increases in incomes the demand for staple foods 
increases only modestly and soon reaches a saturation level. In 
developing countries the income elasticity of items like rice or 
sorghum thus declines with rising incomes. Elasticities larger than 
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one initially, but also declining with higher incomes, are observed for 
the "preferredn foods such as meat, dairy products, and fruits and 
vegetables (see Table X I ) ,  yet there are significant differences 
between countries, depending on traditional food habits. In the 
Indian subcontinent the consumption of milk is high, even at  low 
levels of income and therefore the income elasticity for dairy pro- 
ducts is found to be low. In contrasts, the population of China is 
only recently beginning to consume significant quantities of milk, 
thus exhibiting a high income elasticity for dairy products at  rather 
high income levels. 
Table 3.1. Selected income elasticities for basic food staples and meat at 
different income levels, 1980. 
Country 
Ethiopia 
India 
Indonesia 
E ~ Y  pt 
Nigeria 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
Per capita income (8) 
140 
240 
430 
580 
1,010 
2,090 
3,630 
Basic food staples Meat 
Source: FAO, 1979. 
The Composition of Food Demand 
With further increases in income, saturation becomes the main 
feature of a larger number of food items. The quantity of food a 
human being needs has both upper and lower boundaries, neither 
sharply defined nor generally valid around the world, but which are 
nevertheless clearly discernible. Minimum food intake is usually 
found at  1400-1600 kcal per person per day, for slightly built people 
in warm climates. An upper boundary is about 3500 kcal per person 
per day for sturdily built people in cold or temperate climates. 
Expenditures are found to shift with further income increases to 
more expensive and processed foods for the same or only marginally 
higher amounts of calories. With higher incomes animal protein 
tends to be substituted for plant protein (see Figure 3.2). 
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USA 0-• 
Egypt 
Ch ina India 
Per cap i ta  i ncome (16, l o g  scale) 
Figure 3.2. Relation between per capita income and share of animal pro- 
tein in total protein, 1963-1965 and 1983-1985 averages. Sources: FAO, 
1988; World Bank, 1988. 
This shift to more expensive food takes two forms. One is the 
substitution of expensive items for cheaper items; the other is by 
way of further processing outside the consuming household, 
lengthening the chain from the agricultural producer to the consu- 
mer, and providing the latter with an ever-increasing range of "con- 
venience" foods. Eating out in restaurants can also be included in 
this category. Both the shift to more expensive foods and the 
growth of processing imply that high-income consumers spend a 
much larger proportion of available income on food than is strictly 
necessary for an adequate diet. Nevertheless, that proportion may 
in fact be only some 20% of income in many industrial countries, or 
even less. Japan is an exception to that rule - at comparable 
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income levels Japanese consumers spend close to 30% of their 
incomes on food. One reason may be the high relative prices of food 
due to the high protection provided to Japanese farmers, particu- 
larly for rice and meat; another reason is the strong preference for 
quality food. It is interesting to note in this respect the relatively 
low nutrient intake in Japan in comparison with other industrial 
countries. 
Demand for Crop Products at High Income Levels 
Saturation of demand per capita for an increasing range of food 
items implies that at higher income levels the direct demand for food 
represents a weakening market for unprocessed agricultural pro- 
ducts. At the same time, more processing does channel a growing 
part of the consumer's food expenditure to the processing sectors, 
rather than to farmers. However, it is unlikely that the agricultural 
sector will be brought to stagnation due to saturation of consumer 
demand for food, at least as long as population grows. The demand 
for preferred foods such as meat and dairy products may, in the 
early stages of a country's development, still be met by animals 
which get the bulk of their feed from grazing and from crop sector 
by-products. But these feed sources are limited in most countries 
and are not necessarily the most nutritious. The demand for animal 
products may soon set in motion a process to increase reliance on 
cultivated fodder and grain for animal feed, thus creating additional 
demand for the crop sector. The growth of demand for animal pro- 
ducts thus creates new demand for grain for feed when direct consu- 
mer demand for grain is already saturated. As stated earlier, 46% of 
all grain produced worldwide are currently fed to animals. 
Food Demand and Nutrition 
The role of nutrition as part of food consumption is only one of the 
elements in the food equation. No doubt, at low income levels the 
search will be for commodities that provide a maximum of calories 
for a given amount of money, or even for expansion foods which 
make the consumer feel saturated (Tabor, 1989). But even in those 
situations detailed nutrition studies (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988) indi- 
cate that improvements might have been possible for the same 
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expenditure. As mentioned in Chapter 1, even at  low income levels 
the link between calorie intake and income is not straightforward. 
With higher incomes, the turn toward more expensive or processed 
foods may to some extent also serve the purpose of enriching diets in 
beneficial ways, but food traditions, tastes, and the desire to reflect 
status through the foods being eaten play an increasingly important 
role. It would therefore be wrong to equate the utility of food con- 
sumption with the nutritional qualities of the food purchased. The 
utility embraces a much broader range of qualities than only nutri- 
tive values. Particularly - but not only - at higher income levels 
both the quantities and the nutritional values of much of the food 
eaten may even have a negative correspondence with human health 
and an appropriate diet. 
Other Factors 
The demand for food depends to a large extent on incomes, but 
prices also play a role. We noted above that to some extent pat- 
terns of food consumption and calorie intake in Japan may reflect 
relatively high food prices. The relatively low cost of meat in some 
Latin American countries entails high meat consumption for given 
income levels. Price policies and their effects are discussed in Sec- 
tions 3.2.3 and 3.3.2. 
The most powerful engine of world food demand growth is 
increasing population. Compared with food production growth over 
the past 25 to 30 years of about 2.6% per year, population rose by 
2.2% per year and thus absorbed virtually all additional supplies, 
leaving only a small margin for the expansion of demand associated 
with income growth. 
A main feature of the food system as seen from the demand 
side is that at  high income levels there is food saturation on a per 
capita basis. As population growth generally falls with higher 
incomes, the demand for agricultural products stagnates. More pro- 
duction will then put pressure on agricultural prices, and the terms 
of trade for farmers tend to worsen in the process. Demand adjust- 
ments to lower prices will be marginal as consumers will not spend 
more on food but will instead use their gain in purchasing power to 
increase their demand for nonagricultural goods and services, includ- 
ing further processing of their food. 
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At the other extreme, in poor developing countries, population 
growth and increased food demand due to increasing incomes may 
together easily exceed the capacity of the agricultural sector to pro- 
duce sufficient quantities. Price increases may result, which may be 
exacerbated in years of unfavorable weather or floods. Price 
increases are particularly harmful for those among the poor who 
must obtain most or all of their food from the market, thus reducing 
their access to food. Price stability and timely access to imports are 
therefore high priorities for most developing country governments. 
Hunger, Again 
The characterization of countries in which chronic hunger occurs 
(see Section 2.4) showed that they vary considerably. Some are 
faced with constraints of arable land due to poor natural resources 
or population pressure. In others, farmers are constrained by a lack 
of technology, low levels of land and infrastructural development, or 
restricted access to land due to an inequitable distribution of owner- 
ship. Under these circumstances, we now examine the means by 
which the poorest households manage to obtain the minimal 
amounts of food necessary for survival. 
At this point we must recognize that it is easier to characterize 
the poor in this way than to explain why others with similar initial 
conditions have been able to overcome their handicap. Also, there 
undoubtedly exists something like good or bad luck. Pests, natural 
disasters, and wars often strike individuals at random and spare oth- 
ers. Such random events can have lasting consequences and one 
should avoid rationalizing these, or attributing skills or other 
resources to those who are better-off. Although at  the national level 
chance can perhaps be expected to play a lesser role, differences 
remain. Nevertheless, a few characteristics can be listed here with 
some degree of discrimination between the major regions where the 
hungry are most numerous. In large parts of Africa there is no 
immediate land scarcity but the levels of land development and 
technology are such that yields of staple crops are low and produc- 
tion is limited for each household by the amount of labor available 
during the main seasons when the land is worked (see, for example, 
Mellor and Johnston, 1984). Traditional farmers are mostly poor, 
and most of the poor are farmers, although this should not obscure 
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increasing landlessness in parts of Africa today. Strategies to 
improve the food situation in Africa will therefore focus to a large 
extent on improving the opportunities for agricultural development, 
which has been neglected for too long. 
In Latin America the rural poor have been barred from 
benefiting because land ownership is highly skewed. Many have 
given up and moved to the poverty belts of the cities where 70% to 
85% of the population now resides. Most have no permanent 
employment and are part of the informal urban sector (see, for 
example, the discussion on Brazil in Martine, 1988). For them, agri- 
cultural development and employment is a passed station; they now 
need skills and urban jobs. 
The largest number of the hungry live in South Asia where the 
population pressure on limited land resources is high, even though 
major efforts have been made to improve the physical base of agri- 
culture. Figure 9.9 shows the prevailing situation in Bangladesh, by 
categorizing households according to main occupations, residence, 
and size of agricultural assets. In a situation of extreme resource 
scarcity three-quarters of all households cannot meet their minimum 
food needs; even medium-sized farmers who own land fall into this 
category. 
The largest and worst-fed groups, however, are not farmers 
but either landless farm laborers or other rural dwellers who earn 
their income in the transportation sector as cart-pullers or carriers, 
road workers, and the like. They constitute virtually one-third of all 
households and survive (or not) on about 1500 kcal per day, almost 
all from rice. Again, attention is drawn to the observation that food 
intake levels differ considerably at similar income levels; those asso- 
ciated with farm activities appear to eat more than those outside 
agriculture. At the same time, agricultural workers may use more 
energy and so in fact may not be better-off. 
Agricultural development in this situation derives its impor- 
tance from the need to increase food supplies ahead of population 
growth, but it is unlikely to provide the jobs needed to earn more 
adequate incomes. Employment must be found elsewhere - but 
preferably still in the countryside - which puts a premium on educa- 
tion and training. The need to create jobs outside agriculture 
acquires even more strategic importance when development succeeds 
in raising incomes of the population generally. The demand for food 
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Figure 3.3. Income and calorie intake in Bangladesh by socioeconomic 
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Source: World Bank, 1985. 
- though not necessarily for all agricultural products - grows more 
slowly than that for most other goods and services, and rising agri- 
cultural productivity squeezes out labor from the food-producing 
primary sector. The transition to an economy that depends increas- 
ingly on output and employment outside the food-producing sector 
continues to require a flourishing agricultural sector to contain 
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problems of severe unemployment. The focus shifts, however, to 
opportunities for producing nonfood agricultural products and to the 
processing of agricultural products. These issues belong, however, 
to the discussion of supply. 
3.2.2. Food supply 
Supply Fluctuations 
The instability of food markets can be traced largely to the produc- 
tion side and to the effects of weather variations, floods, and 
droughts. No country is immune to these influences and their 
impacts on food markets. Between countries there are significant 
differences in the variability of agricultural output due to weather. 
Relatively stable and reliable climates prevail in parts of Western 
Europe, North America, and parts of the tropics. The monsoon- 
affected countries such as India, or countries depending on the spate 
of the rivers such as Bangladesh and some West African regions, can 
be harmed by both too little or too much water arriving either too 
early or too late. Irrigation systems, to which we return, can reduce 
vulnerability to weather but cannot eliminate it entirely. 
The Role of Agriculture in Development 
After World War I1 and up to 1960 when the decolonization process 
took place, most observers of the developing world expressed limited 
faith in the potential of the agricultural sector to contribute to 
economic development (Leibenstein, 1962; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; 
Mahalanobis, 1961). The sector was viewed as traditionalist, unmo- 
tivated toward innovation, and at best capable of producing only a 
small proportion of the additional food needs associated with 
development and modernization in the urban centers. Some coun- 
tries wanted to rely for urban food supplies on modern (sometimes 
expatriate) farmers or on state farms. In many countries price poli- 
cies for crops centered on the production of export crops, both to 
earn foreign exchange and to generate government revenues. To 
achieve the latter, governments strongly intervened in the export 
crop trade and drove wedges between world market prices and 
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prices paid to farmers. In order not to distort the relative earnings 
of domestic versus export crops, intervention in food crop markets 
was needed. Low food prices benefit all those who buy part of their 
food in the market, but particularly the urban populations. This 
pattern of thought and of policy action has, unfortunately in hind- 
sight, significantly influenced the development strategies of many 
countries. It has contributed to growing dependence, coinciding 
with the then prevailing view in North America that the disastrous 
developments in agriculture during the 1920s and 1930s should not 
be allowed to recur. Policies were therefore designed to ensure 
access to growing world markets for the staple products that they 
could supply competitively. At that early stage food aid was already 
one instrument, but not the only one, used to pursue this objective. 
For the United States, the creation of the FA0 was also an element 
of the same world view (see Hambidge, 1955). 
In developing countries perceptions have since changed consid- 
erably, particularly since the mid-1960s when it became clear what 
these strategies led to, and in which respects they were ill-conceived. 
One of these concerns the slow growth, price vulnerability, and more 
recently world surpluses of most developing country export crops. 
Another is that most of the Asian countries (except China, which 
followed an entirely different course) became dependent on grain 
imports, not only in years of disappointing harvests, but also in the 
best years. Although food aid did to some extent lighten the bur- 
den, the quantities of imports required exceeded food aid available 
to them and necessitated larger commercial imports. Food aid was 
also seen as a threat to independence. It is to be noted, however, 
that this perception concerning import dependence frequently 
tended to see food aid and food prices in world markets as the main 
cause. But in fact there are several examples, starting from the days 
of the Marshall Plan, and followed by a number of countries in the 
Mediterranean area and in Asia, which show that food aid can go 
hand in hand with a thriving agricultural sector. The neglect of 
agriculture by developing countries themselves has in most cases 
been the source of domestic imbalances, rising foreign exchange 
costs of imports and increasing dependence on food aid. 
The need to reappraise agricultural strategies coincided with 
new opportunities to develop agriculture. In the mid-1960s new 
varieties of wheat and later of rice were developed which promised 
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significantly higher yields when accompanied by prescribed dosages 
of fertilizers and adequate and timely water supplies. The response 
of farmers to the new technology, particularly in irrigated areas, 
exceeded expectations and in turn necessitated a reassessment of 
views held about the responsiveness of farmers to economic incen- 
tives. Although in most Asian countries it has taken many years to 
shift policies toward a more favorable stance regarding agriculture, 
in most of them some sensible balance has been achieved over time 
in their development strategies. 
In Africa agricultural policies similar to those that had pre- 
vailed in Asia have persisted longer and are now in the process of 
being adjusted. The need to do so is increasingly, but still reluc- 
tantly, recognized by African governments in the wake of a disas- 
trous period when the long-term trend of agricultural production 
lagged significantly behind population growth. But what appears to 
be missing is the coincident opportunity, as improved technologies 
have limited scope for application due to a weak infrastructure of 
transport, organized markets, adaptive research, and extension, 
combined with the virtual absence of water control and usually 
unreliable weather conditions. The African problem is further 
aggravated by very large urban-rural income differentials and the 
power of urban populations to pressure their governments to main- 
tain low food prices. 
Physical Resources 
Land is the basic resource for all agricultural production, but not all 
of the land is equally suitable for cropping or livestock grazing. 
Only a small part of all the world's land is suitable for either; crop- 
land currently utilized covers 11% of all land and requires large 
investments to be extended. 
The extent and quality of the land resources in the developing 
world is shown in Table 9.2 ; climatic suitability for rainfed agricul- 
ture is addressed in Table 9.9. The FAO/UNFPA/IIASA study was 
a global one, and by its comprehensiveness involved many assump- 
tions. The assessment may therefore involve large margins of errors. 
According to this assessment only about one-fifth of the soils in the 
developing world do not suffer from some kind of inherent fertility 
limitation. There are considerable variations in regional soil 
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Table 3.2. Dominant regional soils in the developing world in million 
hectares. 
SW South Central S E ~  
Soil type Africa Asia America America Asia Total 
Soils with no inherent 535.2 51.5 359.8 118.9 324.4 1389.8 
fertilitylimitations (18.6) (7.6) (20.3) (43.8) (36.2) (21.3) 
Soils with severe 
fertility limitations 
Heavy cracking 
clay soils 
Salt-affected 
soils 
Poorly drained 
soils 
Shallow soils 
Coarse-textured 
soils 
Semidesert and 
desert soils 
Miscellaneous 204.8 24.1 6.9 - 5.9 241.7 
(7.1) (3.6) (0.4) (0.6) (3.7) 
Total 2878.1 677.4 1770.2 271.6 897.6 6494.9 
a~xcluding  China. 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentages of totals. Some soils exhibit 
several of the characteristics listed and only the main limitation has been con- 
sidered in the generalized interpretation. 
Source: FAO/UNFPA/IIASA, 1983. 
resource endowments; southwest Asia and Africa having the lowest 
percentage of soils without fertility limitat ions. Table 9.4 compares 
potential arable land to  estimated land utilized in 1982 to 1984. 
Table 9.4 suggests that  large reserves of arable land are still 
available to  be converted to  agricultural use. However, some two- 
thirds of the potential reserve is concentrated in eight of the 93 
developing countries included in the data, the largest reserves being 
available in Brazil, Zaire, Angola, and Sudan. A major portion of 
the land reserve in these countries is currently covered by tropical 
forests and may cause severe environmental hazards if brought into 
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Table 3.3. Dominant regional climates in the developing world in million 
hectares. 
SW South Central S E ~  
Climate Africa Asia America America Asia Total 
Cold 
Severe temperature 9.1 113.7 60.8 
constraints (0.3) (16.8) (3.4) 
Warm/cool 
No severe temperature 
constraints 
Dry (0 days) 846.7 369.7 
(29.4) (54.6) 
Inadequate growing 487.9 72.6 
periods (1-74 days) (17.0) (10.7) 
Short growing periods 545.4 98.9 
(75-179 days) (19.0) (14.6) 
Long growing periods 969.2 22.5 
(180-365 days) (33.6) (3.3) 
Year-round humidity 19.8 - 119.7 
(0.7) (6.8) 
Total 2878.1 677.4 1770.2 
' ~ x c l u d i n ~  China. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of totals. 
Source: FAO/UNFPA/IIASA, 1983. 
agricultural production. Most cropland is found in the large deltaic 
regions of the world; most human concentrations are found there 
because historically they offered the best opportunities for long-term 
survival. These are the regions where many wars have been fought 
(see Chapter 2), but also where most of the investments in land 
improvement have been made to control floods, to drain excess 
water, to  construct terraces, or to irrigate. 
Technology 
Agricultural production requires inputs of human labor and of capi- 
tal in the form of implements and draft animals. The proportions 
differ according to place and time, and depend on the conditions of 
climate and soils, the crops to be grown, and the demands to be 
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Table 3.4. Potential arable land and land utilized in 1982-1984. 
SW South Central SE' 
Africa Asia America America Asia Total 
Potential arable landb 840 70 815 75 343 2 143 
% suitable for rainfed 
crop production 97 70 99 48 58 89 
Total use 225 68 160 3 5 280 768 
% of potential 27 97 20 4 7 82 36 
Rainfed use 217 53 152 29 206 657 
Lrrinated use 8 15 8 6 74 111 
a Excluding China. 
b~otential  arable land is derived from Alexandratos (1988) and may somewhat 
underestimate regional potentials in some cases due to incomplete country cov- 
erage of the underlying FA0 study. 
Source: Alexandratos, 1988; and FAO, 1984b. 
met. Local knowledge built up over centuries of experience tends to 
dominate farming methods in many parts of the developing world, 
permitting survival of households often under risky circumstances. 
The intricacies of cropping patterns, their links to livestock farming, 
and the ability to supply food, feed, energy, and building materials 
bear testimony to their long history. 
New technologies enter particularly in those regions that 
already provide secure access throughout the year and a reasonable 
degree of water control. Such developments change the traditional 
factor proportions and production patterns, and open economic links 
through markets that may have been only marginal. Most of these 
regions in India, China, or Indonesia are characterized by land scar- 
city, and small farmers are the dominant category - at least by their 
numbers, though not always in terms of their share of the land. 
Growing landlessness in most countries of South Asia, including 
migration flows to the cities, indicates the oversupply of labor in the 
rural areas of that part of the world. In China, where radical land 
reforms took place in the 1950s, strict controls on urban migration 
left a growing labor surplus in the rural areas that became visible 
with the rural reforms in 1978 and became the source of much 
industrial growth, with limited capital or access to technology, in 
small towns and market centers. Earlier efforts to educate the rural 
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population were an important factor in this development. Africa 
cannot progress quickly in terms of farm technology due to low lev- 
els of land development and rural infrastructure. 
Worldwide agricultural production has grown consistently for 
several decades a t  a rate exceeding that of population growth. More 
land has been brought under cultivation (including transitions to  
double or even triple cropping in newly irrigated areas) but the rate 
of expansion has clearly declined over time. Yield increases have 
gradually taken over as the main source of production growth, due 
to new technologies (seed, fertilizers, and pesticides in particular), 
better farming practices, and shifts to more rewarding crops. Agri- 
cultural growth has consequently become centered in those regions 
where conditions are relatively good and public investments have 
been made. 
Although agricultural production has so far grown faster than 
population, the question arises as to how long can it continue to do 
so in the light of growing populations with rising incomes. Both the 
expansion of the area under agricultural use and production 
intensification pose environmental problems. 
In the various scenarios to be presented in subsequent chapters 
one may note that the projections of global and national production 
levels are well below the global production potential, and they do 
not imply the use of chemical inputs and irrigation beyond reason- 
able levels. For example, in our reference scenario, fertilizer use in 
the developing countries is projected to increase by some 5% per 
year between 1980 and 2000. This is in line with projections used 
by F A 0  (1988, p. 137), where fertilizer use in those countries is 
expected to rise from 43 kilograms of nutrients per hectare in 1982 
to 1984 to 78 kilograms for each hectare in the year 2000, an annual 
increase in total use of 4.6%. This is still less than half the level of 
fertilizer application of some 165 kilograms of nutrients per hectare 
observed in the EC in recent years. 
Cultivated areas are often expanded through deforestation. 
When livestock grazing increases, village commons become degraded 
and forests are depleted. The intensification of agriculture based on 
chemical inputs and irrigation also leads to environmental problems. 
Chemical fertilizers and pesticide residues can cause water pollution, 
eutrophication, and loss of fish stocks. These, in turn, reduce pro- 
duction in agriculture. Similarly, irrigation without appropriate 
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drainage can lead to waterlogging and salination. The excessive 
exploitation of groundwater supplies lowers the water table and 
increases the costs of irrigation for all. Even the development of 
reservoirs for irrigation is often accompanied by the submergence of 
forests, deforestation in upstream forests, and accelerated soil ero- 
sion. These possibilities and the growing environmental concerns 
throughout the world require that we examine the significance of 
these effects in our analysis. 
While all these environmental effects can and do take place, 
reliable estimates of their quantitative significance for agricultural 
production are not available. Moreover, one has to recognize that 
most of these effects take place over long periods and many can be 
redressed, given adequate resources. Thus, saline soil can be 
desalinated; the Dutch have routinely turned the soil into fertile soil, 
in reclaimed polders although at enormous costs. Yet, postponing 
such costs for the future and, presumably, richer generation may not 
be too irrational. In any case, many undesirable environmental side 
effects can be prevented by using appropriate production techniques. 
While this will increase the cost of cultivation, the productivity of 
the global agricultural system can be maintained and even 
improved. Therefore, in our analysis of the hunger problem, with its 
relatively short time frame, environmental considerations are not 
included. We had, however, investigated the issues of sustainability 
in our research (see Parikh and Rabar, 1981; and Parikh, 1988). 
The main global environmental concerns of carbon dioxide and 
the greenhouse effect, the hole in the ozone layer, and acid rain can, 
in principle, affect agricultural productivity, but these effects, apart 
from their uncertainty, are not likely to create supply bottlenecks 
over the next two decades. Even the measures that may be taken 
over the next two decades to reduce these problems, such as the re- 
stricted use of chemicals, will not reduce global agricultural output 
significantly, but will increase the cost of applying the chemicals in a 
more targeted, effective way. More expensive food will make the 
problem of hunger that much more pressing and the conclusions of 
our analysis that much stronger. 
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Labor 
Almost 50% of the world's labor force (including farmers and land- 
less farm laborers) is engaged in agriculture. It includes most of the 
women who are registered as employed; in Africa the majority of 
farmers, particularly those growing food, are female. 
Constrained land resources and limits on resources to invest in 
land improvement contrast with a growing labor force, only part of 
which can be employed in agriculture. Few developing countries 
have the land resources to accommodate their growing rural popula- 
tions in agriculture, but even in those cases the limits will soon be 
reached or, in other cases, have been made effective by skewed land 
ownership. F A 0  estimates suggest that in the future at best one- 
third of the growth of the rural labor force, and maybe as little as 
one-quarter, will find employment in agriculture (FAO, 1981). The 
agricultural labor force is fully employed during only part of the 
year and the F A 0  estimates assume hardly any increase in the 
number of days worked per person. 
This picture is dominated by the situation in the land-scarce 
countries of Asia, with almost three-quarters of the world's agricul- 
tural labor force. A slow growth of agricultural labor demand and 
substantial seasonal unemployment may in fact be intensified by 
mechanization, particularly in countries where land ownership is 
skewed. Avoiding urban drift and increased rural hunger require 
the strong promotion of rural nonagricultural employment, in turn 
placing a premium on rural education. 
In several African countries employment in agriculture may 
increase substantially, since land availability is less of a constraint in 
Asia. The use of less suitable land may, however, reduce land and 
labor productivity and as a consequence more people will be faced 
with inadequate food and hunger, particularly in years of bad har- 
vests. At the same time, the ecological risks increase with the 
expansion of cultivated land. 
In many Latin American countries, the agricultural labor force 
declined during the 1960s and 1970s (see Table 3.5) - the only 
exceptions are Brazil and Mexico, where the agricultural labor force 
increased during the 1960s and declined in the following decade. 
Table 3.6 shows the share of the agricultural labor force in total 
labor for some developing countries. It has declined in all countries 
listed. 
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Table 3.5. Agricultural labor force in selected developing countries in 
thousands. 
Country 1960 1970 1980 1988 
Argentina 1,628 1,511 1,344 1,223 
Brazil 12,094 13,642 13,784 13,523 
Chile 763 669 604 593 
Mexico 6,169 6,500 8,341 9,161 
Venezuela 823 804 793 765 
Algeria 1,744 1,294 1,262 1,379 
E ~ Y  pt 4,330 4,812 5,158 5,761 
Kenya 2,838 3,755 5,837 7,217 
Nigeria 15,895 18,467 2 1,866 25,930 
Zaire 6,823 7,708 7,456 8,492 
Bangladesh 14,024 16,625 18,802 22,167 
China n.a. 336,229 406,131 451,179 
India 137,725 157,043 185,017 208,859 
Indonesia 26,061 27,149 32,180 34,351 
Pakistan 8,810 10,218 13,883 16,936 
Source: Own calculations from data reported in World Tables, fourth editions 
(World Bank, various years); F A 0  Production Yearbook (1988). 
The message from Tables 9.5 and 9.6 is that agriculture cannot 
absorb the growth of the rural labor force. As a result, people either 
migrate to the cities or rural underemployment increases. In Brazil, 
it is estimated that 13.5 million people migrated to urban areas dur- 
ing the 1960s and 15 million people in the 1970s (Martine, 1988). 
For South and Southeast Asia migration did take place, but not 
enough to avoid rising underemployment in agriculture. In rural 
China, where migration to the cities is strictly controlled, since 1976 
the growth of rural industries has taken up some of the slack in the 
labor force. The main reasons why agriculture is able to absorb 
smaller and smaller labor shares are the increasing mechanization of 
agriculture and the shortage of new land that can be cultivated. 
Pricing of Agricultural Products 
What has been the role of prices in this process of agricultural 
development? Several developing countries have discriminated 
against their agricultural sectors through negative protection and 
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Table 3.6. Agricultural labor share in total labor force in selected 
developing countries (in percent). 
Country 1960 1970 1980 1988 
Argentina 20 16 13 11 
Brazil 5 2 45 3 1 26 
Chile 30 2 3 16 13 
Mexico 55 44 37 31 
Venezuela 35 26 16 12 
Algeria 67 47 31 26 
Egypt 5 8 5 2 46 4 2 
Kenya 86 8 2 8 1 78 
Nigeria 73 7 1 68 66 
Zaire 83 79 72 67 
Bangladesh 87 8 1 75 70 
China n.a. 78 74 69 
India 74 72 70 67 
Indonesia 75 66 57 50 
Pakistan 61 59 55 51 
Source: World Tables, third and fourth editions (World Bank, various years); 
F A 0  Production Yearbook (1988). 
overvalued exchange rates. It appears from most of the available 
research (Mellor and Ahmed, 1988; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985) that 
higher agricultural prices relative to prices of all other goods and 
services exert in particular a long-term impact on agricultural 
growth through factor accumulation. In the short run there are pos- 
sibilities of positive effects through improved capacity utilization, 
but these tend to exhaust themselves quickly. FAO's study of price 
policies concludes that the 
total production response to prices is large enough for prices to  
matter, but low enough to rule out the possibility of increasing 
price incentives alone fueling sustained growth in agriculture. 
Raising them where those have been kept low, sorts its effect 
largely through the enhanced attractiveness of new technologies 
but these require new investments in water control, farm equip- 
ment and infrastructure services before they can be adopted. 
Resources take time to be mobilized for that purpose (Mundlak, 
1988)' and, if undertaken, will have an impact on agricultural 
growth only over the course of years. 
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Changing relative prices between different agricultural outputs 
has more immediate effects, by changing factor allocations between 
various crops and other outputs. Many governments have in the 
past shown concern with the demand and supply balance for a single 
agricultural commodity, and have therefore changed its price a t  
intervention points. The response of output can be significant, but 
not enough account is taken of the fact that part of this response is 
at  the expense of other products. Some of these products may sub- 
sequently become the focus of similar concerns and the cause of 
similar policy adjustments. Agricultural price policies thus often 
become a patchwork over time of incidental crop-specific measures 
without much of a view, or even objective, about the overall perfor- 
mance of the agricultural sector or about the needed coherence of 
the entire policy framework. 
Investment 
Much of the debate on price policies focuses on price levels and on 
short-run production effects, whereas long-run effects on production 
capacity through investment is treated less prominently. Nor is 
much attention given to the importance of stable price levels as part 
of investment-promoting policies or to the more structural measures 
by governments that can increase farmers' choices. These choices 
are most commonly discussed and analyzed in a short-run frame- 
work, concerning alternative output mixes, different technologies, 
and marketing channels. The instrument of price policy and the 
introduction of new technological packages can, however, run out of 
steam in terms of output responses or may even fail from the begin- 
ning when the economic and physical environments of farmers are 
not improved, lifting the constraints that inhibit their behavior. 
The limits of price and technology policies are most clear in large 
parts of Africa, even though yields are still very low, or elsewhere 
even when yields are already significantly higher. Parts of the 
Soviet Union come to mind as an example where the lack of process- 
ing infrastructure - including transport, storage, and distribution - 
puts a brake on the process of agricultural growth itself. 
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In the long run yields are upgraded not only through improve- 
ments of the land cultivated but also through the infrastructure pro- 
vided to allow better market access. The needs for research and 
effective extension follow logically, since they must provide and con- 
vey the new technologies adapted to the changing environment. 
Increasingly this will require farmers to be educated and trained to 
enable them to participate in the process of agricultural develop- 
ment. Progress in that respect has been patchy at  best. Some 
investments can be expected from the farmers themselves, perhaps 
by adding improved quality livestock to their herds, planting fruit 
trees, or treating soil. But the bulk of the investments requires 
either a difficult process of collective decision making by all farmers 
concerned - as in the case of irrigation facilities - or that a decisive 
role is played by the government. 
Many of the essential ingredients for increased yields and pro- 
duction can only be expected to be provided by the government if 
these are to be technically sound and mutually supportive. Invest- 
ments are needed in the areas of research and development; exten- 
sion, education, and training; roads, markets, and storage; and irri- 
gation, drainage, and flood control. By their very nature, all of these 
investments require government initiative and implementation for 
the common good; they should not be left to private parties. At this 
point we move to discuss the role of government in a wider context. 
3.2.3. The role of governments 
Intervention Needs 
National security and the maintenance of domestic law and order 
constitute the most basic tasks of any government. In developing 
countries governments also play active roles in promoting growth, 
equity (income parity), and food security. Food policies are impor- 
tant in both developed and developing countries. Several tasks per- 
taining to resource development have been mentioned above. Con- 
siderations of access for all play a role in the assignment of such 
tasks to a government, as in the case of roads, extension services, or 
education. The avoidance of unfair benefits to the few at the 
expense of many is a reason for not allowing irrigation systems to be 
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designed and executed by farmers themselves. Also the costs and 
the risks of investments in resource development may exceed the 
borrowing capacity of the potential beneficiaries, instead suggesting 
the need for government-led financing and the introduction of users' 
charges. Government investment programs for resource and infra- 
structure development are the building blocks for long-term develop- 
ment. 
Agricultural Policies 
Whatever the general extent of government interventions may be, 
virtually all do engage in activities that are directly concerned with 
the agricultural and food sectors of their economies. They do so 
particularly to protect the purchasing power of some or all of their 
citizens, such as groups of consumers, agricultural producers, or 
government departments (or their budget resources). These aims 
are usually pursued through price interventions designed to affect 
both their levels and their stability. Each government faces dilem- 
mas in the design of price policies, since it must compromise 
between imported instability and the domestic desire for stability, 
producer interests (high prices), consumer interests (low prices), and 
its own limited budget resources. Even so, price policies by them- 
selves are insufficient and must be accompanied by complementary 
non-price actions (Streeten, 1987). 
The means by which governments intervene and the extent of 
involvement differ widely among countries and over time. Some 
industrial countries, particularly land-abundant agricultural export- 
ers, are reluctant to intervene in price levels. European countries 
and Japan intervene to support farm incomes. But at the other 
extreme, governments in countries where food is a sizable part of 
consumer expenditures cannot follow that example. They prefer to 
intervene at least enough to ensure reasonable price stability of basic 
consumer goods and keep them rather low to limit inflation. 
Maintenance of adequate stocks, timely access to imports, a reliable 
crop forecasting system, and domestic procurement are the standard 
elements of these policies. Again, public investments in storage and 
stocks are needed, together with current outlays for reporting sys- 
tems and transport. 
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For several developing countries with large agricultural popu- 
lations and limited resources with which to promote their economic 
growth, there is one more dilemma concerning labor markets. In 
those countries, laborers migrating from agriculture may not find 
jobs in the nonagricultural sector or may push other laborers out of 
theirs. In such countries the large armies of urban unemployed will 
tend to force governments to keep food prices low, thus making it 
less attractive for farmers to produce and remain within agriculture. 
To promote food production in such countries governments have 
often resorted to subsidies on farm inputs. Clearly if in a move 
toward trade liberalization the input subsidies are removed first and 
food prices are left unaltered to keep the peace in the cities, then a 
change may easily occur where virtually everyone loses. The farm- 
ers will lose because of higher input costs and the resulting fall in 
output; the urban unemployed will lose because of food scarcities 
and increased migration from rural areas; and the government will 
lose because of the need to purchase food abroad to maintain food 
availability in urban areas at reasonable prices. 
The difficulty facing many governments in rich and poor coun- 
tries alike, and in market as well as centrally planned economies, 
concerns the issue of stability at what costs. Many have been wil- 
ling to do so at  all costs, with the consequence that consumer prices 
for staple foods have increasingly dropped below international prices 
- particularly when currency devaluations take place - and below 
equivalent producer prices for those commodities. Consumer subsi- 
dies, which in some cases amount to 30% of total financial resources 
of the government, have been observed in the past, in turn reducing 
the scope for the government's developmental role and subsequently 
causing social unrest when attempts are made to change the price 
regime. Price stabilization needs its own carefully implemented 
flexibility to avoid such dead ends. 
Whenever agricultural production is inherently unstable 
because of natural conditions, supply fluctuations facing stable 
demand volumes can give rise to considerable price swings for the 
producers. When a substantial part of output is consumed by sub- 
sistence farmers from their own production, market supplies and 
prices will show variations of even larger amplitude than production, 
tempting speculation or hoarding, which may add to the swings. 
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Price Policies 
When prices fluctuate, farmers will continuously adjust their crop- 
ping patterns and engage in risk-avoiding production practices that 
may reduce output levels over time. There may be gains, therefore, 
from market stabilization measures undertaken by the government. 
Price instability today is to a large extent related to exchange rate 
movements, so that governments should understand the limits to 
stabilization measures and the risks they themselves may run 
(Ahmed, 1988). But these are also potential long-term benefits, 
through a better climate for farm investments which affect long-term 
agricultural development positively. Prices in a free market, by 
being low in years of good harvests and high when there is a short 
crop, tend to penalize small farmers who find market prices low 
when they have a surplus for sale and high when they need to buy in 
the market. 
The European Community (EC), through its common agricul- 
tural policy (CAP), has completely severed the relation between 
internal and external prices for about half of its agricultural output. 
Although not unique, it is the largest market segmentation of its 
kind. It starts by setting its own producer prices at which it is wil- 
ling to purchase from farmers and charges variable levies on imports 
to bridge the gap between internal and external prices. Farm 
income objectives determine price levels, which are kept stable or 
rising over time. At the same time, stability by design in a major 
market can have a destabilizing effect on the remaining (world) 
market. The incentives provided by this system have turned 
Western Europe (which in the 1960s was a net importer of almost 
all major agricultural commodities) into an exporter of an increasing 
range and volume of these commodities since the late 1970s. Sur- 
pluses are sold internally and externally with subsidies; internal 
sales are kept as much as possible outside regular market channels 
but subsidized exports compete directly with exports from other 
countries. 
Policy dilemmas in this case were decided in favor of stability 
and of farmers, at  the expense of consumers and taxpayers in the 
EC who pay more for their food. For the majority, food is only 15% 
to 20% of their total expenditure. But rising subsidies have necessi- 
tated also a larger tax take, still leaving the EC very little room for 
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the financing of nonagricultural programs and entailing the 
unpleasant task of frequent negotiations with member states in 
attempts to remain financially viable. At the same time, the com- 
petition offered by these subsidized exports has not gone unnoticed 
by other agricultural exporters, causing severe friction internation- 
ally. 
The Issue of Protection 
The EC attempts much more than just price stability: it wants to 
shift incomes and income growth in favor of the agricultural sector. 
Similar policies for the same purpose are pursued in other, particu- 
larly developed, countries (Table 3.7). The opposite takes place in, 
for example, Thailand (rice), Argentina (beef, wheat), and Pakistan 
(cotton), where substantial export levies are charged by the govern- 
ment, shifting income away from agriculture. Overvalued exchange 
rates for developing country currencies add to this in no small 
measure. 
Most developing countries levy significantly higher import 
tariffs on industrial goods than on agricultural products, or have 
other import restrictions that raise the prices of domestic manufac- 
tured goods above international prices than is the case for agricul- 
tural products. As a consequence, there is a shift in the domestic 
terms of trade against agriculture and a real income loss to farmers. 
One should note, however, that most farm households in developing 
countries, notably on smaller farms, derive a substantial part of 
their incomes from nonagricultural activities and may also benefit 
from lower relative food prices when they obtain part of their food 
from the market. The effects on the livelihoods of the poor are 
equally uncertain, depending on what determines wage rates for 
rural landless laborers. 
Price policies are a means of stabilizing markets and of 
transferring incomes between groups of citizens or between them 
and the government itself. They are instruments intending to give 
equal chance to all in a stable economic environment, yet they are 
also instruments that can cause costly distortions of output, trade, 
incomes, and government finance. These are evident from past 
experience and counsel care in their application. In particular, when 
the burden of their implementation is entrusted to a weak 
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Table 3.7. Relative nominal tariff equivalentsa of agricultural products as 
percentages of the world market prices using consumer prices, three-year 
averages for 1980-1982: reference scenario. 
Beef Other Pro- Nonfood 
Coarse and animal tein Other agricul- 
Country Wheat Rice grains lamb Dairy products feed food ture 
Argentina -21 7 -20 -27 -17 -22 -Ob -32 -5 
Australia 15 27 29 -5 -7 40 15 14 -4 
Austria 42 -5 85 74 34 11 20 10 46 
Brazil 13 2 -16 -13 22 -36 -11 -18 -19 
Canada 13 -7 14 25 53 -1 -18 -12 15 
E ~ Y  pt 30 -6 21 72 14 83 1 - 2 3  -29 
Indonesia -2 -12 -17 3 10 15 -4 -16 -36 
Japan 35 253 42 52 106 43 134 44 98 
Mexico -7 12 7 12 -3 22 -11 17 -33 
Nigeria 44 76 15 42 51 106 -18 -12 -16 
Pakistan 23 68 50 37 28 31 -2 -17 -17 
Turkey 31 44 20 61 249 63 55 6 -5 
EC 84 65 42 61 70 26 35 5 26 
Kenya 10 0 0 -25 25 5 -5 -10 -10 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 
Thailand 0 -20 -10 -25 30 -10 -10 -5 -25 
India 68 2 9 9 48 3 1 -28 -9 
USA 0 0 0 25 80 -5 0 5 2 5 
' ~ h e s e  are calculated a s  the difference between border prices and domestic con- 
sumer raw material prices, and depend on the direction of trade (see Parikh et 
al., 1988). 
b-O means a small negative number; +0, a small positive one. 
government administration, the results can be most distressing, 
inflicting more poverty on rural areas, less reliable food supplies in 
cities, extra costs to the government, and foreign exchange con- 
straints. 
Distribution Policies 
In principle, price policies operate in the same direction for all pro- 
ducers or consumers, large or small, rich or poor. People start with 
unequal endowments, both social and economic. What this means 
for a government that is seen as the focal point of a society's moral 
concerns is discussed further in Chapter 7. In practice, governments 
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do use some resources with the intent to benefit weaker strata of the 
population, in both developed and developing countries. Some of 
the more important instruments concerning food and agriculture are 
briefly mentioned here. 
Food rationing, dual pricing, employment guarantee schemes, 
or food-for-work programs usually serve the purpose of providing 
food to people who lack adequate purchasing power to buy it them- 
selves. Because food is to  be provided at  lower prices or against 
work performed, the costs to the government can be substantial. 
The implicit attempt a t  market segmentation may not fully succeed, 
with leakages adding to  the cost. Nevertheless, considerable experi- 
ence, both positive and negative, has been acquired over the years, 
suggesting feasible ways to  improve the diets of the poorest people. 
The use of particular channels (school meals, distribution through 
maternity health clinics, etc.) or of particular commodities that are 
considered inferior goods by less poor categories appears to be 
attractive. But it should also be noted that in several countries 
some of these public schemes (notably rationing in which limited 
quantities are given to ration cardholders at  less than the market 
price) appear to cater mostly to  the civil service, the police, the mili- 
tary, and the urban population. These programs are not necessarily 
objectionable since they help to stabilize urban incomes and may 
stave off social unrest; an important criterion is that they should not 
add to the instability of the remaining food markets. But they 
hardly qualify under the heading of redistribution. Also food distri- 
bution systems suffer from a less than complete targeting to those 
most in need, as leakages are bound to occur. For example, a study 
by Gavan and Chandrasekera (1979) of Sri Lanka reports that a 
one-pound rice ration led to a net increase in rice consumption of 
six-tenths of a pound. After adjusting for substitution of other 
cereals and noncereals the increase in all food consumption was only 
a little over a tenth of a pound of rice equivalents. Similarly, in 
Egypt, Alderman and von Braun (1984) found that rations of bread 
rather than of wheat flour favored the urban dweller but that the 
opposite held for the rural poor. Pinstrup-Andersen (1988) notes 
that the choice of the commodity as the carrier of the subsidy is very 
important. 
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Another example of a redistributive policy is progressive taxa- 
tion of income. In most developing countries taxes on incomes make 
only a small contribution to government revenues and have limited 
redistributive impact. In many countries high indirect taxes on lux- 
ury goods consumed by the rich probably have a more regressive 
effect on incomes than the income tax. It should also be noted that 
in several countries (including some of the industrial ones) agricul- 
tural incomes are not taxed. Large landowners are obviously the 
main beneficiaries of this policy. 
Asset Redistribution 
Finally, incomes can be redistributed in a more radical way by redis- 
tributing productive endowments, particularly land. In land-scarce 
countries the redistribution of land is sometimes said to be a redis- 
tribution of poverty, but the experiences in Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan after 1945, and China in the 1950s and even more since the 
rural reforms of 1978, demonstrate the importance of redistributing 
an asset with increasing productivity and value. Extensive land 
reforms are usually the results of a revolution (such as in China), 
are brought about by foreign occupiers (Americans in Japan, main- 
land Chinese in Taiwan), or follow a war in which erstwhile land- 
lords have been defeated (Japanese landowners in Korea). Thus, 
they seem only to occur under exceptional and forceful cir- 
cumstances. Access to credit, new crop technologies, and modern 
inputs are strongly associated with land titles, so the redistribution 
of land can be a powerful means of reducing inequity and also of 
increasing agricultural production. In that sense it has a lot in com- 
mon with the distribution of benefits in the process of industrializa- 
tion when the entire labor force previously had access to all levels of 
education. To a large extent, redistribution avoids the development 
of an elitist economy. But resistance against too drastic land 
reforms is usually strong. Some countries follow a gradual course, 
linking land reform to land development. Thus, as a condition of 
land consolidation programs or the introduction of irrigation, limits 
are set on holdings of improved land involving a measure of redistri- 
bution of land. 
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Summing Up: The Costs 
All of these measures to promote, stabilize, and redistribute income 
and its growth impose the need for public resources and thus an 
adequate tax system. Whatever way these resources are mobilized, 
it will always affect disposable incomes in the economy. In princi- 
ple, many ways are open, but choices are far from easy to  make as 
each kind of taxation carries with it some measure of distortion. In 
developing countries the choices are limited because incomes are 
low, reducing the scope for significant revenues. A weak administra- 
tion leads to a choice of taxes that can be implemented with simple 
rules and rates, at points where controls can be easily installed. 
Indirect taxes on goods belong to that category, since they can be 
levied at  the source of production, at  particular collection or pro- 
cessing points, or a t  the border. 
To a large extent the taxation of agriculture (which in some 
developing countries is substantial) takes that form, particularly by 
taxing agricultural exports. Sometimes this is done through border 
levies but more often parastatals are set up which are given an 
export monopoly and which also set domestic procurement prices. 
To prevent farmers from switching to other more remunerative 
crops, some governments prescribe minimum acreage allotments to 
export crops, in turn requiring a control system to enforce them. 
Taxation of this kind appears to be conducive to  neither the buoy- 
ancy of government revenues nor to agricultural development. 
3.3. The International Food System 
Nations are linked into the world economy by trade, capital flows, 
and small movements of labor. The tendency, a t  least with respect 
to trade and capital services, has been toward greater interdepen- 
dence. What holds true in general also applies to food and agricul- 
ture. By the beginning of this century agricultural trade consisted 
mainly of grain exports from North America and tropical products 
from the colonies, both mainly flowing to Western Europe. Today a 
much larger share of agricultural production is traded internation- 
ally and many more countries are engaged in the exchange of a 
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broad array of agricultural products, including their processed 
forms. 
For a variety of reasons nations have maintained or even 
strengthened the roles played by their governments with regard to 
farming and farmers. In this section we describe the international 
food system along those lines: nations as actors, each with policies 
of their own, interlocking through competitive international mark- 
ets. Within that setting we take another look at the place of the 
poor in this system - those who lack the purchasing power to buy 
sufficient food. The role of aid, and of food aid in particular, is also 
discussed. 
3.3.1. Nations as actors in the world food system 
Divergent Trade Positions 
All countries participate in international trade in agricultural pro- 
ducts, but their particular position and importance differ widely. 
First, there are only few major exporters in the land-abundant coun- 
tries of the Americas (Canada, the USA, Brazil, and Argentina) and 
the remaining southern hemisphere (Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and Zimbabwe). They all share the characteristic that they 
were settled - sometimes rather resettled - by migrants from 
Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who 
introduced large-scale farming and cattle raising. Good climatic 
conditions and the provision of infrastructure made it possible to 
produce large volumes of agricultural output that exceeded the 
domestic demand of these relatively sparsely populated countries. 
Large-scale mechanized monocultures enabled low-cost production 
and international competitiveness. In Brazil and parts of Africa 
competitiveness was achieved to some extent with cheap labor. 
Western Europe, whose agriculture has been brought under a 
common EC regime, has in recent years turned from'being the larg- 
est agricultural import zone of the world into a net exporter. The 
northern continent a1 part of the EC traditionally exported dairy 
products, but for virtually all other agricultural products the EC 
needed to import. In addition to its roughly 35% share in world 
dairy export markets, it now accounts for 15% of international grain 
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supplies (including grain equivalents) and of sugar. The EC also 
exports meat, but remains an importer of fish, fruits, vegetables, and 
vegetable oils. It has become a force to reckon with in international 
markets, after a period when other exporters had already lost their 
sales in the EC market itself. This change of position has much to 
do with the agricultural policies described in the previous section. 
The agricultural policies of the small European countries that are 
not members of the EC show many similarities with those of the EC; 
the same holds true for Japan. 
The position of the Soviet Union and the East European coun- 
tries is somewhat surprising. A considerable potential for food pro- 
duction remains untapped, and, next to Japan and Western Europe 
which are both land-scarce, the region has become one of the major 
agricultural importers. Again here, past policies have a lot to do 
with this performance, even when admitting that natural conditions 
are less stable and that large production swings are unavoidable. 
But the region did not have 50 years of continuous bad weather. 
With the recent political changes this may change in the years 
ahead, but for the time being it holds an element of uncertainty for 
the outlook for world agricultural markets. 
The same applies to China, another major agricultural pro- 
ducer which in the past maintained a balance in its external agricul- 
tural trade but which has recently stepped up its imports. Land 
scarcity combined with a rapid increase in the demand for animal 
products suggest increased reliance on imported food, but govern- 
ment objectives concerning grain remain formulated in terms of 
achieving self-reliance in grain. It is not clear in what way this issue 
will be resolved in the years to come. From Table 9.8 it can be seen 
that most of the remaining countries play a modest role. Some 
Asian countries are fair-sized exporters, but others are net import- 
ers. Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is a small trading group with a 
small agricultural trade surplus. The only significant other group on 
the import side consists of the oil- and gas-exporting countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa, most of which have income levels 
permitting a high level of food intake but which have little if any 
land suitable for agriculture. 
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Table 3.8. Trade in agricultural products by main regions in 1985 in bil- 
lion US dollars. 
Region Exports Imports 
North America 56.6 42.6 
Brazil, Argentina 16.3 1.9 
Other Latin America, Caribbean 18.2 10.7 
Australia, New Zealand 
South Africa, Zimbabwe 
Western Europe 
Japan 
USSR, Eastern Europe 
China 7.3 
India 2.6 
Indonesia 3.8 
Malaysia 5.9 
Thailand 3.9 
Other Asian developing countriesa 10.3 
Middle East, North African 
oil exporters 1.8 22.5 
Other Middle East, North ~ f r i c a ~  4.2 4.5 
Other Africa 9.3 6.7 
Total World 272.7 304.0 
'including Oceania. 
including Israel and Turkey. 
Source: FAO, 1985. 
National Policies and International Markets 
The nature of the interactions by all these nations in the world food 
markets is controlled by two basic considerations that cannot easily 
be brought into harmony. On the one hand, virtually all countries 
with an agricultural sector within their boundaries want to set their 
own sovereign objectives and policies with regard to their own agri- 
cultural sectors. At the same time, virtually all countries expect 
world markets to provide them with remunerative outlets for their 
surpluses and with food imports at  affordable prices. It implies an 
attitude by governments that can easily become unreasonable. It 
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will not matter all that much if small trading countries try to 
improve their self-sufficiency in food through subsidies to farmers, or 
distort markets with their domestic stabilization policies. But when 
large trading nations increasingly separate their domestic food 
market from the international market, one can no longer expect the 
latter to remain well-behaved. 
A common characteristic of national agricultural policies is 
their orientation toward domestic objectives and issues. Almost 
everywhere, the stated objective is a reasonable degree of self- 
sufficiency in staple food products. At higher levels of development, 
when domestic demand for agricultural products lags increasingly 
behind overall economic growth, farm incomes become a growing 
concern, inducing measures to raise their level beyond what the 
market offers. Both objectives - self-sufficiency and income parity 
for the farm population - lead to protectionist measures at  the 
expense of the few exporting countries and of domestic consumers. 
3.3.2. International markets 
The Actors in the Market 
The effects of national interventions in agriculture are first of all 
visible in the domestic economy where shifts in supply, demand, and 
prices occur. Changes in imports and exports transmit part of the 
effects to international markets and become magnified since, on 
average, only some 15% of agricultural production is traded. The 
international market has neither the policy-making authority to fix 
upper and lower bounds on prices, nor the resources to  intervene. 
In some commodity markets arrangements were proposed or imple- 
mented in the past, a few of which remain operational. These 
arrangements were usually endowed with limited resources and few 
instruments, and they often created tensions between participants. 
Compensatory finance arrangements do exist to tide over countries 
that are hurt by reductions in world prices of their major exports or 
by price increases of imported cereals. It is to be noted here that in 
the quest for stabilization and compensation the potentially 
benefiting countries derives in large part from governments wishing 
to maintain stable income levels from export monopolies. At the 
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same time, these public bodies pay stable - but mostly low - prices 
for farmer products. 
On the whole, international markets are free markets where 
nations offer their supplies and enter with their demand for imports. 
Prices adjust and are usually volatile because of the relatively small 
size of the markets and because a considerable part of supply volatil- 
ity inherent in agricultural production itself enters the world 
market. It is not easy to operate in those markets as risks are high, 
particularly when account is taken of the additional risk of exchange 
rate fluctuations. To stay in those markets, large amounts of risk 
capital are needed and traders must be able to absorb and interpret 
massive amounts of information to be on the "right" side of the 
market in time and to ensure an economic return on capital. The 
risks for private trade are made even larger when governments, 
which have large resources at their disposal and may be willing to 
make financial sacrifices to meet domestic objectives, are also parti- 
cipating in the international market. 
Whether markets are in all cases competitive is a matter that 
is widely discussed. Many markets for agricultural commodities 
have a limited number of private trading houses, only one or two 
exchanges worldwide with restricted membership, or a small number 
of processing firms. Allegations are frequently made that they can, 
or do, rig the market, especially those for wheat and coarse grains, 
sugar, tea, coffee, or cotton. The likelihood of this being the case 
need not to be ruled out but nevertheless seems small. In the short 
run gains can undoubtedly be made by inventory policies geared to 
market expectations. But the costs and risks of attempting to force 
the market in a particular direction for more than a short while are 
too high to be within reach for virtually any firm. The risks are par- 
ticularly high when governments can enter markets with additional 
supplies. 
Market Distortions 
Returning again to policy issues, the protection of agriculture in rich 
but relatively land-scarce countries of Western Europe and Japan, 
and for some commodities in the USA and Canada, has effects on 
both the level and the volatility of international prices. Production 
has grown rapidly behind the barriers of protection, first reducing 
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. ..... Def la ted  by U S  G P  de f la t i on  
Figure 3.4. Price movements in world markets for wheat and sugar 
Source: World Bank, 1986. 
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these countries' demands for imports and subsequently increasing 
world market supplies, offered at  subsidized prices. Temperate-zone 
products such as dairy, and those competing with tropical products 
such as wheat and sugar (see Figure 5.4), have shown substantial 
declines in world market prices, measured by international purchas- 
ing power for nonagricultural goods and services. At the same time, 
when a crop failure somewhere outside the protected countries leads 
to higher world prices, prices within the protected countries remain 
unchanged, without inducing reduced demand for imports or more 
export supplies. Similarly, a crop failure within the protected coun- 
try will be fully reflected in additional import demand, but not in 
internal prices. In both cases the adjustment is entirely passed on to 
the world market and to other countries with open trading regimes. 
The volatility of world markets is increased. 
World markets for major agricultural products are subject to 
short-run and long-run distortions. Countries with no major stake 
in world markets, particularly if they are small net importers, will 
not see this as a major problem as long as these distortions do not 
interfere with their domestic policy objectives. However, exporting 
countries not wanting to  subsidize their exports undoubtedly react 
differently as their export earnings are reduced and they may need 
to take costly measures to maintain their market shares. 
Analysts and policymakers have different views when defining 
what constitutes an intervention and even more what constitutes a 
distorting intervention. Governments have a vast array of instru- 
ments available to  influence agriculture directly and indirectly; these 
differences are not a matter of taste or political preference but are 
genuine. Virtually every government intervenes at  some time, so 
that some can now claim that their interventions are not distorting 
but intended to  offset distorting interventions by other governments. 
Exporting developing countries cannot participate in that race 
because they cannot afford the costs of subsidization. They must 
adjust their trade and their domestic factor allocations. 
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3.3.3. International adjustment 
Surplus production has continued to increase in both the land- 
abundant countries and the highly protected ones, with world prices 
declining in some instances to historic lows in the last few years. It 
has also led to large and costly intervention stocks held by govern- 
ments - subsidized sales for fodder, for army consumption, for dis- 
tribution to disadvantaged groups, or for subsidized export sales and 
food aid. The measures do not cope with the surpluses themselves, 
but with their disposal. More incisive measures are increasingly 
being taken to dam the accumulation of surpluses, such as by paying 
farmers to leave land lying idle, by limiting price guarantees to par- 
ticular quantities, by reducing the scope for selling farm products to 
intervention offices, or by outright reduction of guaranteed prices. 
The effectiveness of these measures is not satisfactory in all cases 
but recently a somewhat improved balance of demand and supply 
has been reflected in a recovery of world market prices. 
Two basic causes which have led to these measures of 
retrenchment can be mentioned. One is the budgetary cost of gluts; 
the other is the ominous consequences for international trade rela- 
tions, particularly between the EC and the USA. Where costs are 
concerned, virtually all industrial countries have experienced serious 
fiscal problems that are difficult to bring under control and have led 
to a reduced willingness to tolerate high farm support costs. For the 
EC an additional reason is the need for more budgetary room to 
maneuver in the course of economic unification. Agricultural sup- 
port in the EC is subject to considerable fluctuations due to 
exchange rate movements, and this provides an additional reason to 
limit liabilities and to make structural changes in the support 
system. 
The trade aspects are of more immediate concern, as some- 
times threat and counterthreat become a daily routine, in some 
instances followed by actual measures restraining trade. It should 
be noted that agricultural products have never effectively come 
under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which set the standards of conduct for international trade. 
Its past efforts to maintain a liberal trading climate in the world 
have always excluded, by agreement of the parties, the agricultural 
sector. The short-term action and counteraction of the past has 
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created a haphazard structure of ad hoc arrangements that may 
reduce conflagrations and acrimony, but sacrifice a good bit of con- 
sumer welfare in the process, of which a substantial part is foisted 
on the developing and importing countries as the weakest partners 
in this play. 
In the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations the GATT formed 
a separate committee on agricultural trade where measures are 
being discussed toward more orderly trade relations. One proposal 
is a prohibition of export subsidies to avoid the entrance of high-cost 
production into world market competition. Another proposal con- 
cerns the replacement of variable border levies by fixed border 
charges, which will expose protected markets to movements in inter- 
national markets. A possible third (alternative or complementary) 
proposal is a gradual reduction of the cultivated acreage. 
Abolishing subsidies and variable levies is not the same as a 
move toward free trade. It permits the maintenance of a system of 
quantity controls, geared to domestic demand, by products coupled 
with high guaranteed prices for those quantities (possibly even 
higher than is currently the case) to compensate farmers for lost 
volume. All production would then serve domestic markets, the 
costs would be passed on to domestic consumers, and in years of low 
international prices deficiency payments would probably be made to 
maintain farm incomes. Whether a system of quantitative controls 
would work depends on technological developments and their impact 
on production growth. Also, the question will be raised to what 
extent exports can be added into the production quotas, particularly 
when higher world market prices are expected to prevail due to the 
phasing out of export subsidies. There is every reason to expect 
farmers to raise the issue of their "rightful share" in the world 
market, even when this revives - openly or in a more complex and 
hidden way - the issue of export subsidies. 
This is the basic dilemma. Once all the existing paraphernalia 
of bureaucratic controls are in place, the major exporters will be 
under strong pressure to negotiate shares in the world market and to 
fix the price range. An agreement of this kind should be seen for 
what it is: an international cartel that pursues its farmers' interest 
at the expense of its own consumers and of the importing countries. 
The odd situation prevailing now, with free competition between few 
exporters, is obviously in no one's best interests. It inflicts costs on 
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all suppliers that are immediately raised to the level of political 
conflict, since governments must assume the costs. Governments 
are not in a position to withdraw from their role as major actors 
because of their domestic agricultural objectives, so they are pushed 
toward negotiated market shares and production restraints. The 
Boren-Boschwitz proposal of 1986 advocating cooperative supply 
adjustment strategies is one that moves in this direction and contin- 
ues to be strongly debated. The alternative route, toward free trade 
in agriculture, is longer and more arduous, requiring the dismantling 
of the current control and support systems and their replacement by 
some form of deficiency or other compensation payments coupled 
with acreage reductions. The last strategy is essential in order to 
avoid a situation in which either the cost of deficiency payments 
becomes too large or the agricultural income objectives move out of 
reach. At the same time, world market prices may still remain 
disappointingly low. Policymakers face a dilemma either to create a 
cartel or to step into the uncharted terrain of trade liberalization. 
In the latter case acreage reductions are essential, and in the former 
they will be hard to avoid. 
3.3.4. Adjustment, aid, and hunger 
An end to gluts, whatever way it is brought about, will bring higher 
world market prices in its wake. Developing countries will consider 
higher prices a mixed blessing, with benefits to farmers and from 
exports, but additional costs for imports and for consumers. It 
poses the usual problem for these countries: how to pass on price 
incentives to farmers without engendering social unrest in the cities, 
or alternatively incurring unsustainable subsidy costs due to mainte- 
nance of lower consumer prices. In the case of those consumers 
already a t  the margin or below safe nutritional levels, measures will 
be needed to protect them from higher food costs at  the expense of 
government budget resources. 
There is a prima facie case here for additional external assis- 
tance, avoiding the reallocation of limited budget resources to food 
subsidies for the poor. However, this should not be mistaken for a 
plea to provide more food aid, since the subsidy costs do arise 
irrespective of whether the country is a net importer or exporter of 
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food, or self-sufficient. Aid is needed in a form that enables the 
government to provide food subsidies to the poor without disrupting 
its ongoing programs. This calls for program support; if the coun- 
try happens to be food importing and the type of food required for 
its market happens to be available under food aid, so be it. In fact, 
when food aid can substitute for commercial food imports, this is 
attractive in that it is the purest form of convertible financial aid. 
Hunger is a large problem, aid to cope with it within a reasonable 
timespan would also need to be massive (IFPRI, 1988), possibly in 
the order of doubling net flows of aid and reallocating between coun- 
tries as well. This may seem unlikely, but we return to that in 
Chapter 6. 
There is a popular notion that food aid serves particularly to 
cope with the human devastation caused by famines. However, 
emergency food aid in most years does not exceed 20% of total food 
aid shipments, the remainder being supplied to countries which need 
regular imports to meet market demand but lack foreign exchange 
to import commercially. The popular. notion of food aid as emer- 
gency relief stems largely from confrontation of a large public 
through the media with appeals for its support when famine 
threatens many lives. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play 
an important role, using both permanent and temporary actions to 
address specific emergencies. They have the advantage that they 
are capable of mobilizing a large audience into action and support. 
At the same time, they are not tied to governmental channels at the 
recipient country side. This last attribute is worth mentioning as it 
encourages donor governments to channel resources through NGOs 
when there is good reason to mistrust the capability or the willing- 
ness of a recipient government to use aid receipts, in particular 
emergency food aid, to benefit famine-affected population groups. 
Most food aid consists of grains. In recent years aid-financed 
grain imports were less than 10% of total grain imports of the 
developing countries, or about 9 million tonnes yearly. Around its 
mobilization, allocation, and delivery there is a strong international 
framework of organizations, with the World Food Programme 
(WFP) at its core. Early warning systems notify the donor com- 
munity of impending food shortages; there are regular meetings to 
assess overall and country needs and to coordinate bilateral and 
multilateral action. Funding is also provided to meet the nonfood 
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costs of transport and distribution. Still, the amounts of available 
food aid remain strictly limited and the case for larger (and some- 
times also more timely) flows could convincingly be defended. 
The direction of policy change is probably in the opposite 
direction: if gluts were to end, so would most food aid which has not 
been able to shed its image of surplus disposal. No doubt improve- 
ments did come about over the years in the quality of food aid, with 
more attention given to what is needed in markets of destination 
rather than to what happens to be available in intervention stocks. 
It remains an important and useful instrument of emergency relief 
and famine assistance, but it is not necessarily a good instrument of 
long-run assistance to development (see von Braun and Huddleston, 
1988). Even for the poor it holds true that they want to  spend some 
of the additional income obtained as food for other purposes. Ulti- 
mately, at  the national level the additional purchasing power 
injected by way of food aid will show up as additional demand for 
imports of which only a small part is food. Program aid is therefore 
preferable, with income support to the poor and in a policy context 
that enables additional import demands to be met. 
3.3.5. The food system and the hungry 
The way in which the world has been divided among its inhabitants, 
and the constraints imposed on some countries and governments, 
cause hunger to persist. It is easy to criticize the performance of the 
governments of developing countries meeting the food needs of their 
populations. Yet, the constraints imposed by the developed world, 
such as restrictions on the movements of labor, capital, and technol- 
ogy, are overwhelming factors causing the fundamental polarity of 
the system. Many of the policy changes now considered with respect 
to world agriculture and trade, however important from other 
angles, do not seem too significant when looked a t  from the perspec- 
tive of the hungry. 
CHAPTER 4 
The Need for a Comprehensive 
Analytical Tool 
4.1. Characteristics of the BLS 
The study of hunger and poverty in its proper national and inter- 
national context required the development of a new modeling sys- 
tem. Some of the reasons why previously existing models, or sys- 
tems of models, did not appear suitable are briefly summarized here 
and the main characteristics of the Basic Linked System (BLS) are 
presented. 
4.1.1. Geographic classification 
Models used for economic policy analysis should identify specific pol- 
icy instruments and decision makers, and should therefore be 
designed for use a t  the level a t  which policies are made. Even inter- 
national agreements have to work through national policies, so that  
countries need to be treated as units in a system of national models. 
Global models without a country dimension but operating at  global, 
continental, or regional levels do not tell us "who should do what," 
and so are not suitable for economic policy analysis. 
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Table 4.1. Models in the Basic Linked System. 
Models with Models with 
common country-specific 
structure structures 
Argentina CMEA 
Australia China 
Austria India 
Brazil United States 
Canada 
E ~ Y  Pt 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Kenya 
Mexico 
Nigeria 
New Zealand 
Pakistan 
Thailand 
Turkey 
EC 
Regional group models 
African oil exportersa 
Africa medium-income exportersa 
Africa medium-income importersa 
Africa low-income exportersa 
Africa low-income importersa 
Latin American high-income exportersa 
Latin American high-income exportersa 
African medium income 
Southeast Asia high-medium exportersa 
Southeast Asia high-medium importersa 
Asia low income 
Southwest Asia oil exporters 
Southwest Asia medium-low income 
Rest of the world 
 h his classification refers to net agricultural trade. 
The risk is to move to the other extreme of wanting to model 
all countries, which is neither a feasible proposition nor strictly 
necessary: it might easily lead to the use of a common structure of 
national models of such simplicity that it may defeat the purpose of 
the analysis. In the world food system it is possible to distinguish 
between countries that are large enough in terms of their national 
food systems to warrant separate models. Other countries which are 
smaller in those terms can be grouped together and do not need a 
fully specified policy module as they are price-takers in the world 
food markets. 
In the BLS 20 countries (including two country groups, each 
with a common policy framework) are modeled as national units; 
these represent some 80% of world food production, consumption, 
and trade. The European Community (twelve countries) and the 
members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (seven 
countries, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) are each 
represented by one national model; this set of models embraces 37 
countries. The 130 countries and territories accounting for the 
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remaining 20% of the world food system are grouped into 14 
regional group models using geographic location and the main 
characteristics of their national food systems on the world market as 
criteria for their classification (see Table 4.1). 
The BLS is therefore a tailor-made system for the analysis of 
food issues. Other issues such as industrial development, the world 
energy economy, or international capital flows would require 
appropriate reclassification of countries to suit those purposes. 
4.1.2. Commodity classification 
Obviously a modeling system concerned with food issues should 
have the major food items as separate commodities. Their 
classification should be the same in all models that constitute the 
global system to permit international linkage. 
It is not sufficient to make a modeling system of a partial 
nature, only containing food items or only covering agricultural pro- 
ducts. This would result in a modeling system that deals mostly 
with the production side of the food equation, but with food demand 
largely exogenous since the demand generated by incomes outside 
agriculture is not modeled. Partial analysis is not attractive for that 
reason, as it does not permit a satisfactory representation of price 
formation, price policies, or the interactions between the agricultural 
and the nonagricultural sectors and intersectoral allocation of pro- 
duction factors. 
The full representation of all demands for and supplies of food 
require economy-wide modeling with a commodity classification that 
is exhaustive. Nonfood agriculture needs to be included as does the 
nonagricultural sector. The models define agricultural products at 
the producer level. At the consumption level these commodities are 
consumed jointly with nonagricultural outputs in proportions 
prescribed to represent the inputs and costs of processing the agri- 
cultural commodities between the farm gate and the final user. 
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4.1.3. Micro-foundations and actors 
The food system as part of the national economy consists of actors, 
each with endowments and constraints, responding to signals reach- 
ing them through markets or otherwise. The models must identify 
those actors, describe their behavior exhaustively for the national 
economy, and integrate them through the classical identities on 
quantities and financial flows. The models actually distinguish agri- 
cultural and nonagricultural producers, consumers, and govern- 
ments as actors, placing them in the context of a general equilibrium 
framework. That framework is comprehensive in that it embraces 
the entire economy, all actors and all foods and services without 
unaccounted sources of supply or demand. 
The BLS models (except one) do not distinguish classes of 
actors such as consumers by income groups or agricultural produc- 
ers by size of productive assets. The exception is the BLS model for 
India. Models of the same type, but not linked into the BLS, do 
exist for Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Thailand. It is unlikely that one 
could make another version of the BLS in which all national models 
would feature classes of producers and consumers. They require 
knowledge of a country's socioeconomic structure that does not 
allow generalization and standardization of model structures, lead- 
ing to a much more decentralized effort and therefore major coordi- 
nation problems to ensure that models can be linked (and delivered 
in time). 
For the analysis of poverty and hunger a classwise approach is 
desirable, particularly for the purposes of policy analysis. The BLS 
can do this for India, and for the other countries with detailed 
models it can be done by using the assumptions and findings on aid 
flows and international prices as exogenous variables for country 
scenarios. Greater detail in the policy modules of these models add 
to the usefulness of such scenarios. For the other country indicators 
relating to variables such as agricultural and nonagricultural pro- 
duction per capita incomes have to be used. 
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4.1.4. International linkage 
Domestic demand and supply forces determine a country's imports 
and exports under a constraint of net capital inflows determining the 
permissible current account deficit on the balance of payments. Net 
exports, by commodity, of all countries meet in the world market 
where prices adjust to clear markets. These price adjustments are 
transmitted back to all countries and cause deviations from the per- 
missible current account deficits, so that world market price adjust- 
ments followed by domestic adjustments must take place until the 
world markets clear. 
Changes in domestic and international policies of the major 
trading countries or changes in capital flows lead to a different 
course of trade and price adjustments in world markets and in all 
national economies. In that way, the BLS is an appropriate tool for 
tracing the effects of policy changes in one or more countries on the 
economies of all others. In the case of India directly, and for a few 
others indirectly, these effects can be traced further to particular 
population groups. The analysis of issues concerning hunger and 
poverty in an international setting requires both a BLS and the 
more detailed national models used here. 
4.2. The Analytical Apparatus 
The system of linked national agricultural policy models was 
developed by IIASA's Food and Agriculture Program (FAP) with 
the help of a network of collaborating institutions. It constitutes a 
system that lends itself to the study of the effects of alternative pol- 
icy measures on the domestic food situation in given countries. 
These measures may be taken by their own governments, by the 
governments of other countries, or by international organizations 
operating under specified international agreements. 
90 Hunger - Beyond the Reach of the InMsible Hand 
4.2.1. The BLS of national models 
Currently in the Basic Linked System there are three types of 
model, as shown in Table 4.1. The first set contains what are called 
the Standard National Models, all of which were developed at 
IIASA. Although they have a common structure they are individu- 
ally estimated. The parameters are separately estimated for each 
country from country-specific data. The second group contain some 
detailed models built by collaborating institutions; these models do 
not necessarily follow the common structure of the Standard 
National Models. These models have relied on country-specific data 
and so embody much more country-specific policy structures. The 
third set of models represents groups of countries in a simpler yet 
methodologically consistent way. 
Although national models may have greater commodity detail, 
the international exchange among the national models takes place at 
the level of the ten commodities shown in Table 4.2. The BLS is a 
dynamically recursive simulation model solved in yearly time steps. 
Table 4.2. Commodities considered in the model. 
- 
Wheat Other animal products 
Rice Protein feeds 
Coarse grains Other food 
Beef and lamb Nonfood agriculture 
Dairy products Nonagricul ture 
4.2.2. A typical FAP national policy 
The building blocks of the IIASAIFAP model system are the 
national models; each reflects the specific problems and characteris- 
tics of that particular nation. Although the national models do not 
differ in their structure, they are country-specific in their contents, 
particularly in their descriptions of government policies. The FAP 
model system enables such diverse models to be linked, but requires 
that all national models have a common sector classification at the 
international trade level (nine agricultural and one nonagricultural 
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Figure 4.1. Information flows in a typical national model. 
sector) and meet reasonable additional technical requirements. For 
example, net exports have to be continuous functions of relative 
world prices and be independent of their absolute levels. Even 
though the national models differ from each other, the broad struc- 
ture is common to all. In some, food supply and demand are dis- 
tinguished according to income groups. The information flows in a 
typical model are shown in Figure 4.1. 
Past prices and government policies affect production deci- 
sions. The domestic production in each sector of the economy 
accrues to each sectoral groups. The income this represents is 
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determined by the price that these products command. For exam- 
ple, if farmers have grown two million tonnes of wheat and one mil- 
lion tonnes of rice, they would have an income of twice the price of a 
million tonnes of wheat plus the price of a million tonnes of rice, 
minus the cost of producing wheat and rice. These initial entitle- 
ments of the different products for the various groups may be redis- 
tributed by government policies. 
Given these entitlements and world prices, groups trade among 
themselves under the influence of government policies, which include 
national market policies (price, buffer stock, trade), public finance 
policies (balance of payments, public demand, direct taxation), and 
international market and finance policies (agreements on prices, 
buffer stocks, trade, financing). The resulting exchange equilibrium 
determines the domestic prices, net exports, tax rates, and the con- 
sumption patterns. In the process of exchange all the markets are 
cleared within the (national) balance of trade constraints and the 
income and resource constraints faced by the various actors. Within 
the broad schematic outline of such a national model, the methodo- 
logical approaches do differ from model to model. Some of the 
methods most commonly used are as follows: 
Supply responses. Four alternative approaches are used in the vari- 
ous models: 
Econometric estimation of acreage response and yield functions 
based on past performance. These include relative 
profitabilities, critical inputs, and factors as explanatory vari- 
ables. This is the approach followed in the models of India, the 
USA, and one version of the Canadian model. 
A nonlinear programming model to allocate land, factors, and 
inputs to different crops based on estimated production func- 
tions is used in the IIASAIFAP models. 
A linear programming approach integrating economic and 
institutional aspects with agronomic potentialities and con- 
straints is used in models of Thailand and in one earlier ver- 
sion of the model for Bangladesh. 
A hierarchy of linear programs is used in the models of cen- 
trally planned economies (Hungary and Poland) to describe 
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and coordinate the behavior of planned sectors and various agricul- 
tural subsectors. 
Income generation. Within the BLS, only the model for India dis- 
tinguishes different classes of actors based on the distribution of 
assets such as land, draft animals, equipment, and so on, and the 
product is distributed across these classes as income entitlements 
accruing to labor, land, capital, etc. In other models, not part of the 
BLS, a similar approach is adopted. In the developed country 
models no income distribution is included because food consumption 
is hardly affected by it. 
Demand behavior. Demand behavior in the BLS is described 
through estimated equations, one for each commodity, which express 
human consumption as a function of income and price. Each year 
these are approximated by a linear expenditure system. For 
developing countries where different expenditure classes are dis- 
tinguished (notably in the case of India), a separate demand system 
is estimated for each class from time series of household expendi- 
tures. 
Government policy. Government policy in each national model can 
be described by a hierarchical set of adjustment rules for policy tar- 
gets such as domestic price targets, trade quotas, stock targets and 
bounds, tax rate bounds, and so on. However, to minimize the prob- 
lem of exploding numbers of variants in the BLS, price transmission 
functions are used to characterize government policy. These func- 
tions relate current to past world market relative prices and self- 
sufficiency to the domestic relative target price. 
4.2.3. The international linkage 
A first round of net exports of all the countries is calculated for an 
assumed set of world prices, and international market clearance is 
checked for each commodity. World prices are then revised using a 
non-differentiable optimizing algorithm and transmitted to the 
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Figure 4.2. International linkage: K, trade deficit; E, net trade vector; 
pw, market price vector. 
national models. Next, these generate new domestic equilibria and 
adjusted net exports for all countries. 
This process is repeated until the world markets are cleared in 
all commodities. At each stage of the iteration the domestic markets 
are in equilibrium. The procedure is shown schematically in Figure 
4.2. It may be noted that  any international agency - such as a 
buffer stock agency - can be represented as a country, and the 
effectiveness of its policies can be evaluated within a framework in 
which country policies react to the policies of the agency. This pro- 
cess yields international prices as influenced by government policies. 
The outcome of this process is examined by governments who may 
change their policies for the next period. Agents in the model do not 
formulate expectations about government policies, so that issues of 
time consistency and the like do not arise in our models. 
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Since these steps are taken on a year-by-year basis, a recursive 
dynamic simulation results. Simulations are carried out over a 20- 
year period during which alternative policies are phased in and their 
consequences are projected not only for individual countries but also 
for the entire system. 
The approach of the FAP model system is undoubtedly bold, 
but, if certain major policy issues are to be adequately explored, we 
believe that such a level of complexity is inescapable. 
4.2.4. Validation and tuning 
In validating and tuning the models, emphasis was placed on the 
fact that the primary purpose of developing the BLS is to obtain a 
medium-term policy analysis model and not a short-term forecasting 
one. It does not incorporate short-term variations due to weather 
nor any speculative behavior resulting from such variations. For 
policy analysis we want the BLS to track the central tendencies 
correctly. 
The model system was validated in three phases. In the first 
phase individual national models were tested in a stand-alone mode 
(i.e., unlinked to other models with given world prices). For each of 
some 90 endogenous state variables generated by the model, values 
were regressed against the values observed. The performance was 
found to be satisfactory. In the second phase the country models 
were run up to the year 2000, again in a stand-alone mode with 
given world prices. In the last phase a series of "linked runs" with 
full interaction between the individual national models within the 
global exchange system were carried out. 
The objective in phases 2 and 3 was to test whether the models 
behave reasonably. Since this is a very subjective notion, 
specifications and parameters were changed in individual models 
only in case of extreme results. The outcome of this process was to 
generate certain base runs which in turn were used as the basis for 
comparison with specific policy runs. 
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4.2.5. Exogenous and endogenous variables in the BLS 
Several important variables remain exogenous, though for a large 
and complex model system such as this the exogenous variables form 
only a small part of the total. The more important of these are 
summarized below: 
Population and its growth is taken from the latest UN and ILO 
sources (median projections), but for some individual countries 
such as India these have been adjusted by the latest national 
information and projections. Population growth in the 
scenarios is not affected by changes in nutritional status. 
Similarly, the participation rate in the total labor force is 
defined exogenously, but the allocation of the labor force 
between agriculture and the rest of the economy is endogenous. 
Land available for cultivation is exogenous, and the data are 
taken predominantly from F A 0  sources and from national esti- 
mates. This also includes the development of existing and new 
land over time. 
Rates of total investment as a share of the GDP are estimated 
from the historical period, and after a period of adjustment in 
the early 1980s they are kept constant. Some exceptions to 
this exist, such as India, where the investment rate changes 
exogenously over time. 
A number of important exogenous assumptions are made for 
the "Rest of the World," i.e., the group of residual countries 
that are modeled only in groups for inclusion in the system. 
These include growth rates for both agricultural and nonagri- 
cultural production based on past performance. As a baseline 
for the 13 regional aggregates representing the less developed 
countries (LDCs) in the category "Rest of the World," we have 
adopted the demand and production estimates of the "medium 
growth" scenario of a detailed F A 0  study, Agriculture: 
Toward ZOO0 (FAO, 1981; Alexandratos, 1988). Unlike in the 
F A 0  study, however, outputs and demands respond to 
changes in world prices. 
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4.2.8. The reference scenario, welfare indicators, and 
comparisons for policy evaluation 
As is usual in such analysis, the results of simulated policy scenarios 
of the model will be compared with those of a reference scenario. 
Since the reference scenario provides only a basis for comparison, it 
need not be described in detail. Suffice it to say that in the refer- 
ence scenario, the continuation of present policy regimes is assumed, 
and it generates growth from 1980 to 2000 comparable with that 
realized in the 1970s. 
It may be reiterated that  the reference scenario is not a predic- 
tion. It merely serves the purpose of providing a point or line of 
comparison. Of course, it should be specified in such a way that  
policy conclusions are not distorted. Analyses were carried out with 
alternative reference scenarios with different economic growth rates, 
and we found that the basic nature of the results were not sensitive 
to the choice of the reference scenario. 
The simulations are carried out over the years 1980 to  2000 
and policy changes are introduced between 1982 and 1985 depending 
on the scenario. Comparisons are generally expressed as a percen- 
tage change of the particular variable from its value in the reference 
scenario. Moreover, three-year averages of the values of the vari- 
ables are taken for comparison. Four indicators were used to  com- 
pare scenarios: 
(1) Gross domestic product at constant 1970 prices. 
(2) Equivalent income. Equivalent income corresponding to a con- 
sumption bundle is defined as the income required under a reference 
set of prices (we used 1970 prices) to obtain the same utility as is 
provided by the given consumption bundle. This notion is similar to 
the Hicksian equivalent variation measure. 
(3) Calorie and protein intakes per capita. Although average calorie 
and protein intakes do not by themselves give a precise indication of 
the nutritional status of the population, any changes in these vari- 
ables across scenarios do suggest the direction. Since changes in pro- 
tein and calorie intakes are very similar, only results for calorie 
intake are reported here. 
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(4)  Population sufering from hunger. In order to evaluate the 
impact on hunger in different countries and in the world an indica- 
tor is generated. A cross-country regression to FAO's (1977) 
country-wise estimates of the levels of hunger is fitted to recover the 
F A 0  methodology in a reduced form that can be easily used in simu- 
lation. Using the data for the years 1969 to 1971 for 58 countries, 
the F A 0  provides estimates of percentages of populations suffering 
from hunger. 
4.2.7. Comparative advantage of the BLS 
Compared with other global policy models, the BLS can be charac- 
terized by the following: 
It is a general equilibrium system empirically estimated (and 
not benchmarked on one year's data). As a general equili- 
brium model, it distinguishes a number of commodities, but it 
distinguishes more agricultural commodities than other general 
equilibrium models. 
Governments are important actors in the system, and a broad 
range of government policies is included, modified in response 
to changes in world market prices. Thus a change in the poli- 
cies of one government affects through world market prices the 
policies of other governments, which in turn are affected by 
them. This is important because excess demand functions fat- 
ing a country may change when policies change. 
The BLS is a policy analysis tool that can explore simultaneous 
changes in several policies of different governments. 
In comparison with commodity models the strength of the BLS 
lies in the fact that the reactions to policies pertaining to other com- 
modity markets are also taken into account. However, it should 
repeated that the BLS is not meant to be a tool for short-term fore- 
casting, and hence it includes none of the usual short-term 
phenomena. The BLS is used to generate policy scenarios to give 
insight into the nature of the world economic and food system and 
to explore the effectiveness of alternative policies to alleviate hunger. 
CHAPTER 5 
The Nature of the 
World Food System: 
Why Do Many Policies Fail? 
5.1. Introduction 
The world food system consists of many actors, some powerful and 
others dependent. Together they make the system move to meet 
demand for food, to produce it in increasingly efficient ways, and to 
trade it nationally and internationally. Although the system does 
not provide stability, it has generated long-term real declines in 
prices for major staple foods (Figure 5.1). Yet, to the poor who do 
not have means to purchase food, the world economic (and political) 
system is of little help. The poor are vulnerable to  changes in the 
prices that affect them and when economic shocks occur the system 
seems to transfer the major burden of adjustment to those who are 
too poor to buy or produce the food they need. Even under stable 
economic conditions their biological requirements exceed their 
effective demand. 
This description of the nature of the world economic system is 
demonstrated in this chapter through simulations using the BLS. In 
particular, we show that hunger is a stubborn problem. It will not 
go away by merely increasing global food production or by removing 
barriers to agricultural trade. It will not go away if the rich 
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Figure 5.1. Long-term corn and wheat prices in the USA. Source: Mar- 
tin and Brokken, 1983. 
countries restrict their consumption or if they increase production, 
or even if they reduce their agricultural production to give economic 
incentives to agricultural producers in developing countries. These 
propositions are tested using the BLS by generating various policy 
scenarios until the year 2000 and comparing the results with those of 
a reference scenario. 
Before we turn to the results of the policy scenarios developed 
using the model, a word of caution is in order. Computable models 
provide numbers and quantitative estimates. Such quantification is 
important in judging the relative effects of different policies, in iden- 
tifying critical elements in the working of the global system, and in 
evaluating the direction of net effects of many interacting factors. 
However, some skepticism regarding the accuracy of such 
quantification should always be exercised. We have tried to  esti- 
mate parameters econometrically, we have tested the model in many 
ways, and we feel the workings of the model conforms to economic 
theory and common sense (certainly the results of the scenarios look 
believable). Yet one must treat these numbers with caution. 
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5.2. Popular Suggestions for Alleviating Hunger: 
Do They Work? 
Many people concerned about global development and equity are 
deeply disturbed by the conditions of abject poverty and the hunger 
suffered by millions of people in the developing world. Thinking 
about ways to alleviate hunger, they have proposed several actions, 
often pertaining to changes in the life-styles of people in the econom- 
ically advanced countries to benefit deprived people elsewhere. 
Some suggestions for life-style changes are made primarily with 
domestic objectives in mind, but these also derive some of their 
arguments from a supposedly beneficial effect on hunger in the 
world. Whatever their motives, these must be taken seriously as 
they reflect the same concerns that led to the construction of our 
models. These models can now be used to test the validity of some 
of these courses of action, and their effectiveness. 
These suggestions can be grouped according to the way they 
are supposed to work. Some focus on increasing global food sup- 
plies; others suggest ways of increasing domestic food supplies in 
developing countries; still others suggest ways to increase the real 
incomes of the poor. Nevertheless, there are some who argue that 
there is no need for any special policies to deal with hunger, as 
trickle-down of overall economic growth will take care of it in due 
course. The various suggestions grouped in this way are shown in 
Table 5.1. In this chapter we look at policies that are to work 
through the first three mechanisms listed in Table 5.1 and show why 
they are inadequate to solve the problem. Policies that increase real 
incomes of the poor will be examined in Chapter 6. 
5.2.1. Trickle-down over time: A painfully slow process 
As we have seen, the numbers of people who are chronically hungry 
have not declined over the last 40 years, despite the fact that these 
four decades have seen unprecedented economic growth at the world 
level. These decades have also witnessed an equally unprecedented 
growth in the populations in developing countries. Although global 
population growth rates are gradually slowing down, the populations 
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Table 5.1. Policy suggestions for alleviating hunger. 
Policy suggestion Policy action 
Through trickle-down No special policy needed 
over time 
Increase food supplies More production in developing countries 
on the world market Less consumption in developed countries 
UMiss a Mealn 
Avoid overconsumption and waste 
Eat less meat; feed people not pigs 
Increase food production Better production incentives 
in developing countries in developing countries 
Give better prices to producers 
Let the markets work; 
remove trade barriers 
Lower production in 
developed countries 
Increase productivity of More public investment 
the assets of the poor Develop infrastructure of roads, markets, 
electricity, and irrigation 
Research and extension 
Increase real incomes Increase demand for labor, 
of the poor particularly unskilled labor 
Through faster economic growth 
Through labor-intensive technology 
Larger emphasis on labor-intensive sector 
Technical innovation 
Make food cheaper (more expensive) 
when poor are net buyers (sellers) of food 
International migration 
Transfer of money or goods 
of the developing countries will continue to grow for many more 
decades. 
Economic growth, in general, increases employment. The asso- 
ciated increases in consumption and the demand for services also 
create some additional employment opportunities for unskilled work- 
ers. This trickle-down of the effects of economic growth, even 
without significant efforts to redistribute incomes, can be expected 
to raise, on average, the incomes of the poor. If these increases are 
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not completely offset by increases in the number of the poor due to 
population growth, one would expect some reduction in chronic 
hunger. Although trickle-down has reduced the proportion of popu- 
lations that suffer from chronic hunger, it has not eliminated it over 
the past 40 years. 
To examine to what extent trickle-down, without any specific 
policies to alleviate hunger, would reduce chronic hunger in the 
world, a model scenario was developed. This scenario is termed the 
reference scenario. It starts from the basic assumption that the pol- 
icy regimes in various countries will continue to be the same as  in 
the past. The simulation is carried out from 1980 to 2000. The 
reference scenario paints a perspective of development up to the 
year 2000 that can be characterized as follows: 
The economic growth rate is somewhat more optimistic than 
the historical trend over the 1960s and the 1970s.[l] 
Although the effective demand for food grows substantially 
because of higher incomes and larger populations, the world 
food system meets this effective demand with very modest 
increases in agricultural prices. 
Despite the continuation of existing protective policies, agricul- 
tural trade increases still further, again continuing past trends 
toward global interdependence. 
Considerable improvements in various indicators of welfare are 
noted. In particular, the proportion of the populations of poor 
countries affected by chronic hunger decrease significantly, 
although the absolute number of hungry decline only margi- 
nally and large numbers remain hungry even by the end of the 
century. 
Even though the numbers of hungry decline after 1990, they 
still constitute a sizable number. Estimates of the hungry at 
the global level are given in Table 5.2. Although the incidence 
of hunger in developing countries (excluding China) declines 
from 23% of the population in 1980 to 11% by 2000, there are 
still 400 million hungry people in 2000, somewhat less than the 
510 million shown in the scenario for 1980. This implies a 
reduction of little more than 1% per year over the projection 
period. 
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Unless economic growth in developing countries is much more 
rapid than it has been in the past, or unless their development 
strategies are dramatically reoriented to generate much more 
employment than in the past, trickle-down will reduce chronic 
hunger at a very slow pace. 
Table 5.2. Global incidence of hunger in the reference scenario. 
Population (million) 
World 
Developing countriesa 
Africa 
Asia 
Latin America 
Near East 
Hunger in developing countries (million) 
Developing countriesa 
Africa 
Asia 
Latin America 
Near East 
Percentage of population in hunger 
Developing countriesa 
Africa 
Asia 
Latin America 
Near East 
a Excluding China. 
5.2.2. Would increased global food supply and lower world 
market prices help the hungry? 
If consumers in the richer communities were to reduce overconsump- 
tion and decrease waste, or if American farmers were allowed to pro- 
duce all they wanted, or if new biotechnologies enabled food to be 
made from nonfood materials or industrial wastes, global food sup- 
ply would increase and world market prices would fall. 
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Some evidence shows that world grain prices are at  times 
raised artificially by the government policies of some major export- 
ing countries, preventing poor countries from importing more, par- 
ticularly when their needs are large. Thus, not just prices but also 
hunger are kept at a higher level. What would happen if increased 
global food supplies were to keep world prices low, permitting poor 
countries to import more than they do now? 
To explore these questions we developed a scenario in which it 
is assumed that a hypothetical country enters the market with a 
firm intention of selling, at  any price, 50 million tonnes of wheat 
each year which it gets as Ymanna from heaven" to help poor 
importers. A new additional supply channel is thus opened in the 
system that produces a fixed amount irrespective of the price, 
without any claim on production resources and demands nonagricul- 
tural goods in exchange. The 50 million tonnes were chosen to 
represent a generous estimate of the amount of cumulative food 
deficits of all those who at present do not obtain a minimum satis- 
factory diet. In other words, if this additional food supply were in 
fact to reach those people, hunger would be entirely eradicated. The 
amount is - maybe surprisingly - small and would add only about 
3% to global cereal supplies (Reutlinger and Selowsky, 1976). 
It should be emphasized that though this hypothetical country 
gets this wheat as "manna from heaven," it does not give it free to 
others but sells it on the world market in exchange for nonagricul- 
tural goods. To ease the shock to the system the additional annual 
supply to the world market starts at a level of 10 million tonnes in 
1981, reaches 50 million tonnes in 1985, and stays at  that level up to 
the end of the simulation period in the year 2000. 
As an immediate result of the increased wheat availability on 
the world market the international price of wheat falls by more than 
one-third, depressing simultaneously more or less all other agricul- 
tural prices. Supply in the model responds with a timelag, and the 
demand elasticity is low, so that this price movement is to be 
expected. The agricultural terms of trade on the world market 
decrease in the initial phase by 4.3% when weighted by production 
and even more, by 8.2%, when trade weights are used. 
The world food system, which itself is the outcome of actions 
by farmers and consumers, reacts to the deterioration of prices with 
a twofold strategy. As an immediate response, agricultural inputs 
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and resources are reallocated to more attractive agricultural sectors 
subject to flexibility constraints inherent in the agricultural sector 
and individual production possibilities. 
A series of adjustments starts as soon as the first additional 
supplies appear on the market. The international market response 
is rapid. The major wheat exporters reduce their exports by 
increasing their stocks, and importers increase their imports. Yet the 
quantity is too high to be completely absorbed at prevailing prices. 
Initially the wheat price drops and stays depressed for some time, 
but this is followed by a substantial recovery later on. 
The second-stage adjustment on the part of the exporting 
countries, after reducing their exports, is to reduce their production 
as well. This happens with different timelags, different speeds, and 
different intensities. This is the general response of all exporters. 
The second-stage adjustment on the part of the importers, 
after increasing their imports and domestic demand, is to reduce 
domestic supply. In other words, they substitute domestic produc- 
tion for cheaper imports. Of course, they reallocate their production 
capacities to other products. Because of these substitutions the con- 
sumption of wheat increases only marginally, and hungry people do 
not eat much more. 
The real advantage seems to be in the beef market. In almost 
all countries there is an upward shift in feed consumption: either 
wheat is directly used as animal feed or producers substitute wheat 
for coarse grain production. Beef production and exports in the 
exporting countries and imports in the importing countries go up, 
and for some years after the shock an upswing in the beef market is 
created, until prices and production begin to adjust. 
These two mechanisms - the reallocation of agricultural 
resources and inputs in the short run and the adjustment of inter- 
sectoral substitution and investment decisions in the long run - 
work together with the dynamics of the world market and the adap- 
tation of consumer demand to achieve a new equilibrium. This 
adaptive nature of the world food system explains its resilience to 
shocks but also its stubbornness with respect to hunger. The pro- 
tective nature of this adaptation process (protective for the rich 
agricultural producers) is captured in Figures 5.2 and 5.9, which 
show how the agricultural prices relative to the BLS reference 
scenario recover over time. 
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Figure 5.2. Index of world market prices in the manna scenario relative 
to the BLS reference scenario. 
After all these adjustments we may ask what happens to the 
additional 50 million tonnes of wheat put on the market by the ima- 
ginary country? The answer is that they have been absorbed into 
the system. Figure 5.4 shows the percentage distribution of the 
manna in terms of four "destinations": replacement of foregone pro- 
duction, human consumption, feed use, and changes in national 
buffer stocks. 
By the end of the simulation period in the year 2000, more 
than 85% of the 50 million tonnes of manna wheat supply has been 
neutralized by means of production reductions and only less than 3 
million tonnes (about 6%) are left for additional human consump- 
tion. Wheat in buffer stocks is back to levels slightly lower than 
those observed in the reference scenario. 
It needs little explanation to understand that the nutritional 
impact of the manna wheat supply is at best marginal, as can be 
seen from Table 5.5. The reduction in the estimated number of 
hungry indicator used in the BLS comes to only 2.5%, equivalent to 
about 10 million out of a total of 400 million undernourished people 
in the year 2000. Even the short-term impact on hunger as 
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Figure 5.3. Changes of world market prices relative to the BLS reference 
scenario in the manna scenario, 1985 and 2000. 
represented by the 1985 comparison seems far from dramatic - 
namely, a 6.3% decline in the hunger indicator, i.e., about 31 million 
out of 490 million hungry people. These results certainly reflect the 
rapid response of the wheat sector to changing prices on the world 
market and the limited impact through that market exercised on the 
incomes and purchasing power of the poor. 
Thus very little of the manna reaches the hungry of the coun- 
tries represented. Consequently, hunger is not eradicated; instead a 
new export and production structure is created that is more 
profitable with the new relative prices. The market mechanism does 
not take into account the needs of the poor. 
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Figure 5.4. Share of utilization of the 50 million tonnes of wheat in the 
manna scenario, 1985 and 2000. 
Table 5.3. Changes in the number of hungry: manna scenario versus 
reference scenario, 1985 and 2000. 
1985 2000 
Change in Change in 
Developing Reference manna scenario Reference manna scenario 
country scenario scenario 
group (million) (million) (%) (million) (million) (%) 
~ o t a l '  490 -3 1 -6.3 400 -10 -2.5 
High-middle 4 5 -5 -11.2 35 -1 -3.7 
income 
Low-middle 100 -6 -5.5 60 -2 -2.8 
income 
Low income4 345 -20 -5.9 305 -7 -2.2 
4 Excluding China. 
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We now consider why the world food system behaves this way. 
We also assess whether the model provides a fair description of the 
system or whether the outcome is merely due to some peculiarity of 
the model. The agricultural producers in the developed countries 
are first of all concerned with maintaining their own incomes; when 
prices change they adjust their production structure by reallocating 
their resources so that they maximize their expected incomes. So 
when 50 million tonnes of wheat are dumped on the world market 
and wheat prices fall, producers shift resources away from wheat to 
produce commodities other than wheat. Much of the additional 
wheat supplies are neutralized this way. 
A major objective of governments in developed countries is to 
protect the incomes of their farmers to maintain some desired level 
of income parity between agriculture and nonagriculture. Thus 
when the world price of wheat falls they try to counteract it first by 
putting more wheat into stocks or by changing their trade policies or 
both. At the next stage they may also lower their support prices for 
wheat and increase support prices for other agricultural commodities 
in an attempt to limit their budgetary outlays associated with farm 
income policies. This will encourage farmers to shift cropping pat- 
terns away from wheat. 
Similarly, the governments of poor developing countries also 
try to protect their domestic producers against the fall in the price 
of wheat in the international market. They try to  insulate domestic 
prices by adjusting tariffs and trade restrictions. Some will import 
more when wheat is cheaper on the world market, but the amount of 
foreign exchange they can command to import grain is usually very 
limited. Also, larger imports of basic staples such as wheat may 
violate self-sufficiency objectives that are politically motivated and 
are therefore pursued in spite of their economic costs. But even 
when they do import more, the domestic price may still not be 
allowed to  fall to reflect the decrease in the world market price fully. 
As a consequence the poor in such countries can be expected to 
benefit only marginally from the manna on the world market. 
This is how the model also characterizes the behavior of pro- 
ducers and governments. The model solution does indeed seem sen- 
sible against this background. However, we should point out one 
mechanism that can possibly change the outcome and is not cap- 
tured in the model. When food stocks build up within developed 
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countries, they may give more food aid to poor countries. The 
developing country receiving such food aid may in turn reduce its 
commercial food imports from the open market. By neglecting this 
possible switch from trade to aid, more food imports may in fact 
take place with the manna scenario than the model suggests. Still, 
it assumes that developed countries are willing to provide more aid 
and also that the aid-receiving government will pass on the benefit 
to its own consumers. In fact, the benefits of such induced aid are 
likely to be small, since food aid is often directed for political con- 
siderations to selected countries that may not necessarily be the 
neediest ones. Also, experience suggests that recipient governments 
do not usually give priority to the poor when distributing the 
benefits of food aid. 
This scenario can be interpreted in other ways too. If people 
in developed countries were to eat less wheat, more wheat would be 
available on the world market and the effects would be similar: it 
would lead to similar changes in the structure of production, trade, 
and prices with only a marginal impact on the hungry in the world. 
5.2.3. Would reduced meat  consumption in the  developed 
countries help t h e  hungry? 
One idea offered, especially by the younger generation in the 
developed countries, suggests that a reduction in meat consumption 
in the developed countries would reduce the use of grains for animal 
feed, leaving more food for the starving in developing countries. 
Since the production of a kilogram of meat requires more than 4 
kilograms of grain as feed, this idea has intuitive appeal and has 
been the subject of earlier research (Linnemann, et al., 1979). In 
most proposals of this kind, the grain saved is somehow transferred 
to developing countries. However, this cannot be assumed to take 
place by itself, since this requires a separate decision to transfer 
resources. 
During the period from 1978 to 1980 average grain production 
in the developed market economies amounted to some 545 million 
tonnes per year. Domestic consumption (production less net 
exports) amounted to 453 million tonnes, out of which approxi- 
mately 310 million tonnes (of grain equivalent), i.e., 68% of domestic 
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consumption, were fed to animals. (For details of the calculations 
performed on the underlying database, see Fischer and Sichra, 
1983.) If the calories derived from consuming the meat had instead 
been obtained by consuming the grain directly, no more than 80 mil- 
lion tonnes of grain would have been needed. Thus 230 million 
tonnes of grain would have been saved, a tremendous volume 
indeed. Using a generous estimate of average human calorie intake 
requirements in developing countries of 2500 kcal per capita per day 
suggests that a 50% reduction in meat consumption in developed 
market economies would save sufficient food for about 300 million 
people. Put another way, 1200 kcal each day could be provided for 
the 510 million people estimated to be suffering from hunger, and 
therefore could, in principle, completely resolve the hunger problem. 
Would reduced meat consumption in the developed countries, 
as may result from a spread of vegetarianism, lead to a reduction of 
hunger in the poor developing countries? In this scenario, called the 
"vegetarian scenario," the demand for meat in the developed coun- 
tries explicitly represented in the BLS (Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Japan, the EC, and the USA) is reduced gradually by 50% over the 
period from 1981 to 1990. To make up for the implied calorie gap 
due to reduced meat consumption, the demand for cereals, roots, 
vegetables, and dairy products is increased proportionally. 
These reductions in meat consumption compared to the refer- 
ence scenario amount to some 15 million tonnes of beef and lamb 
and approximately 3 million tonnes of the protein equivalent of pork 
and poultry in the year 2000. This would release roughly 110 mil- 
lion tonnes of feed grain annually. 
Again, as with the manna scenario, the economic agents in the 
system adjust in a variety of ways. The reduced demand for meat 
initially lowers meat prices, and this stimulates meat consumption. 
Thus compared with the reference scenario the actual reduction in 
meat consumption in the developed countries, where demand is 
lowered, is only 32% in 1990 and 41% in the year 2000. Even so, the 
reduction in the use of grain for animal feed in these countries is 56 
million tonnes in 1990 and 93 million tonnes in the year 2000. The 
result is that world grain production is reduced and human con- 
sumption is increased, but mainly in the developed countries; grain 
consumption in the developing countries goes up by 1.6% in 1990 
and only 0.5% in the year 2000. 
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As a consequence of the vastly changed demand pattern in the 
selected developed market economies and the resulting reduction in 
feed grain consumption, overall demand for agricultural commodi- 
ties decreases, causing a major reduction of agricultural terms of 
trade. Over the transition period, 1981 to 1990, during which the 
changes in consumption are introduced, the index of world market 
prices for agricultural goods, relative to nonagricultural prices, falls 
steadily to about 12.6% below the level observed in the reference 
scenario. The changes in agricultural prices trigger a worldwide 
adjustment process, on both the producer and the consumer sides, 
restoring agricultural prices at the end of the simulation period to 
about 3.4% below the respective values in the reference scenario. 
As a consequence of the specification of the vegetarian 
scenario, the fall in prices is especially dramatic for meat products 
and commodities used mainly for feed, such as coarse grains and 
protein feed, and to a lesser extent for wheat and rice. The only 
exceptions in the general picture are dairy products which even 
experience a price increase as a consequence of the increase in milk 
consumption to substitute partly for protein from meat products. 
Some details of the price responses at the global level are given in 
Table 5.4. 
The associated changes in production and demand for the 
grain sectors are shown in Table 5.5. Cereal production in the 
developed market economies is reduced relative to the reference 
scenario by 24 million tonnes in 1990 (-3.5%) and by 56 million 
tonnes (-6.7%) in 2000. This offsets approximately half of the reduc- 
tion in the use of grain for feed, amounting to about 56 million 
tonnes (-14.8%) and 93 million tonnes (-20.8%) in 1990 and 2000, 
respectively. 
In the developed countries, the human consumption of cereals 
increases to compensate for the implied calorie gap that arises from 
lower meat intake by no less than 15.7 million tonnes (+14.1%) by 
1990 and 22.1 million tonnes (+18.0%) in the year 2000. This 
increase in human consumption of cereals, together with the adjust- 
ment of other cereal uses and of production, leaves only about 21.3 
million tonnes (+14.9%) for additional exports in 1990 and even less 
- only 13.5 million tonnes (+6.9%) - in the year 2000. However, not 
all of this export availability of grains leads to additional consump- 
tion in the developing countries since there are similar production 
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Table 5.4. Percentage change in relative world market prices: vegetarian 
scenario relative to reference scenario, 1990 and 2000. 
Commodity 1900 2000 
Wheat -14.2 -7.5 
Rice, milled -10.2 -0.9 
Coarse grains -30.1 -10.5 
Beef and lamb -52.1 -46.7 
Dairy products +22.1 +44.0 
Other animal products -34.4 -30.6 
Protein feed -27.0 -30.6 
Other food -1.6 +5.6 
Nonfood agriculture -3.6 +10.5 
Prices of agricultural relative to 
nonagricultural products 
Production weights -12.6 -3.4 
Trade weights -16.1 4 . 8  
Table 5.5. Response of grain sectors in the vegetarian scenario and refer- 
ence scenario, 1990 and 2000. 
1990 2000 
Reference Change in Reference Change in 
scenario scenario scenario scenario 
(million (million (million (million 
tonnes) tonnes) (%) tonnes) tonnes) (%) 
Developed market economies: 
Production 694.6 -24.1 -3.5 828.4 -55.8 -6.7 
Human consumption 111.4 15.7 14.1 122.9 22.1 18.0 
Feed demand 378.3 -56.0 -14.8 446.6 -92.9 -20.8 
Total demand 548.4 -41.3 -7.5 639.5 -74.0 -11.6 
Net exports 143.0 21.3 14.9 195.0 13.5 6.9 
Developing countries (ezcluding China): 
Production 504.1 -17.4 -3.5 656.8 -20.5 -3.1 
Human consumption 33.1 7.0 1.6 578.5 2.8 0.5 
Feed demand 95.8 -2.5 -2.7 143.8 -13.9 -9.6 
Total demand 578.6 4.2 0.7 787.4 -12.8 -1.6 
Net imports 75 .O 21.4 28.6 130.4 8.2 6.3 
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adjustments in this group of countries as a result of lower farm 
prices. 
From the above outcomes it becomes obvious that the impact 
of the proposed reduction in meat consumption will fall far short of 
the level suggested by the simple back-of-the-envelope calculation 
made in the discussion of the motivation for the vegetarian scenario. 
In terms of average calorie consumption the overall effect on 
developing countries (excluding China) by the year 2000 is almost 
negligible, as shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6. Percentage change in daily calorie consumption in developing 
countries: vegetarian scenario and reference scenario, 1990 and 2000. 
Developing countries (excluding China) +1.4 +0.4 
Middle-income developing +2.3 +0.9 
Low-middle-income developing +0.6 0.0 
Low-income developing $0.8 +0.1 
Accordingly, the estimated number of hungry people (see Table 
5.7) does not change significantly in the long run. There is an aver- 
age 7% improvement by the year 1990, i.e., about 34 million fewer 
hungry people, and even that decline is largely swallowed by the 
year 2000 due to the lagging but steady adjustment of agricultural 
producers to the changing world market conditions. 
Thus although the effects are in the right direction, the reduc- 
tion in consumption by the rich is by itself inadequate to have a 
significant effect on hunger in the world. In a sense the vegetarian 
scenario is similar to the manna scenario, in that both try to channel 
more food to the poor by increasing food supplies on the world 
market. In both cases the additional food supplies come from out- 
side the poor countries where the majority of the hungry live. Both 
of these options fail to make a significant reduction in hunger for the 
same reasons. The producers adjust their production to the chang- 
ing market environment. Also, in both scenarios there is no direct 
income transfer to the poor nor any direct increase in the income 
entitlements of the poor. Their real incomes go up only to the extent 
that the prices of food that they buy fall. This does not amount to 
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Table 5.7. Estimated number of hungry people in developing countries: 
vegetarian scenario and reference scenario, 1990 and 2000. 
1990 2000 
Change in Change in 
Reference scenario Reference scenario 
scenario scenario 
(million) (million) (%) (million) (million) (%) 
Developing countries 
(excluding China) 470 -34 - 7.1 400 -6 -1.4 
Middleincome 
developing 40 - 8 -19.6 3 5 -3 -8.0 
Low-middleincome 
developing 85 - 5 - 5.8 60 -1 -0.6 
Low-income 
developing 345 -2 1 -6.0 305 -2 -0.8 
Table 5.8. Percentage change in agricultural input factors in the 
vegetarian scenario relative to the reference scenario in the year 2000. 
Volume 
Country Capital Labor Land Fertilizer index GDPA 
Australia -14.3 3.8 0.0 -41.3 -10.4 9.3 
Japan - 5.8 - 3.7 - 3.2 - 4.3 - 9.8 - 3.8 
USA n.a. n.a. - 1.9 n.a. - 6.7 - 5.1 
EC - 7.9 -11.6 - 2.2 - 4.6 -10.6 - 9.4 
Argentina -23.3 -23.0 -26.1 -26.3 -21.7 -19.4 
Brazil -11.6 -1.1 - 4 . 6  - 1.4 - 4.3 0.3 
E ~ Y  pt -14.5 -15.4 -15.3 -15.6 -11.7 -1 1.3 
India n.a. n.a. 0.0 - 2.6 0.0 0.1 
Indonesia - 3 . 7  - 0 . 1  0.0 0.2 - 0.4 - 0.4 
much, particularly after some time when producers have adjusted 
their production structures. The employment impact on the poor of 
the changed production structures is mostly adverse because lower 
agricultural prices reduce agricultural output in most countries and 
hence also reduce agricultural employment on which many of the 
poor depend (see Table 5.8). 
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5.2.4. Would a Green revolution in the OECD countries 
promote a Green revolution in the less 
developed world? 
The increased availability of food and lower prices on the world 
market would appear to be of little help to the hungry. However, 
increases in food production in the developing countries themselves 
may help because many of the poor depend on employment in the 
agricultural sector for their livelihoods. But how can developing 
countries be stimulated to put more emphasis on agriculture? Many 
developing countries tend to keep agricultural prices low and to tax 
agriculture, thus reducing incentives for farmers to grow more food. 
Assuming that higher agricultural prices on the world market are at 
least to some extent passed on to domestic markets, more remunera- 
tive prices to farmers and increased agricultural production could 
result. If world market availability is reduced and prices are 
increased for agricultural products, although the poor consumers in 
developing countries may be hurt by the higher food prices, the 
stimulus to agricultural development would in time, and one hopes 
in the not too distant future, help them too. 
Lower supply and higher prices on the world market could be 
realized if the OECD countries were to reduce their output. Sup- 
pose, for example, that the environmental concerns represented by 
the Green parties in Europe culminated in attempts to reduce the 
use of chemical fertilizers and to restrict the extent of land cul- 
tivated. A tax on fertilizer prices may be introduced to provide for 
the cost of cleaning up existing environmental pollution. To simu- 
late this "Green scenarion we stipulate the following. A tax of 50% 
is levied on fertilizer prices in the OECD countries. Moreover, total 
cultivable area is reduced by 20%. It should also be noted that, like 
in the vegetarian scenario, no additional transfers to developing 
countries take place. 
The changes are introduced over a nine-year period from 1982 
to 1990 in the OECD countries explicitly modeled in the system 
(Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, the EC, and the USA). 
Although the share of OECD countries in global agricultural pro- 
duction is less than SO%, the share in global agricultural trade is 
much larger. Thus world market prices for agricultural commodities 
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Table 5.9. Percentage changes in prices and production: Green scenario 
relative to the reference scenario, 1990 and 2000. 
Production Production 
Devel- Devel- 
World OECD oping World OECD oping 
market coun- coun- market coun- coun- 
Commodity price Total tries tries price Total tries tries 
Wheat 52 -2.6 -14.3 11.4 55 -3.4 -17.8 12.8 
Rice, milled 20 0.2 - 9.0 1.3 11 0.2 - 9.4 1.2 
Coarse grains 63 -3.4 -12.4 12.8 45 -2.4 -10.3 12.1 
Beef and lamb 8 0.1 0.7 -1.2 9 1.0 0.1 1.3 
Dairy products 22 -1.1 - 1.0 -3.8 21 -0.4 - 1.6 -1.9 
Other meat & fish 15 -2.2 - 3.7 -2.8 18 -2.7 - 6.4 -0.4 
Protein feed 35 0.1 - 0.8 1.5 44 -3.1 - 9.2 5.3 
Other food 5 0.0 - 0.7 0.6 3 0.2 - 4.6 2.1 
Nonfood products 4 -0 .1  0.9 -0.4 -2 -0.9 -0.8 0.3 
Total agriculture 17 -1.2 - 3.9 1.1 14 -1.2 - 5.8 2.5 
increase significantly and as expected agricultural production 
increases in the developing countries (see Table 5.9). 
Yet the higher domestic prices that promote increased agricul- 
tural production also lead to a lower calorie intake in most develop- 
ing countries. Moreover, in terms of consumer utility (i.e., 
equivalent income) almost all show a decline. The utility measure is 
based on the underlying utility functions behind the expenditure sys- 
terns that characterize consumer behavior. The results summarized 
in Table 5.10 indicate that even when agricultural production 
increases substantially (as it does, for example, in Nigeria, Pakistan, 
and Turkey) the average calorie intake and utility indicators may 
fall. Thus, the gains from higher incomes and food consumption in 
the agricultural sector are in most cases more than offset by the 
negative effect of higher food prices on food consumption of those 
who are net buyers of food. 
In the previous scenarios it was seen that lower world market 
prices have slight but positive effects on reducing hunger. Higher 
world market prices have, not unexpectedly, the opposite effect by 
reducing food consumption in developing countries. Even after 15 
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Table 5.10. Impact on developing countries: Green scenario compared 
with the reference scenario (percentage changes by 2000). 
GDP 
Relative GDP agricul- 
price of Food at ture at Equi- 
agriculture price 1970 1970 Calorie valent Persons 
Country (pa /Pn)  index prices prices intake income hungry 
Argentina 11.5 5.1 0.2 6.1 -0.5 2.1 9.5 
Brazil 8.6 5.1 -0.2 0.7 -1.1 -0.8 24.1 
Egypt 16.5 8.3 -1.4 -3.1 -0.7 -0.4 - 
India 6.1 - 0.4 -0.1 -2.1 -0.3 13.6 
Indonesia 3.6 2.0 0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.2 - 
Kenya 11.2 9.7 1.6 4.5 1.3 - -6.2 
Nigeria 0.6 2.6 1.2 9.6 -0.6 0.4 53.4 
Pakistan -0.2 0.6 -0.2 7.1 -0.8 2.1 11.1 
Thailand 13.9 7.1 0.2 4.7 -0.4 - 4.7 
Turkey 6.8 2.8 0.5 8.6 -0.3 0.4 6.8 
All developing 
countries - - -0.2 1.6 -0.9 - 9.0 
Pa agricultural prices; Pn nonagricultural prices. 
years of increased production in the year 2000, there are 9% more 
hungry people than in the reference scenario. 
5.2.5. Would agricultural trade liberalization and 
"right prices" help reduce hunger? 
The World Bank and the IMF have repeatedly advised developing 
countries to liberalize their economies. The developing countries are 
often told that if only they get their "prices rightn and let the mark- 
ets work (Yeutter, 1989) to increase the incentives to their farmers, 
the hunger problem would take care of itself. In contrast, although 
the Green scenario demonstrates the effects of higher world market 
prices on developing countries and on hunger, it differs in that it is 
assumed that the domestic policy regimes in the developing coun- 
tries are not changed. Several countries with domestic price regimes 
isolate domestic prices of staple food products from international 
prices. In liberalization scenarios these regimes are assumed to 
change, with increased transmission from world market movements 
to domestic prices. 
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The impacts of agricultural trade liberalization on the global 
food system and on national economies have been described in detail 
by Parikh et al. (1988), and so here we give only a brief summary of 
some relevant aspects. 
The Notion of Agricultural Trade Liberalization 
The analysis of trade liberalization in this study is restricted to the 
removal of distortions between trade prices and domestic prices at 
the level of raw materials of the agricultural commodities. They do 
not remove all distortion-creating measures from all market and pro- 
duction activities. Thus, the scenarios move toward free trade and 
not to total trade liberalization so that they should be characterized 
as "freer" trade scenarios. The reason for restricting the analysis to 
removal of border protection measures only is the difficulty in 
obtaining accurate information on all trade-distorting measures. 
For some country models additional changes are introduced. In 
the case of the US model, land set-aside programs are also removed 
in the scenarios in which the USA liberalizes trade. The wedges 
existing between the consumer and producer prices for wheat, coarse 
grain, and beef and lamb in Japan, and for wheat in Nigeria are also 
set to zero when these countries liberalize; and in Canada the quotas 
imposed on dairy production in the reference scenario are removed 
when it liberalizes. The monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) 
that are given to EC member countries are still implicitly included 
in the producer prices, since the EC is treated as one aggregated 
country. The kind of distortion resulting from this takes a much 
more elaborate model to assess. Since, however, the MCAs are 
small in comparison with the EC's protection against third coun- 
tries, one might argue that their impact is not very drastic. This is 
especially so if one works with the hypothesis that the MCAs distort 
only the (absolute) price levels between the EC member countries 
but not the relative prices of agriculture, which are the same in all 
EC member countries. Of course, to the extent that the MCAs vary 
across commodities and across countries, the relative prices will vary 
throughout the EC. 
Thus, in our analysis of trade liberalization where these calcu- 
lated tariff equivalents are removed, only the assistance given at the 
border is abolished. The assistance given for domestic production 
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or consumption or both is not affected by the removal of tariff 
equivalents. This holds for all types of domestic assistance, such as 
subsidies on nonagricultural inputs, price support payments, storage 
subsidies, deficiency payments, production quotas, consumer subsi- 
dies, transportation subsidies, marketing licenses, export credit, 
insurance support, and so on. 
Trade liberalization is partial in our analysis in yet another 
sense. Agricultural trade liberalization is done in the scenarios by 
removing protection from agricultural commodities, as reflected in 
the protection factors estimated. Because reliable information on 
the protection factor for nonagriculture is not available, it is not 
removed from the nonagricultural sector. As a consequence, trade 
liberalization here is partial. Relative distortions among agricultural 
commodities are removed, but the relative distortion between agri- 
cultural and nonagricultural sectors is not fully removed. The pro- 
tection factors as indicated by available crude estimates for the 
nonagriculture sector are much smaller compared to those for agri- 
cultural commodities in the developed market economies. Thus, the 
removal of distortion from the nonagricultural sector should have a 
small impact on the overall results when only these countries liberal- 
ize. Yet, the rich countries strongly protect some of the products of 
interest to LDCs, such as processed food and textiles. Thus the 
effects on the LDC exporters could be somewhat distorted in these 
scenarios. Full liberalization would favor exports of manufactures 
from developing countries, possibly at  the expense of somewhat 
lower primary product exports. In the estimates presented here, 
some underestimates of overall export growth may be presumed, and 
a possible overestimate of agricultural exports. But these are no 
more than intuitive presumptions. 
For the developing countries, the nonagricultural protection 
factors may be expected to be somewhat larger but many play a 
comparatively modest role on the world market. Thus, here also, 
the effects on the results for the world market should be small. Of 
course, for individual countries the results can be significantly 
affected by total liberalization.[2] 
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The Scenarios 
In alternative scenarios of agricultural trade liberalization different 
groups of countries liberalize. These scenarios are designated by F- 
OECD, F-LDC, and F-ALLME, where F refers to freer trade and 
the countries liberalizing are indicated in the designation (see Table 
5.11). The results are compared with the BLS reference scenario. 
Table 5.11. List of agricultural trade liberalization scenarios. 
Designation Description 
F-OECD All OECD countries excluding Turkey 
F-LDC All developing countries excluding China 
F-ALLME All market economies 
In all the trade liberalization scenarios discussed, it is assumed 
that China and the CMEA countries do not participate in trade 
liberalization, though they do moderately modify their trade pat- 
terns in response to changing world prices. 
All the scenarios are run from 1980 to 2000. Trade liberaliza- 
tion is gradually introduced over a five-year period, from 1982 to 
1986, so that 1986 is the first year of fully liberalized agricultural 
trade. In these scenarios agricultural trade is liberalized without the 
introduction of any compensating lump-sum transfers either within 
countries or among countries. 
Impact on World Market Conditions 
The changes in the relative prices of agricultural commodities on the 
world market compared with the reference scenario for the three 
trade liberalization scenarios are summarized in Table 5.1 2. When 
the LDCs liberalize, the aggregate price of agriculture (production- 
weighted) goes down, but, when the OECD countries liberalize, it 
goes up. This is what one would expect since the OECD countries 
in general protect their agriculture to a much greater extent than do 
developing countries, many of whom in fact tax their agriculture.[3] 
What is also worth noting in Table 5.12 is that the structure of rela- 
tive prices of agricultural commodities differs significantly depending 
9 Table 5.12. Changes in world market prices and global net exports (percentage change over the refer- 
ence scenario). a T: 
0' 
Relative prices Net exports 2 
1990 2000 1990 2000 2 o 
EL 
Commodity F-ALLME F-ALLME F-OECD F-LDC F-ALLME F-ALLME F-OECD F-LDC ta 
's 
Wheat 16 23 18 5 1 3 -2 3 
Rice 22 16 2 1 1 35 36 3 7 -12 
T 
Coarse grains 17 13 11 4 -4 -3 -5 0 
Beef and lamb 26 11 17 -3 52 69 35 27 
Dairy products 38 34 3 1 12 30 24 13 24 
Other animal 
products 3 - 1 -0 1 3 14 17 -4 
Protein feed 11 13 13 1 5 4 5 -1 
Other food -1 -3 5 -6 4 10 10 -2 
Nonfood 
agriculture -1 1 -17 -2 -14 5 6 5 0 
Nonagriculture 0 0 0 0 13 13 17 -3 
Total agriculture 9 5 9 -2 
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on which group of countries liberalizes. Although the aggregate 
price of agriculture changes by a small amount, changes in prices of 
some of the commodities are large. 
In spite of large changes in prices of many commodities, global 
production levels change only marginally (see Table 5.19). This 
again is an understandable outcome since the demand for agricul- 
tural products is largely price inelastic in the richer countries who 
dominate global trade. The global production adjusts to meet the 
small change in global demand. However, the levels of global net 
exports change substantially so that for an individual country, the 
world market environment can significantly alter its opportunities. 
Table 5.13. Changes in global production levels in trade liberalization 
scenarios (percentage change over the reference scenario). 
F-ALLME F-OECD F-LDC 
Commodity 1990 2000 2000 2000 
Wheat 1.4 1.5 0.5 1.5 
Rice 1.3 1.6 1.2 0.7 
Coarse grain 0.7 1.7 1.7 -0.0 
Beef and lamb 2.2 5.3 3.3 1.6 
Dairy products 1.2 2.4 1.9 0.4 
Other animal products 0.7 1 .O 0.8 -0.0 
Protein feed 2.7 2.3 2.0 0.3 
Other food 0.2 +O.O 0.2 -0.3 
Nonfood agriculture -0.1 +1.1 -1.5 -0.3 
Nonagriculture +O.O -0.0 -0.0 -0.3 
Total agriculture 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.1 
Impact on Growth and Sectoral Composition 
The changes in world market prices affect domestic prices of indivi- 
dual countries. The effects depend on changes in their trade poli- 
cies. Table 5.11 shows changes in domestic prices, growth of aggre- 
gate GDP, and growth of agricultural GDP in selected countries. 
The aggregate numbers in Table 5.11 should be interpreted 
with caution, since they involve pitfalls of aggregation. Yet these 
numbers show that, in general, agricultural GDP does respond to 
relative prices of agriculture. However, the impact of agricultural 
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Table 5.14. Impact on relative price of agriculture on GDP and agricul- 
tural GDP (percentage change over reference scenario for the year 2000). 
Numbers rounded off: +O means > 0 but < 0.5; -0 means > -0.5 but < 0. 
Agricultural trade liberalization by 
F-ALLME F-LDC F-OECD 
GDP GDP GDP 
Country Pa/Pn GDP agric. Pa/Pn GDP agric. Pa/Pn GDP agric. 
Japan -39 +O -6 -1 +O -0 -35 +O -5 
EC -12 $0 -8 -0 +O -1 -9 +O -7 
USA -5 +O 1 -0 +O +O -2 +O 2 
New Zealand 8 1 11 -3 -0 -2 16 2 14 
Canada 13 -0 17 -0 -0 1 16 -0 17 
Australia 9 +O 1 -6 -0 -1 15 +O 3 
Austria 6 +O +O -3 +O -2 8 -0 2 
Turkey -10 1 -9 -13 2 -14 1 -0 6 
Pakistan - 1 3 -1 -10 3 -9 +1 -0 3 
Nigeria -9 -1 -1 -9 -2 -7 +O 1 7 
Egypt 8 -3 5 1 2 -4 5 -1 2 
Mexico -5 -4 1 -5 -2 -3 -1 -2 4 
India 3 +O -0 -2 -0 -1 3 +O +O 
Argentina 48 -0 47 31 +O 29 12 0 14 
Brazil 25 -1 7 18 -1 6 8 -0 1 
Indonesia 17 1 6 13 1 4 2 +O +O 
Thailand 20 +O 6 14 +O 4 8 +O 3 
Kenya 15 3 10 7 1 4 11 2 5 
Pa/Pn = Price of agriculture/price of nonagriculture weighted by domestic pro- 
duction. 
GDP at constant 1970 prices. 
trade liberalization on aggregate economic growth is rather small. 
Even after 15 years of liberalization, for many countries the GDP 
hardly changes. For developed market economies this is as expected 
because agriculture is a small part of the economy. For the develop- 
ing countries this is rather surprising; even with large changes in the 
relative price of agriculture and consequent significant changes in 
agricultural GDP, the aggregate GDP changes but little. Yet the 
result is understandable. Higher agricultural growth comes about as 
a result of additional investment in agriculture, which in the absence 
of any additional aid is realized by reducing investment in 
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nonagriculture. Thus, changes in the relative price of agriculture do 
alter sectoral proportions but their impact on total GDP is rather 
small. 
Another point to note in Table 5.14 is that policies of other 
countries do matter. For example, when only the LDCs liberalize, 
Egypt's GDP goes up. However, when along with the LDCs the 
OECD countries also do so, as in the scenario F-ALLME, Egypt's 
GDP falls. 
We should emphasize once more that agricultural trade liberal- 
ization here is only partial and that some of the commodities of par- 
ticular interest to many developing countries such as sugar, coffee, 
and tea are not distinguished as separate commodities in the models. 
Disaggregated analysis may change the result for some developing 
countries, but the broad nature of the results may not be expected 
to change. General equilibrium models of trade liberalization do not 
seem to show large efficiency gains due to changes in sector propor- 
tions (Whalley, 1985), perhaps because such models usually account 
only for gains due to movements along the production possibility 
frontier. It is often argued that the potential gains from the removal 
of wasteful rent-seeking, directly unproductive activities, and the 
introduction of greater competition and efficiency brought about by 
freer trade can be significant (Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati and Sriniva- 
san, 1982; Harris, 1986). 
Although in these simulations the agriculture-nonagriculture 
sector proportions seem to be unimportant for growth, one should 
also look at the results from a different perspective. A small change 
in sector proportions can lead to large changes in relative prices. 
Therefore, the objective of price stability requires that either the 
sector balance is carefully set or that trade policy is flexible. 
Impacts on Equivalent Incomes, Food Intake, and Chronic Hunger 
Even when agricultural trade regimes, relative prices of agriculture, 
and sector proportions seem to have little impact on the aggregate 
GDP of an economy these could have important consequences for 
equivalent incomes, food intakes, and the level of chronic hunger. 
Table 5.15 shows these effects on selected countries. 
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Average equivalent income (see Section 4.2.6) is in some sense 
a better measure than per capita GDP to see the impact on growth. 
It accounts for consumer preferences (at least the preferences 
implied by the demand system of the average consumer, whatever 
that may mean), which per capita GDP does not do. In general, the 
observed changes in equivalent income are similar to changes in 
GDP, though for some countries the two do show different signs. 
Nonetheless, the conclusion remains that agricultural trade liberali- 
zation makes a small impact on the economic growth of developing 
countries, even in equivalent incomes. 
Even when the average consumer's equivalent income becomes 
better-off, particular groups of consumers may be worse-off. Thus, 
their food intake may go down and hunger may still increase. For 
example, for Argentina in all three scenarios equivalent income 
increases but calorie intake falls and hunger increases. Similarly, 
but in reverse, equivalent income falls in Mexico but calorie intake 
increases and the number of hungry falls. 
The estimates of hunger are based on calorie intake and con- 
stant income distribution patterns. The changes in calorie intake 
and in hunger are therefore consistent. Nonetheless, it is worth not- 
ing that percentage changes in the levels of hunger are much larger 
compared with changes in average calorie intake. (However, the 
very large percentage changes in hunger in Table 5.15 reflect the 
very low level of hunger in the reference scenario for several coun- 
tries.) What emerges from these scenarios is that when agricultural 
trade liberalization increases domestic food prices in a developing 
country, calorie intake may go down even when real income 
increases and this has an adverse impact on the chronically hungry 
in the country. 
For developing countries as a whole the changes in hunger lev- 
els are summarized in Table 5.16. In addition to the countries 
shown in Table 5.15, these numbers also include other LDCs 
(though it is assumed that there is no hunger in China). 
It can be seen that the global level of chronic hunger is some- 
what affected by agricultural trade liberalization. When only the 
LDCs liberalize, the world price of agriculture goes down and 
hunger in the world is somewhat reduced. When only the OECD 
countries liberalize does the reverse happen. When all market 
economies liberalize then hunger goes up marginally. 
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Table 5.16. Impact on hunger of various agricultural trade liberalization 
scenarios (percentage change in the level of hunger over the reference 
scenario). 
- - - 
Scenario 1990 2000 
- - 
F-ALLME 
F-OECD 
F-LDC 
Summary 
The results indicate that agricultural trade regimes and the associ- 
ated relative prices and sectoral balances, though important for their 
impact primarily on food intake and hunger in a country do not pro- 
vide a solution to the problem of hunger. As we have seen, a move 
to liberalize agricultural trade results in small changes in growth 
and sectoral balances but has no significant impact on hunger. 
We now reiterate three limitations of our analysis. The first is 
that only agricultural trade is liberalized. Our results may not be 
generalized to liberalization of other sectors. The second limitation 
is that some possible gains from trade liberalization due to the aboli- 
tion of rent-seeking, directly unproductive activities are not cap- 
tured in our analysis. We recognize the possibility that such gains 
may be large. However, the significance and extent of such gains, 
particularly for agriculture, remain to be demonstrated empirically. 
The third limitation is that because of the need to aggregate commo- 
dities, such as sugar, tea, coffee, and cocoa, in one group, gains from 
freer trade in such commodities to small countries exporting these 
commodities may be understated. For major exporters of such com- 
modities the possible adverse effects of the loss of terms of trade is 
also not fully accounted for due to aggregation. Nonetheless, for the 
developing countries with separate national models in our system, 
the impact of such an understatement, we believe, is not likely to 
change the nature of the results nor our conclusions. 
Finally, although we have shown the importance of relative 
prices for hunger, we wish to emphasize that price policy alone can- 
not adequately deal with hunger in the sense of virtually eliminating 
it by the year 2000. 
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5.3. Concluding Comments 
A reference scenario with relatively optimistic growth rates shows 
that, although the numbers of hungry in the world will go down, 
many people are likely to continue to remain hungry by the year 
2000. 
Increased supplies on the world market are absorbed into the 
system as producers, consumers, traders, and governments adapt 
their behavior with negligible improvement in the consumption of 
poor consumers in poor countries. 
Reduced meat consumption in the developed countries, as may 
be expected from a spread of vegetarianism, frees up resources from 
the production of animal feed that could, in principle, be directed to 
the provision of more food for the poor. However, this again would 
have no significant impact on the hungry. 
Reduced agricultural production in the OECD countries will 
increase world market prices, increase export opportunities for 
developing country exporters, and increase domestic agricultural 
prices in those countries, thus stimulating their production, which in 
the long run (hopefully not too long a run) would benefit the poor. 
In this case the results show that although domestic agricultural 
production does increase as expected, the calorie intake or utility 
measures suggest that consumers would be worse-off even after 15 
years. 
Agricultural trade liberalization does provide incentives to 
increase domestic agricultural production in many developing coun- 
tries and in a number of them the agricultural GDPs also increase. 
However, the higher agricultural growth is brought about by divert- 
ing resources from the nonagriculture sector and the aggregate GDP 
changes little. 
When the developing countries liberalize their agricultural 
trade but the OECD countries do not, there is a small reduction in 
hunger. This gain disappears when the OECD countries also 
liberalize. Thus, agricultural trade liberalization would provide no 
solution to the hunger problem. 
Therefore solutions that attempt to deal with hunger through 
the market mechanism, either through increasing supply on the 
world market or through increased agricultural production in the 
developing countries, do not work well enough. The present world 
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food system is shown to be resilient for the rich but stubborn for the 
starving. 
Notes 
[ I ]  Growth in the 1980s was actually much slower than in the preceding two 
decades. 
12) In fact, model scenarios in which crudely estimated nonagricultural pro- 
tection factors were also removed confirmed these expectations. The main 
reeults at the global level and the character of the scenarios did not change 
significantly. A significant impact on the size of efficiency gains and losses 
for some developing countries was seen but that too was not dramatic nor 
did it alter the qualitative picture. In any case, it does suggest the need 
for having better estimates of nonagricultural protection factors. 
[3] Negative protection is, like positive protection, removed in these scenarios 
to the extent that it is effected through export taxation. 
CHAPTER 6 
Policies that Effectively 
Reduce Hunger 
6.1. What Works and Why? 
The search for effective policies to reduce hunger requires that a 
closer look be taken at  the character of the issue to be tackled. 
Those who suffer from hunger appear not to be a part of the mark- 
ets for food, which raises questions about the reasons for their exclu- 
sion. These indications of the economic position of chronically 
hungry people should, in turn, suggest effective ways to  improve 
their access to  food. The main characteristics of the problem of 
chronic hunger, emanating from a large body of research in develop- 
ing countries, are the following: 
Hunger is closely related to poverty, manifested as the inade- 
quacy of available purchasing power to obtain sufficient food in 
the market. 
The largest proportion of poor people (some 70% to 80%) live 
in rural areas that are not within easy reach. 
The urban poor and a major part of the rural poor earn their 
incomes by offering unskilled labor in markets with abundant 
supplies of such labor. 
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Rural families, particularly in Africa, use primitive agricultural 
technologies and are unable to produce enough food for sub- 
sistence even with full use of all available labor. 
No safety net exists to maintain minimum levels of income to 
people not employable: the old, the sick, and the disabled. 
Also an adequate household food supply is no guarantee that 
all members of the household, particularly women and chil- 
dren, will obtain what they need. 
In some countries and regions local social structures permit the 
exploitation of abundant labor by those endowed with control 
over complementary production factors. 
The daily concerns of the poor with survival and their lack of 
resources severely limit their influence on national priorities for 
development. 
Even when policy priorities stress the needs of the poor, 
effective instruments are difficult to identify and to apply. 
What these characteristics suggest is that in order to deal with 
hunger we first have to deal with poverty. This means increasing 
the value of the endowments the poor have, namely, unskilled labor 
and land if any, or giving them other endowments through transfers. 
The value of unskilled labor could be increased by increasing its 
demand or reducing its supply, or by developing skills through edu- 
cation and training. The value of land could be improved by invest- 
ments in land improvement, through irrigation, drainage, and level- 
ing operations, perhaps using labor-intensive methods. The impact 
of various policies can be enhanced by lowering population growth 
rates. Some policy actions that may be effective in reducing hunger 
include the following: 
(1) Lower population growth rates. 
(2) Rural works programs and investments in land development 
such as irrigation, drainage, and leveling. 
(3) Food and other aid. 
(4) International migration. 
We now discuss each policy in turn. 
Policies that Effectively Reduce Hunger 
6.1.1. Lower population growth rates 
Lower population growth can benefit the poor in several ways. For 
an economy whose growth rate is limited by the available aggregate 
investment, a smaller population means higher per capita incomes. 
Thus with the same income distribution the poor would have higher 
incomes and would be able to buy more food. Smaller population 
growth also means more land per capita and that there would be 
fewer landless and marginal farmers. With the labor supply reduced, 
wage rates would go up. This would also reduce hunger. But this 
conclusion depends on the assumption of unchanged aggregate 
investment and savings. 
Unfortunately, without coercion, population growth rates fall 
rather slowly and often significant reductions occur in groups with 
higher per capita incomes. Thus there is a chicken-and-egg problem 
here. To raise incomes we need to lower population growth and to 
lower population growth we need higher incomes. In peacetime, 
infant mortality and the birth rate are the main levers of demo- 
graphic change but their impacts are very slow. Over a period of, 
say, twenty years starting today, population size largely depends on 
the number of those alive. Thus, changing the population growth 
rate is more of the nature of an analytical exercise to find out about 
long-run effects 'projected" on the near future. Nonetheless it is 
worth exploring the impact of lower population growth. 
To do so, a BLS scenario has been designed where population 
growth in developing countries (excluding China) is gradually 
reduced to 75% of its value in the BLS reference scenario. Hence, 
average annual population growth in these countries for the years 
from 1990 to 2000 is reduced to 1.8% per annum compared with 
2.3% in the reference scenario. Table 6.1 shows the adjusted popu- 
lation projections used in the simulation run. Accordingly, the 
estimated number of people in the developing world in the year 2000 
(excluding China) would drop from 3587 million to 3281 million, i.e., 
by 7.2% or some 306 million people. On a world scale this would 
represent a 4.2% reduction. 
The reduced population would lead to a somewhat reduced 
production capacity in the developing countries; however, on a per 
capita basis indicators such as GDP or grain production increase by 
3% to 5% (see Table 6.2). It comes as no surprise that the estimated 
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Table 6.1. Reduced population growth scenario (population in millions). 
A  POP- A  POP- 
RS RGS ulation A  % RS RGS ulation A  % 
World 5,189 5,130 
DEV 2,803 2,743 
Middle income 502 491 
Low-mid. income 889 870 
Low income 1,412 1,382 
PGR > 2.5% p.a. 939 915 
P G R  < 2.5% p.a. 1,864 1,827 
RS = Reference scenario. 
RGS = Reduced growth scenario. 
DEV = Developing countries. 
PGR = Average annual population growth from 1990 to 2000 in the reference 
scenario. 
Table 6.2. Percentage changes in selected indicators in the year 2000, re- 
duced population growth scenario relative to  the BLS reference scenario. 
World DME DEV 
A %  A %  
A  % per capita A  % A  % per capita 
Population -4.2 0.0 -7.3 
G D P  -0.6 3.7 +O.O -4.3 3.2 
G D P  agriculture -1 .O 3.3 -0.3 3.0 4.6 
Cereal production -1.2 3.1 -1.0 -2.4 5.2 
Net calorie production -1.6 2.7 -1.6 -2.5 5.2 
DME = Developed market economies. 
DEV = Developing countries, excluding China. 
number of people with inadequate diets drops significantly compared 
to the BLS reference scenario. There are fewer people, with higher 
incomes and slightly lower food prices; the results are summarized in 
Table 6.9. In summary, a reduction of population in developing 
countries of 306 million people by the year 2000, as assumed in the 
reduced population growth scenario, leads to  131 million fewer 
suffering from hunger. Hence, the scenario results suggest that  in 
the medium term, around the growth pattern assumed in the 
La 
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Table 6.3. Impact of reduced population growth rates on the level of hunger. 2.. 
X 
r' Reference scenario Reduced population growth scenario R 
1990 2000 1990 2000 t n 
Change in Change in 
number of number of 3 
hungry relative hungry relative 4 't
No. of % of No. of % of to reference to reference 
hungry total hungry total scenario % scenario % 
(mln) pop. (mln) pop. (mln) change (mln) change 
Developing countries 473 16.9 396 11.2 -4 1 -8.8 -131 -33.0 
Middle income 40 7.9 34 5.4 - 5 -12.9 - -47.8 
Low-middle income 84 9.5 57 5.1 -10 -12.0 - 24 -42.0 
Low income 349 24.7 305 17.0 -26 - 7.5 - 91  -29.8 
PGR > 2.5% p.a. 159 16.9 150 12.1 -2 1 -13.2 - 61 -40.9 
PGR < 2.5% pea. 314 16.8 246 10.7 -20 - 6.5 - 71 -28.8 
PGR = average annual population growth from 1990 to 2000 in the reference scenario. 
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reference scenario, for every 100 children fewer born in the develop- 
ing world there would be 50 fewer starving. Population pressure 
and insufficient success in decreasing net population growth rates in 
developing countries certainly hinder attempts to solve the world's 
hunger problem. Of course, this should by no means be an excuse 
for not trying to find other measures that would reduce poverty and 
hunger. 
In this scenario we introduced a 5% reduction in population 
growth rates in all developing countries. If it were possible to 
reduce the population growth rate of the poor proportionately more, 
the benefits of lower population growth on reduction in hunger 
would have been larger than those shown in the scenarios. 
6.1.2. R u r a l  works programs a n d  investment in 
l and  development 
Since many of the poor depend on agriculture for their incomes, 
increased agricultural productivity can be expected to help the poor 
gain higher incomes and to make more food available, which should 
reduce hunger. Land is the most critical resource in land-scarce 
Asian countries with high population densities, where the majority 
of the hungry live. In Africa land is not so scarce, but productivity 
is low for want of water or drainage. Thus investment in irrigation 
and drainage that would improve land productivity offer an attrac- 
tive option to deal with the problem of hunger. 
We noted in Chapter 5 that increased food production in 
response to high food prices does not help to alleviate hunger 
significantly, but investment in land improvement such as irrigation, 
drainage, and leveling could increase output without increasing food 
prices. Moreover, such investment can be very labor-intensive and 
the additional employment could provide scope to increase the 
incomes of the poor. 
In countries where the poor are hampered in their quest for 
higher incomes by the lack of productive employment opportunities, 
there is an obvious case for creating additional wage employment. 
This is particularly attractive in rural areas during the agricultural 
slack season, providing incomes to those who cannot be expected to 
be absorbed by the employment creation associated with the overall 
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economic growth process. Rural works programs could thus be 
effective in providing targeted income supplements to those in 
greatest need. Beyond that, it is possible to use these programs for 
the creation of productive assets that would contribute to economic 
growth. If such programs become sufficiently widespread to operate 
as employment guarantees, then the wage rate offered would become 
an effective minimum wage. 
There is considerable experience with programs of this kind in 
southern Asia and in China. Some have used food aid as a main 
source of financing, paying wages partly or entirely in the form of 
grain. Such programs have not been without problems (technical as 
well as managerial) in preparing and executing them and in main- 
taining the assets created. The programs are small in relation to the 
total demand for employment, and a rapid expansion could easily 
overtax local organizational capabilities, leading to larger leakages 
and reducing the income benefits for the rural poor. 
There may also be institutional obstacles to such programs. 
The creation of additional employment opportunities for the rural 
poor would tend to increase wage rates and thus may be resisted by 
the relatively well-off and economically powerful rural landholders 
who employ wage labor. Also, when land is unevenly distributed, 
the benefits of productivity improvements accrue unevenly and 
mostly to the larger landowners. It may also not be possible to tax 
the landowners to recover from them the costs of land improvement. 
Still, most observers agree that land development programs could be 
expanded and that their benefits are sufficient to justify larger 
programs. 
India: Rural Works Programs Can Be Egective but Cannot be 
Financed Solely by Domestic Resources 
For an analysis of the effectiveness and consequences of rural pro- 
grams one cannot rely on a single set of assumptions, and so expan- 
sion of this approach is fraught with uncertainties. These pertain to 
the methods of financing, the leakages in reaching the poorest rural 
groups, the productivity of the assets to be created, and the wage 
rate to be set. In our analysis carried out with the model of India, 
the choice is made for a program that provides a wage of about 
Rs 6 (in 1985 prices) per person for each day worked, paid in the 
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Table 6.4. Impact of rural works programs on growth and on the rural 
poor (percentage changes from the reference scenario in the year 2000). 
Scenario specifications Estimated results 
Addi- 
tional 
tax 
(% of 
cost) 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Target- 
ing 
effec- 
tiveness 
(%I 
100 
100 
50 
50 
50 
Invest- 
ment 
effec- 
tiveness 
(%I 
100 
100 
100 
50 
0 
GDP 
Per. 
capita 
(1970$) 
3.5 
-4.6 
-3.7 
-7.3 
-11.8 
Average 
calorie 
intake 
Per 
capita 
Calorie intake per capita 
Poorest Two poorest 
class classes 
form of wheat a t  the prevailing market price. The two rural classes 
with lowest incomes in the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors 
of the rural economy are assumed to participate a t  a rate of about 
200 person days for each family. An additional 50% is added to the 
wage costs of the program for materials, equipment supplies, trans- 
portation, and other overheads, and the total is charged against the 
government budget. 
Also, it is assumed that in the best case the assets created by 
the rural works programs are as effective as normal investments in 
increasing agricultural productivity. Even though there is some evi- 
dence that well-planned and well-executed land development pro- 
jects can be very productive, this assumption is made to eliminate 
the suspicion that the results of the scenario depend on the assump- 
tion of such productivity gains, which may appear "magical." More- 
over, the scope for such "magical" land-improving investment is lim- 
ited and may not provide opportunities to generate the needed 
employment . 
In terms of effectiveness, alternatives are analyzed regarding 
the leakages of benefits to other income groups and the productive 
value of the assets created by the program. As for financing, the 
assumption is made that the government either will raise sufficient 
additional revenues from taxes on households or will offset the costs 
by reducing other public investment outlays. Table 6.4 presents 
some alternatives and their results, compared with the reference 
Policies that Effectively Reduce Hunger 14 1 
scenario. The latter contains only the existing food rationing 
scheme for the urban population. 
In all classes there is a major improvement in the food situa- 
tion of the poorest rural classes, even when the targeting 
effectiveness is assumed to be only half of the total wage bill. In fact, 
the calorie intake is improved so much for those groups that  one 
may conclude that hunger would be eradicated particularly when 
targeting is successful and the investments made are productive. 
These results are the same regardless of how the program is 
financed, i.e., either through increased taxes or through reductions 
' in other investments. Also, with less optimistic assumptions about 
targeting effectiveness, dietary improvements for the poorest classes 
remain impressive; logically the pessimistic assumption that, in the 
last alternative presented, no productive assets would be created has 
no effect on the improvement of the situation of these poorest 
groups, but the GDP per capita is significantly lower. 
This result should be seen in conjunction with the implications 
for the entire economy of India, which are not small and are strongly 
dependent on the assumptions made with respect to the modes of 
financing and the effectiveness of rural works programs to create 
productive assets. If the program is financed by additional taxation, 
overall economic growth is accelerated significantly and the national 
average calorie intake improves even more rapidly, leaving no 
groups worse-off but the poorest groups considerably better-off. 
However, how realistic is the presumed tax effort that will be needed 
to achieve this attractive result? Taxes on household incomes in 
1980 amounted to about 2% of GDP (excluding taxes on foreign 
trade and on corporations) in India and would need to be raised to 
some 8% or 9% of GDP to generate the resources required. 
Although 2% of GDP may seem a small level of taxation, one has to 
realize that it is collected from a very small fraction of the popula- 
tion. In 1988 India had 7 million taxpayers out of a population of 
more than 800 million. India has one of the highest tax rates in the 
world; in 1990, incomes above Rs 22,000 (US $1250) per year were 
taxed, and those above RS 100,000 had a marginal tax rate of 54%. 
Thus to  raise direct taxes to 8% of the GDP from the relatively rich, 
the tax rate would have to be so high that evasion would be 
widespread. Even though the additional financial resources would 
gradually become a smaller part of taxation in time, it is hardly 
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likely that an increase of this magnitude could be achieved, particu- 
larly when the purpose is so clearly the transfer of resources from 
the rich to poor. 
If the rural works program were to replace the regular public 
investment program, thus avoiding the need for additional taxation, 
the macroeconomic effects would be much less attractive because 
there would be a significant reduction in economic growth. This loss 
of growth momentum has increased pessimism about the 
effectiveness of rural works programs to contribute to the creation of 
productive assets. In the least attractive case, in which the program 
involves digging holes and filling them again, the level of per capita 
GDP in 2000 is set back by 12% and it is likely that the gains of the 
poorest classes in terms of calorie intake would be offset by reduc- 
tions in the nutritional status of the next higher income classes. In 
overall terms, growth is reduced from an annual average of 5% in 
GDP in the reference scenario to barely 4.5%, which is a consider- 
able price to pay. 
In the process of introducing rural works programs, we also 
consider the consequences for the balance of payments. In all 
scenarios it is assumed that government policy will maintain target 
prices for food in the domestic market, so that changes in domestic 
demand caused by the distribution of food to the rural poor are 
bound to affect the country's external trade position. The financing 
of the program is highly problematic: either the tax burden is high 
or reduced investment will result in lost opportunities for economic 
growth. This raises the question of possible external financial 
support. 
Could additional aid flows be used to support rural works pro- 
grams? If so, what level would be required, and what kind of aid 
would be helpful? The results of model runs exploring these ques- 
tions are summarized in Table 6.5. As expected, rural works pro- 
grams on this scale change the pattern of trade, and tariff revenues 
go down. To maintain the growth rate of the economy at the level of 
the reference scenario when the government is unable to raise the 
tax rate, the additional aid therefore needs to include compensation 
for changes in tariff revenues as well as the cost of the rural works 
program. Changes in tariff revenue can be large because the 
significant redistribution of income due to the rural works program 
leads to a change in the structure of domestic demand and hence in 
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Table 6.5. Rural works programs, balance of payments, and aid needs for 
India.a 
Variables 
(billion 1970 $)) 
Per capita income 
(1970 $) 
Costs of the rural 
works program 
Change in tariff revenue 
from the reference scenario 
Change in trade deficit (= aid) 
from the reference scenario 
Year 
No 
extra 
aid 
Aid to 
maintain 
growth 
117.0' 
182.0' 
3.6 
3.1 
-2.0 
-1.0 
5.4 
3.9 
Larger aid, 
terminated 
by 1996 
'~enerates some 10 billion person days of employment per year, two-thirds of 
the expenditure reach the target groups as wages, and investment is assumed to 
be totally ineffective. 
~ x c e ~ t  for per capita income. 
Equal to the reference scenario. 
the sectoral composition of net imports. Large increases in aid also 
result in changes in net imports and hence tariff revenues. The level 
of aid needed is some US $5 billion (at 1970 prices) per year, which 
decreases over time. With such aid to maintain the growth of the 
reference scenario, India remains dependent on substantial addi- 
tional aid flows to sustain the program. The most attractive option 
is to start with additional aid in the early years to raise economic 
growth to a higher level, which then enables the extra aid to be ter- 
minated in the late 1990s without disrupting the financing of the 
rural works programs. Even for such a strategy the level of aid 
needed is less than US $10 billion per year for a period of 15 years. 
Considering that nearly one-third of the world's hungry live in 
India, this is a modest amount. 
Bangladesh: Alternatives to  Increase Incomes of the Poor 
The effectiveness of the rural works program is based on the addi- 
tional incomes it creates for the poor. Other policy alternatives to 
do this and the role that external aid can play in facilitating such 
policies are explored with the model of Bangladesh. Over the past 
few years Bangladesh, with about 100 million inhabitants, has 
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succeeded in improving its domestic supply of food (mainly rice) so 
that domestic rice supply roughly balances effective demand. As in 
India, this in no way indicates a situation in which all people receive 
adequate food: up to half the population has insufficient purchasing 
power to meet its food needs. 
Further increases in food production can easily have some less 
desirable impacts on the economy: the current rice price is deter- 
mined by the import price plus domestic trade and transport mar- 
gins, but would fall to the export price less such margins to get rice 
to the point of shipment. The price may even fall further as the 
quality of the rice produced may not meet international standards. 
Procurement and stockpiling by the government could only be 
short-run palliatives if production were to remain above effective 
demand, and declining prices are unlikely to lead to more consumer 
demand because real incomes of rice producers fall and those of oth- 
ers which rise in real terms are not expected to spend much more 
on rice. In short, the Bangladesh economy shows signs of contrac- 
tion once market demand is met by domestic production. 
It is doubtful whether at this stage industrialization can gen- 
erate enough offsetting push to the economy to overcome the con- 
tracting impact exerted by the food market. There is a serious shor- 
tage of skilled labor, most industries depend heavily on imported 
inputs and spares, capacity utilization in existing industries is low 
due to unreliable supplies of power and natural resources, and there 
are management problems. Some industrialization can be expected 
to occur but is unlikely to become a major driving force for the econ- 
omy in the medium term. 
The question therefore becomes whether ways can be found to 
prop up the demand for the main staple foods domestically and to 
forestall an undesirable decline in the price of rice. As in the case of 
India, obvious possibilities are subsidized rationing to people with a 
high propensity to consume rice - the poorest classes - as well as 
investment in rural works programs that would employ the same 
groups. The capacity to undertake the latter is not as yet at the 
level reached in India, and the main emphasis, at least in the near 
term, therefore falls on expanded rationing. Experience in recent 
years suggests that a substantial part of rationing subsidies and 
food-for-work programs does reach the rural poor. 
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Table 6.6. Rationing scenario for Bangladesh: yearly subsidy increase, 
1985-1990 
Outcome for 1990 3% 25% 35% 
Rationing subsidy 
(billion Taka) 2.3 6.0 8.8 
Trade deficit (billion Taka) 49.5 52.4 54.5 
Wheat imports (billion Taka) 7.9 8.6 9.1 
Calorie intake 
Landless 1,672 1,726 1,748 
Rural informal 1,718 1,749 1,772 
National average 1,982 1,996 2,006 
Income per capita ratio, 
farmlnonfarm 0.7 0.7 0.7 
US $1 = Taka 26. 
Scenarios analyzed with the Bangladesh model assume 
significant increases in subsidized rationing targeted to  the poorest 
groups: the program is expanded a t  a rate of 25% or 35% per year 
for the period 1985 to 1990 and is compared with a scenario with 
only a 3% increase per annum, slightly in excess of population 
growth. As expected, this improves the income distribution to the 
benefit of the poorest groups; it also leads to a small improvement in 
the ratio between farmers' and nonfarmers' incomes as the program 
is successful in maintaining or even slightly improving the real 
market price of rice. Production is hardly affected as a consequence, 
however, due to the inelastic supply of rice. There is a slight 
increase in the import demand for wheat, but this is only a small 
part (less than 20%) of the additional subsidy costs. 
The most important finding concerns the financing of the sub- 
sidy. Some part (about 25%) is met from additional tax receipts due 
to  the slightly faster growth of the economy; the remaining 75% 
shows up as an enlarged trade deficit in the country's external 
account (see Table 6.6), translating into an additional need for aid 
from abroad. Some part of it can take the form of food aid (wheat); 
but additional food import needs are small, and therefore additional 
food aid can only provide 20% of the needed finance. The rest needs 
to be provided as balance-of-payments aid, freely usable by the 
government to  finance nonfood imports. This is interesting for two 
reasons: 
146 Hunger - Beyond the Reach of the Invisible Hand 
About threequarters of the increase in food subsidies results in 
an increased trade deficit, which makes rationing an expensive 
proposition unless additional aid is provided. 
The additional aid can only be provided in the form of food aid 
to the tune of 20%, since the program of rationing must focus 
on the distribution of domestic rather than imported grains, in 
turn requiring aid in the form of balanceof-payments support. 
The additional need for aid is roughly US $200 million, 10% 
more than the actual and projected level of aid to Bangladesh. This 
is not much - some US $2 per capita - and it also bridges only 
onefifth of the gap between the actual calorie intake of the poorest 
groups and estimated minimum requirements. Further growth of the 
coverage of rationing after 1990 could reduce hunger, at a cost that 
does not appear excessive in terms of external and domestic 
resources. But the former should be in forms other than food aid. 
6.1.3. Food and other aid 
Section 6.1.2 has indicated that certain measures can effectively 
counter hunger; these are primarily of a national kind, either 
through targeted rationing, with the expansion of rural employment 
programs or through a shift of investment resources to regions 
where poverty is concentrated. In each case, it was noted that exter- 
nal assistance would need to be increased to ensure the availability 
of adequate resources to maintain economic growth. 
The examples are all from South Asian countries where 
poverty is most intense and widespread, and therefore the analysis is 
highly relevant. Our models for Africa, Latin America, and other 
parts of Asia where poverty affects large numbers of people are 
unfortunately not well-enough specified to attempt the same type of 
analysis. There can be some doubt about the relevance of findings in 
South Asia to other parts of the world, where the characteristics of 
poverty are not the same. In Latin America the skewed distribution 
of land ownership may hamper the effectiveness of the approaches 
suggested for the cases of India or Bangladesh. Similarly, in Africa 
excess labor supply may be much less rampant, particularly among 
rural women, since the low levels of agricultural technology and crop 
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yields even for subsistence food production require amounts of labor 
in excess of many households' labor supply. For these reasons, one 
should interpret our results with caution. 
One remaining question concerns the benefits to be expected 
from additional external assistance, assuming that no changes occur 
in the national policies of the recipient countries. In other words, it 
is assumed that the objectives of development policy are in no way 
altered with increased aid flows and resource allocations continue to 
be made as before. An analysis along these lines will shed some 
light on the issue of eradicating hunger in developing countries out- 
side Asia; it can also provide some guidance on aid levels that may 
be needed to achieve significant progress in eradicating hunger 
before the end of this century. 
Another question in this connection concerns the form that aid 
should take. Many donor countries find it easier for domestic politi- 
cal reasons to give aid in the form of food. Food aid has often been 
criticized for its adverse impact on incentives for domestic food pro- 
duction, but there is also clear evidence that such impacts occur 
mostly as a consequence of inappropriate policies by donors and 
recipients alike, rather than the intrinsic characteristics of food aid 
itself. In particular, when a decline in the availability of food is the 
cause of hunger, as is the case during droughts and famines, addi- 
tional food brought to the region should help. However, when 
hunger is the outcome of inadequate incomes, as chronic hunger usu- 
ally is, the effectiveness of food aid is not obvious. In fact, food aid 
can be counterproductive, but this applies to all other forms of aid 
as well. To explore these issues further with the Basic Linked Sys- 
tem, several aid scenarios were developed. 
Aid Scenarios 
Existing flows of assistance on concessional terms - low interest, 
long repayment periods, or outright grants - amount to approxi- 
mately one-third of 1% of the developed market economies' GDP 
and has hovered around that level for many years. This is only half 
the effort called for in a number of UN resolutions. Most of the 
poorest countries, with little prospects for increasing their export 
earnings, lack the capacity to absorb loans at harder terms as their 
debt servicing limits will soon be reached. Yet, in fact less than half 
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of the limited amount of concessional assistance goes to these 
countries. 
A simple and straightforward approach to additional aid has 
been taken in designing the scenarios. A tax is levied on all coun- 
tries with per capita incomes of US $1500 or more (in 1970 dollars) 
amounting to 0.5% of their GDP, and is distributed to countries 
with per capita incomes of US $1500 or less. It is assumed that the 
distribution is inversely and exponentially related to per capita 
incomes, so that a country with a per capita income of US $100 
receives five times more than one with an income of US $1000: this 
provides the main part of additional aid to the poorest countries. 
The scheme is assumed to start in 1984, and to add to concessional 
capital flows, which in the reference scenario gradually increase to 
0.4% of the developed market economies' GDP in the year 2000. 
Thus in the aid scenarios, over the entire period from 1984 to 2000, 
the UN objective of 0.7% of GDP is exceeded and the aid level 
moves from 0.83% in 1985 to 0.9% by 2000. (The scenarios all begin 
in 1980. What may look like an attempt to rewrite history for the 
1980s was not so when these scenarios were made in 1985.) 
Several other more detailed scenarios have been tested which 
formulate international taxation proposals and burden-sharing alter- 
natives in which various groups of countries participate. Links have 
also been made to reduce defense expenditures. For the scenario 
discussed here, as for others not presented, it is assumed that none 
of the recipient countries lacks absorptive capacity, whereas in real- 
ity additional aid may have decreasing effectiveness. 
Two alternative and simple assumptions are made about the 
use of additional aid by the recipient countries. In one case, all new 
aid resources add to the level of investment, i.e., domestic savings 
efforts remain the same as before aid was provided. This assump- 
tion expresses a preference of donor countries, but in practice has 
been found difficult to achieve. In most aid-receiving countries 
investment spending rises by less than the aid amount, domestic 
savings rates are somewhat reduced, and consumption - public as 
well as private - rises. Therefore, an alternative scenario assumption 
provides the same additional aid flows but leaves it to the country 
itself to determine its use. In that case the propensities applicable 
to domestic resources will most likely apply to the external resources 
as well: if a country normally saves 20% of its resources and 
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Table 6.7. Alternative aid scenarios for all developing countries:' percen- 
tage change from the reference scenario. 
Reference run A-capb A-BO~'  
Scenario 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
Number of hungry (million) 470 400 -13 -32 -24 -32 
of which, in poorest countries 345 305 -15 -40 -29 - 4 0  
GDP per capita (1970s) 370 500 2.4 5.3 0.5 1.7 
of which, poorest countries 120 170 9.8 24.7 1.4 3.5 
Number of hungry (million) when 
aid is terminated in 1998: 
All developing countries -13 -25 -24 -17 
of which, in poorest countries -15 -34 -29 -12 
' ~ x c l u d i n ~  China. 
b~dditional  aid given for capital formation. 
'Additional aid given for balance of payments support. 
consumes the remaining 80%, it will use additional resources in the 
same way. Thus, investment, savings, and consumption rates 
remain the same but apply to a slightly increased availability of 
resources. Actual use of additional aid for investment may be 
between these two extreme cases. 
Full addition to investment outlays in run A-Cap (aid for capi- 
tal creation) leads to a significant increase in economic growth in all 
developing countries together, and a particularly strong increase in 
the poorest countries. When the additional aid is spent freely by 
the recipient countries (A-Bop, aid for balance of payments) there is 
also some economic growth but the difference is small because the 
impact on savings and investment is limited. The difference 
between these two scenarios in terms of reducing hunger after 15 
years in the year 2000 is only very small (see Table 6.71, suggesting 
that consumption use of aid can be as effective in reducing hunger as 
its use for investment purposes. In both cases the effects on food 
prices are similar. But consumption creates a stronger dependence 
on continued aid flows, as is demonstrated by terminating the aid 
flows in both scenarios in 1998 and comparing the effects on hunger 
in the year 2000. In the "consumption" scenario, hunger rises rather 
steeply, but in the "investment" scenario the effect is much smaller 
because the reduction of hunger in that case has a more solid 
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foundation in employment and incomes created alongside the higher 
levels of invest men t . 
The scenarios demonstrate that a rather modest but sustained 
effort to provide additional aid leads to significant improvements in 
the food situation in recipient countries. The effects are more sus- 
tainable, the more recipient countries succeed in channeling addi- 
tional resources into larger investment programs. The effort is mod- 
est, as  appears from what happens with the economic growth in the 
developed market economies: by the year 2000, their GDP ends up 
hardly smaller (by 0.2% to 0.4%) than in the reference scenario. 
Additional aid obviously leads to additional imports by the recipient 
countries, which to a large extent are purchased in the industrial 
countries and thus compensate for the deflating impact of the aid 
flow itself. This compensation is almost 100%. 
To explore the possible impacts of increased aid in kind, three 
scenarios were developed and analyzed with the BLS. Again, the 
scenario design has been kept simple and transparent and does not 
pretend to explore the issue exhaustively. A tax is levied in 
developed market economies equivalent to the respective current 
value of 50 million tonnes of wheat annually for the period 1982 to 
2000. The entitlement for these 50 million tonnes of wheat is 
transferred to selected developing countries with per capita incomes 
of US $1500 or less (those explicitly represented in the BLS include 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thai- 
land, and Turkey). Three variants of this basic setup were tested: 
(1) Recipient countries were supplied with wheat from this addi- 
tional aid-in-kind fund with no restrictions on usage. 
(2) Recipient countries were supplied as above with restrictions on 
re-exporting the donated wheat. 
(3) General balance of payments support was given to the poor 
countries in sums amounting to the equivalent of 50 million 
tonnes of wheat. 
In each variant, the government receives additional incomes. 
Even when wheat is received in kind, when sold in the domestic 
market (in variants 1 and 2) or when re-exported (as can happen in 
variant I), the government receives additional income. Such 
budgetary support permits a government to increase public 
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Table 6.8. Scenarios on wheat aid to selected developing countries: per- 
centage change relative to the reference scenario in the year 2000. 
RS Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 
DME DEV DME DEV DME DEV DME DEV 
GDP 5,053 985 -0.10 
Agricultural prod. 
(1970 $ billion) 151 158 0.63 
Net food prod. 
(1012 kcal) 1,633 1821 2.70 
Cereal prod. 
(million tonnes) 746 449 1.41 
Wheat prod. 
(million tonnes) 222 144 6.32 
Cereal food consump. 95 346 -0.31 
Wheat food consump. 50 127 -0.48 
Number of hungry 
(millions) 184 
DME (Developed market economies). Aid is provided by selected developed 
market economies: Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United 
States, and the EC. 
DEV (Developing countries). Aid is given to selected developing countries: 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, and Tur- 
key. 
expenditure and investment or to lower domestic tax rates. No res- 
triction is imposed in these scenarios on the use of this income, nor 
is any change in a government's allocative behavior stipulated. 
Variants 1 and 3 differ in that in variant 1 the value of re-exported 
wheat would be lower than its import value. 
Table 6.8 highlights some of the results from these scenarios. 
As expected, the second variant shows the biggest impact on the 
estimated numbers of hungry, a decrease of a little more than 30% 
in the affected developing countries, i.e., some 60 million people. 
However, this improvement is achieved a t  the expense of increased 
dependence on foreign cereal supplies. In the year 2000 the domes- 
tic production of wheat in the nine developing countries studied 
declines by 13.7% (some 20 million tonnes) relative to the reference 
scenario, the total production of grain crop decreases by 4% (i.e., 18 
million tonnes), and feed production as measured by net calorie pro- 
duction is lowered by 3.6%. General balance of payments support 
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equivalent to  50 million tonnes of wheat (variant 3) has less of a 
short-term effect on hunger, approximately 10% decrease, yet this 
does not discourage agricultural producers as in the previous case. 
The results clearly suggest that stepping up food aid cannot lead to 
a sustainable solution to the hunger problem. 
6.1.4. International migration 
We saw in Chapter 2 that  today natural resources including land 
have been completely divided among nation-states, and massive 
international migration is no longer an option. Natural resources 
are distributed unevenly in relation to the distribution of people. 
Under these circumstances, is it reasonable to expect that  poor 
countries could follow the example of the rich? In a world divided 
by fences, some to  keep people out from where resources are abun- 
dant, others to keep them in where endowments are poor, the 
chances of escaping from poverty are severely limited, even when the 
international framework for trade and capital flows is a fairly liberal 
one. Not only are there barriers to migration between developed 
and developing countries, but also between developing countries 
such as India and Bangladesh and within countries such as Ethiopia 
and China. In this scenario we focus on migration from developing 
to developed countries. The modeling system lends itself to illus- 
trating why, even in a world with free mobility of all goods, services, 
and capital, poverty will persist as long as labor markets are 
protected. 
Fences around countries and their labor markets no doubt 
serve noneconomic purposes, such as protecting national cultures, 
identity, and sovereignty, but they also cause a loss of potential 
welfare. In other words, these noneconomic purposes have their 
costs in economic terms and these are unevenly distributed; those 
inside the fences protecting the rich will gain, those outside will lose. 
Without suggesting that the fences should be lowered, one may still 
want to  know how much the advantaged gain and how much the 
losers bear; the potential welfare gain for the world from removing 
the fences entirely would be large enough to compensate those who 
lose their now privileged positions, and still leave something 
for those who now bear the burden of the world's 
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compartmentalization. Leaving the fences standing should logically 
lead to the question of whether those who benefit (earn a rent) from 
the fence, should not compensate those who now bear the losses. 
Nations have widely divergent endowments of natural 
resources, including their own location, which suggests that the 
analysis of liberalization cannot be restricted to goods and capital 
alone. Given such unequal endowments it is highly unlikely that 
poorly endowed or located countries could develop in ways that 
could ever bring their income levels up to those prevailing in the 
rich countries; they are bound to run into obstacles as they try to 
acquire available land, energy, food, and affordable capital from 
abroad. One cannot devise development strategies that would use 
abundant labor for the production of export goods without reaching 
the limits on international demand for those products. The equali- 
zation of wages requires that people from these countries work 
abroad and possibly repatriate their earnings. Whether analyzed in 
a static or a dynamic sense, the conclusion reached is that the only 
way out of poverty is to increase the marginal product of labor and 
that the chances of doing so to equalize wage rates around the world 
are exceedingly slim if there is no migration. Technological develop- 
ments may even work in the opposite direction of equalization. 
If for sociopolitical reasons the fences are retained, then one 
should realize that these work in the same way as any other import 
quota in international trade and that compensation of the losers is a 
relevant economic issue. If one accepts the neoclassical model, as 
free trade advocates do, one should also recognize that all arguments 
from welfare theory which advocate free trade in commodities and 
open capital markets will hold, a fortiori, for labor services once it is 
recognized that some factors like agro-ecological resource endow- 
ments, i.e., land, can never be traded. The point is not merely a 
theoretical one. The restrictions of the fences can be felt every day. 
Turks and Yugoslavs in Germany, Hispanics in the United States, 
North Africans in France, all contribute to the economic develop- 
ment of their host countries, yet those guest-workers are not always 
welcome. These reactions are often voiced by organizations whose 
proclaimed aims are to maintain national cultural identity as well as 
to protect labor markets for the unskilled. The highly skilled need 
less protection of this crude kind if only because they are already 
sufficiently well protected through educational requirements (such as 
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doctors and lawyers) or security interests (say for officials and mag- 
istrates). 
Opposition to migration therefore amounts to opposition to 
free trade, and in any case is inconsistent with a no-aid argument if 
a policy of free trade is based on the logic of compensation for 
migration barriers. In that sense the calculation of welfare gains 
from free migration is relevant in that it gives quantitative expres- 
sion to the compensation to be paid to remain credible when advo- 
cating free trade but banning migration. We now examine the mag- 
nitude and distribution of the aid flows that can be related to this 
argument. 
Our modeling system is not sufficiently detailed to include 
some of the features needed to explore scenarios of international 
migration satisfactorily, but with some assumptions (admittedly 
heroic ones) it was possible to generate such simulation runs. The 
following assumptions were made: 
(1) Migrants acquire the skills and life-style of the country to 
which they have immigrated to as soon as they arrive. 
(2) The costs of migration are negligible. 
(3) Large-scale migration is tolerated and does not disrupt the 
economies of the countries of origin and destination, and the 
migrants repatriate none of their earnings. 
(4) Migration is driven by the differences in per capita incomes 
between the country and the global average. 
In a scenario in which nearly 300 million people were relocated over 
a 15-year period the global GDP at 1970 world prices at the end of 
this period (the year 2000) increased by more than 20%. This 
amounts to more than US $1000 billion. 
Hamilton and Whalley (1984) tried to assess the implications 
of barriers to labor mobility between high-wage and low-wage coun- 
tries. They point out that the efficiency gains implied by the remo- 
val of migration restrictions are substantial, suggesting that this 
issue may be much more important to LDCs than any other issues 
raised thus far in the North-South debate. 
Our admittedly very crude estimate indicates the extent of the 
global economic loss. In comparison, the resources needed to elim- 
inate poverty and hunger seem a pittance. Yet in the current 
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climate of skepticism about aid, such additional aid may be hard to 
mobilize, unless it is a part of policy changes that address concerns 
of the developed countries themselves. Agricultural surpluses, trade, 
export shares, and trade liberalization are issues that cause concern 
in many developed countries. It is to these issues that we now turn. 
6.2. Aid: Why? 
6.2.1. The stubbornness of the hunger problem 
We have found scenarios that work and, according to the model, do 
help in alleviating the hunger problem, yet the policies suggested 
have not yet been adopted. It may be that the preceding analysis is 
wrong and thus irrelevant, but, if we suppose that it is not, then 
there are three basic factors that may explain why the suggestions 
have not been adopted, or at  least not to a sufficient degree. What 
is required for effecting a change and may have been lacking in the 
past is knowledge of strategies that can bring about change, power 
to effect the strategy, and willingness to help. If knowledge had 
been the main limiting factor in the past, this report could end here, 
leaving it to the readers to judge whether the suggestions are 
appropriate or not, or a t  most concluding with some views on the 
administrative aspects of implementing the suggestions. Alterna- 
tively, if in spite of knowledge and a strong willingness no collective 
action could be mobilized to combat poverty and hunger, then the 
answer could also be very simple: no concerted action is possible, so 
act as an individual and help as much as you can; do not wait for 
others. Given the modest amounts of aid required, however, the 
assumption of a lack of power seems unrealistic. 
This brings us to the third and most important constraint, 
namely, the willingness (or absence of willingness) to help. As long 
as the rich are unwilling to help more, there is little reason to expect 
any quick solution, although changes will undoubtedly occur. 
Technical progress will go on, environmental protection will be of 
increasing concern, wars, droughts, and floods will attract the 
world's attention, but hunger will persist. In fact, in many ways 
this appears to be the situation today. At present, development aid 
is in an economic sense marginal. Willingness to put pressure on 
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countries with inequitable policies is minimal, and international 
migration has been virtually blocked. Inadequate willingness to help 
thus seems to be the major lacuna. Why people are reluctant to 
help and what can motivate them are the questions we explore next. 
6.2.2. Why people are reluctant to help 
The absence of willingness to help may be rationalized in several 
ways. We first consider the position that the Darwinan principle of 
"survival of the fittest" has a moral value by itself and justifies the 
neglect of the poverty problem. Leaving aside the moral aspect, one 
may dismiss this view by pointing out that poor people who in this 
view are "less fit," rather than having fewer survivors, in fact tend 
to have higher fertility and net reproduction rates than the rich, so 
the fact that poverty is so widespread goes against the principle 
itself. To this it may be objected that Malthusianism certainly must 
work at some stage of deprivation, but this amounts to advocating 
genocide and hardly any society has permitted such uncontrolled 
operation of Malthusian solution. 
Second, following a more benevolent line of argument, there is 
the optimistic view that aid is not necessary; the problem will 
resolve itself. Technical progress and economic growth in developed 
countries can serve as engines to the world economy and solve the 
problem. Policy reforms may be required but those would be 
related to deregulation to let the self-interests of all parties con- 
cerned work more efficiently. It is to be hoped that we have shown 
that this line of reasoning is inconsistent, at  least as long as migra- 
tion is prohibited. In many poorly endowed countries foreign aid is 
essential to mitigate the hunger problem. 
Third, some people think that the problems are so enormous 
that no significant advances can be made. Our and others' calcula- 
tions have indicated that this is too pessimistic a view. With 
sufficient willingness to help, it could be solved, perhaps even quite 
easily. 
Fourth, arguments against aid itself follow the line that it 
often is so difficult to give appropriate aid that it may be better not 
to give it at  all. Aid is bad for the poor, and the reasoning is as fol- 
lows. To alleviate poverty two types of remedy are usually 
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suggested. In the short-run direct income transfers from the rich to 
the poor should alleviate current suffering; structural investments 
aimed at  improving the poor's capacity to earn adequate incomes 
are advocated as a long-run solution. The arguments against direct 
transfers tend to express the idea that short-term direct income 
transfers lead to long-term transfers and create aid dependence. 
Investment aid directed to the poor may necessitate the acceptance 
of less profitable projects which, in this perception, would never 
have been selected on commercial terms. The arguments derived 
from these views can be listed as follows: 
(1) When the poor receive guaranteed minimum incomes, they will 
not be willing to work at  very unpleasant, low-wage jobs, caus- 
ing wage-push inflation which in turn will erode the real value 
of this income. 
(2) The poor spend most of their incomes on consumption. Future 
generations should give aid so as to stimulate investment. 
(3) When the poor are given minimum incomes they will also buy 
more of some goods that cannot be produced in the domestic 
economy and thus increase import dependence. 
(4) A higher domestic production caused by, say a bumper crop, 
would reduce poverty in the eyes of the donor and thus reduce 
aid, so that the poor who can foresee this are discouraged even 
further to produce more. 
( 5 )  When transfers are given as commodity aid of a fixed composi- 
tion, say food aid, domestic production may be discouraged by 
less remunerative producer prices. 
It would not be difficult to expand these arguments but the points 
listed may sufficiently illustrate the idea that it is bad for the poor 
to provide direct transfers to them, much in the way it is bad for a 
child to receive too many candies. Although each argument has 
some degree of validity, that should only be a reason to look for 
ways to provide aid effectively, as other means to alleviate hunger 
will take too long. 
The arguments against investment aid essentially relate to the 
high project costs and the low profitability of the capacity created. 
In this view aid is seen as an investment subsidy that distorts the 
orientation of the recipient country. Again, such reasoning is faulty. 
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The selfish forces of "the market" do not solve problems of income 
distribution. There is no need for transfers. Also investments go to 
the most profitable destinations under free markets. Aid is needed 
precisely because free commercial investment, say across national 
borders, has not been and cannot be expected to ensure sufficient 
labor and land productivity in all nations. Low wages do not neces- 
sarily attract the investment that would be required to raise them. 
The natural environment, locational factors, and shortage of accu- 
mulated skills may prevent this. 
Aid is often a transaction between governments that cannot 
always be swayed by moral arguments. Governments often spend 
the money on armaments and wasteful prestige projects resulting in 
corruption, capital flight, and conspicuous consumption rather than 
on poverty alleviation. Unless safeguards are devised to guard 
against such waste and misuse, reluctance to support aid may be 
understandable. 
Despite all these reasons for not supporting aid, the fact is that 
many people do care and want to help fight hunger. It is worth ex- 
amining what positive motives people have to help. 
0.2.3. Willingness to help on moral grounds: 
Voluntary income transfers 
A fundamental source of willingness to help and a major reason for 
optimism is that people care for each other. They may dislike others 
being richer than themselves, but seeing people starve gives satisfac- 
tion to virtually no one. Almost everyone would very much like this 
problem to be solved, and this represents a strong political force, 
especially as we have seen that relatively little sacrifice would be 
needed to achieve a solution. 
In the economic literature aid is often termed a grant or 
transfer. Boulding (1982) provides the following definition of 
transfer: 
There are two basic economic relationships between economic 
partners: exchange, in which there is a mutual flow of economic 
goods from each party to the other; and the grant or transfer, 
which is a one-way flow of economic goods from one party to 
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another, without economic goods passing in exchange although 
there may be noneconomic goods passing. 
Sociologists and anthropologists (see, for example, Hirschleifer, 
1985) have attempted to elaborate upon these noneconomic goods in 
an attempt to reduce all relationships to exchange relations, in this 
way expanding the paradigm of selfishness. This tends to obscure 
the fact that compassion and a sense of fairness do exist, that an 
individual's decision to give to a charity is usually not governed by 
selfish motives, and that the individual tends to be more easily 
discouraged by the low marginal effectiveness of his or her country's 
gift than being encouraged by possible future rewards. Sociologists 
may be interested in identifying the noneconomic goods purchased 
through transfers. But as long as social scientists are far from being 
able to measure these goods it is useful to maintain the concept of 
altruism and the associated willingness to help. 
Spinoza in his Ethiea (1677) postulates that humans show wil- 
lingness to help as a kind of a reflex. The more similarity one 
observes with some other person, the more one behaves as if it was 
oneself. Thus, one person will defend another in case of attack and 
help him or her when in danger. Rawls's "veil of ignorancen (Rawls, 
1972) is a reinvention of this concept. Under this concept, the less 
people know, the more similar they become. Spinoza's view has the 
advantage that it helps explain why, for example, aid programs exist 
in which children, say, in Europe help children in India. 
Identification appears to be the basic concept. Their willingness to 
help is elementary. 
Spinoza also makes clear that identification with other people 
has its limits: one may even recognize a threat in another person 
and dislike him; one may also dislike another person because he is 
better-off. In other words, people identify with others only up to a 
point. It is here that the concept of the voluntary grant comes into 
play. Its voluntary nature makes it possible to orient the gifts to 
whom one likes, and the fact that one is only allowed to give, not to 
take, protects those who are disliked. A grant works one way only: 
the donor decides, all the recipient can do is refuse it. 
We now look at  whether this process of voluntary income 
transfers can be expected to contribute to the solution of the hunger 
problem. Such a model of an economy was first presented by Arrow 
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(1984) and was later elaborated upon by Keyzer (1987). Each agent 
cares about others as well as himself and is able to transfer income 
to other agents according to his preferences, the availability and 
cost-effectiveness of the projects, and the need perceived. This pro- 
cess is not necessarily fair. Selfish people may not want to help, 
thus forcing others to help more; recipients may lie about their need. 
Thus, the process of voluntary transfers may degenerate. 
Nevertheless, when we speak about hunger in the long run, no 
lie is possible. Willingness to help is an elementary drive and volun- 
tary income transfers offer means to channel it, provided the 
donor-recipient relation is truthful. Emergencies may be exag- 
gerated once but not repeatedly, and the donor may introduce con- 
ditions for aid. In times of emergency there is little donor agencies 
can do but help; at  other times donors can ask for domestic reforms 
and income redistribution in exchange for assistance; otherwise their 
own constituencies would be unwilling to pay any longer. 
Yet it is too simple to argue that voluntary transfers alone will 
resolve the hunger problem. Clearly, it is a major resource for the 
poor but not one that can be expected to grow suddenly by itself. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the increased willingness of some donors 
may, in theory, fail to increase total aid disbursements. Thus, there 
is a need to consider other motives for giving aid and to search for 
potential synergy between them. 
6.2.4. Selfish motives: Aid to satisfy donors' economic, 
political, or security interests 
One way to mobilize support for the cause of poverty alleviation 
would be to prove that helping is in the donor's interests. Used as a 
policy instrument, aid can further the donor's economic, political, 
and security interests, and may also be viewed as an insurance 
premium against adversity. 
A purely selfish agent, as represented in the BLS and in most 
economic models, would not engage in helping others. However, 
when price effects are taken into consideration, the consequences of 
helping may be positive for the donor under the so-called transfer 
paradox (Bhagwati et al., 1984), according to which the gift may 
create a demand which improves the donor's terms of trade and 
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overcompensates for the cost of the aid. However, several simpler 
arguments exist, all of which explain aid as being in the donor's 
interests (see Maizels and Nissanke, 1987; Ruttan, 1989), which can 
be categorized as follows: 
(1) Current economic interests. These include stability of the 
donor's export industry, support for domestic producers (say 
farmers or arms manufacturers), and tax deduction rules for 
private donors. 
(2) Future economic interests. These include future supply of 
noncompeting goods, demand for the donor's goods and the 
development of preferences through habit formation in favor of 
the donor's products, and insurance against adversity. 
(3) Political and security interests (votes in the UN, alliances, mili- 
tary bases). 
Each argument may have a degree of validity of its own, but the 
first argument (particularly stabilization of the donor's export indus- 
try) is in its unqualified version a fallacy. It may be true that the 
donor suffers from overcapacity in some sectors. Generating 
increased demand may then help producers, but not if their 
increased output is then given away in the form of aid (the shipping 
and supervision costs incurred would burden the balance of pay- 
ments, for example). The advantages of producing more becomes 
apparent only when the surplus is sold commercially so that it 
represents an increase in national savings to be recaptured through 
future earnings; this would not apply when those earnings are then 
given away as aid. 
Yet there is a stronger argument. When used efficiently by the 
recipient country, it will accumulate resources that will reduce 
import needs and eventually expand exports. In due course the reci- 
pient country will even provide goods and services to the donor at 
competitive prices. Development aid could then be seen as being 
similar to investment in an employee. However, it may also be that 
the aid stimulates consumption in the recipient country more than it 
does production. The recipient will then incur a debt that does not 
benefit the donor unless it is being repaid at a high rate of interest, 
and for this a surplus would have to be created. 
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With respect to the other arguments it is clear that tax deduc- 
tion and support of interest groups do not necessarily represent the 
donor's interest. In these cases the taxpayer is the actual donor and 
he or she is not consulted except at election times. As for the long- 
run interests (argument 2), these may indeed exist, but unless the 
recipient is fully colonized by the donor, the donor's competitors are 
likely to benefit most from the aid. 
Hunger represents a tremendous waste of human resources. 
By not feeding children properly, both their physical and mental 
growth is impaired. As a consequence they may become liabilities to 
the world community instead of assets, even if only a few would pos- 
sess the brilliance of a da Vinci or an Einstein. Preventing serious 
malnutrition is a public good for humanity because of the potential 
contribution to human welfare. 
Let us also observe that if appropriate levels of aid may 
already be argued for with no reference to the recipient's interests 
then apparently these arguments either must have been unknown or 
were not very convincing in the past. Otherwise the levels of aid 
would have been much higher. In general terms, it is probably true 
that it is beneficial for a donor to give some aid, but unless this aid 
is viewed from the recipient's point of view, there is no reason to 
expect that it would be sufficient to resolve the hunger problem. 
More important, the economic, political, and social interests 
would never allocate most "aid" to the most needy; rather, they 
would invest it where the return is highest. It would not be targeted 
to groups that do not serve the donor's interest. The poor would be 
most likely written off and any beneficial impact on them would be 
purely coincidental. 
Aid to the poor may also have features of an insurance prem- 
ium against adversity. Even completely selfish people will be willing 
to pay this premium, provided they believe that they or their chil- 
dren may themselves be poor someday and that the scheme is reli- 
able, so that it will work for them if and only if they pay the prem- 
ium today. 
In such a scheme, a subjective assessment of the likelihood of 
future events determines present-day certainty. Yet, how does one 
assess future uncertainty? One way is to regard the future as com- 
pletely uncertain, as reflected in Rawls's "veil of ignorance," neglect- 
ing not only factors that are irrelevant in the sphere of consideration 
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but all factors. Such a mental exercise greatly exaggerates the 
agent's uncertainty and thus his or her willingness to pay a 
premium. 
Morality in some sense reflects this, i.e., it is the result of the 
mental exercise of assuming that one would be the other person or 
living creature and ranked differently in society than one currently 
is. This self-imposed uncertainty may motivate one to make volun- 
tary transfers. Obviously, in the real world perfect morality cannot 
exist: one cannot meaningfully make the mental exercise of being 
Mrs. X in the year 4003 and act accordingly; nor can anyone be 
expected to treat his neighbor's children as his own. What the veil 
of ignorance makes clear is that willingness to help may be enhanced 
by uncertainty. Earlier we saw that fences erected in the form of 
constraints on migration drastically reduce the risks of the rich. 
They have more resources, temperate climates, good health care, 
tight security measures, strong defense, and solid pension funds. 
The compartmentalization hardly stimulates solidarity with those on 
the other side. Some environmental and security risks may also 
affect the rich, but in many respects it may be more rational, from 
their point of view, to build a fortress of security measures around 
themselves and to use force against any threats. Until some global 
environmental disasters occur this fortress could probably survive 
technically, but not morally of course. Labor-saving technology 
would even allow small communities to flourish; the highly skilled 
and resource endowed would have little need for the others. The 
rich would find it cheaper to protect themselves by strengthening 
fences that reduce their risks than by paying for aid as an insurance 
premium. Rather than performing mental exercises which increase 
uncertainty, such as the veil of ignorance, they would develop an 
infrastructure to reduce it. 
At this point the scope for increasing international aid may 
seem bleak. Limited capacity on the part of the recipients to use the 
funds effectively restricts the scope for increasing aid when viewed 
as an investment, and fences around countries may provide better 
protection than any aid scheme. Yet, there is still an argument for 
aid that we should examine. 
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6.2.5. Aid as a share in the benefits from international 
cooperation 
As long as international aid is seen as something peripheral that is 
not required for the well-functioning of the rich as well as the poor, 
it will lack institutionalization and will depend on a level of public 
awareness that would be difficult to maintain over long periods of 
time. To have international aid function in a more institutionalized 
way it must play a central role in the sphere where it belongs - in 
the sphere of international relations. 
We return to the case of trade liberalization discussed in 
Chapter 5. Once the potential gains from multilateral tariff reduc- 
tions have been appreciated by all parties, the reduction itself must 
be agreed upon. Not only should gainers compensate losers, but 
agreement also should be reached on sharing the overall gains from 
the agreement. It is not easy to find rules for this because there are 
many situations where free-riding may be best for some individuals 
or countries, that is, to have the others liberalize and to keep one's 
own hands free to affect, say, the terms of trade. Yet when all par- 
ties do this, no agreement is reached. In other words, it is not often 
possible to reward individual participants according to their margi- 
nal contributions when joining an agreement (see Walzer, 1983). 
The situation is basically the same as in a relatively small noncor- 
porate firm, say a law firm. There the employees together generate 
an income but the harm that a former employee can cause by set- 
ting up a firm around the corner is not necessarily a good indication 
of what he or she could earn inside the firm. Seniority, membership, 
and other ranking rules will often be used to distribute the corporate 
surplus, and principles of distributive justice will have to be adhered 
to in order to achieve acceptance of these rules (see Walzer, 1983). 
In any negotiations, even when they start from pure 
selfishness, ethical notions have to be used to justify the sharing of 
cooperative surplus and to establish reliability of the scheme. Dis- 
tributive justice thus enters the economic sphere. Joining a long- 
term agreement is in some sense like joining a community with its 
own principles of distributive justice, its own policy, and its own 
rules for handling disagreement. New agreements determine who 
are members and nonmembers and in some sense change the system 
itself. Only those agreements where participants are so unimportant 
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that their joining or not joining hardly matters (and such agree- 
ments are reached on the market in everyday life by individuals) 
leave the institutional structure unaffected. This is so either because 
no one is large enough to affect it or because the agreements have 
such a short duration that there simply is no time to find out what 
the cooperative surplus actually is. This is precisely what distin- 
guishes a large from a small organization. In a small organization 
power will tend to be shared equally unless the organization is like a 
prison from which some of its members cannot leave (the migration 
argument once again). For larger organizations this is why workers' 
unions may be needed, simply to create the monopolistic power 
needed to enforce distributive justice. 
Once it is accepted that all long-term agreements are steps 
toward the formation of communities, and once it is understood that 
agreements need concepts of distributive justice to function, then it 
is only a small step to conclude that international agreements, such 
as those on trade liberalization discussed in the Uruguay Round, 
need an aid component. This would not only compensate the losers, 
but would also give credibility to the agreement's principles of dis- 
tributive justice. 
It is here that the rent-of-the-fence argument fits in. The argu- 
ment against protectionism is that it causes a loss welfare; indeed, 
the world could be better-off if there were no protection. The inter- 
national agreement to abolish it will have to stipulate how the gains 
from abolition are to be distributed, and, if some parties want to 
make exceptions, they will have to pay for it. To claim, for example, 
that the agreement applies to agricultural products but not to 
minerals would not be credible. 
Should the same principle of distribution apply to labor, 
minerals, and agricultural commodities? If not, then what principles 
should apply in different areas? To explore this it is necessary at 
this point to consider some of the ideas by Walzer (1983, pp. 30-63), 
who argues that no single principle of distribution could ever hold 
for all commodities. In particular, several commodities (in the 
broad sense of social goods) should never be sold or distributed 
according to the rules of the market. Examples of such goods 
include membership of a community, public office, marriage, or a 
doctor's title, which would then lose their meaning. 
166 Hunger - Beyond the Reach of the Invisible Hand 
Some sort of allocational principle is required in each sphere. 
Walzer argues that for such an agreement to function the allocation 
must be "fair" within its own sphere but not necessarily in other 
spheres. Not only should one not buy public office, one should not 
marry to get public office. Nor should irrelevant criteria such as 
race or sex count. This is not to say that the positions should be 
distributed by lottery, only that characteristics irrelevant to the 
sphere of operation should be ignored. We stress that the word 
"shouldn is used here not in an ethical sense. Violation is not neces- 
sarily immoral but it hampers satisfaction of the interests of all par- 
ticipants. 
With respect to migration this has important consequences 
which Walzer points out as follows. A country consists of regions 
with neighborhoods as basic elements. Each neighborhood is some 
sort of community. If foreigners were allowed to move freely into 
the country, fences around the country would soon be replaced by 
fences around neighborhoods. Language, common history, and com- 
mon habits distinguish members from nonmembers. A foreigner 
gaining access to the labor market would be more than just a pro- 
vider of labor services. He would bring his culture, possibly his fam- 
ily, and would require a place to live. For this he would need to 
gain access to some neighborhood that might not wish to accept him 
as a member. It is the essence of a community that it has the right 
to decide whom to accept as member. The right to give up member- 
ship has to be a private decision, otherwise surplus sharing cannot 
work. (Still there are cases where termination of membership has to 
be restricted somewhat, such as divorce.) Again the term "right" is 
used in a positive rather than a normative sense: for the community 
to function the right must be recognized. Following Walzer's think- 
ing it is legitimate for communities and maybe even their essence to 
restrict membership. This only strengthens the rent-of-the-fence 
argument, to which we now return. 
If living in some small community is desired by a group of indi- 
viduals but has a welfare cost to some members of a larger commun- 
ity to which this small community belongs, then following the prin- 
ciples of free trade agreements, the people who enjoy the small 
community life should compensate their fellow members in the 
larger community. If the larger community is at least in part an 
economic one, then a financial payment is an adequate 
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compensation. In this case the rent of the fence is one way to define 
the payment. This way is by no means unique but the larger com- 
munity will have to decide on what is considered just within its own 
sphere. The rent of the fence is not a damage claim which once paid 
relieves the donor countries of all responsibility; rather, it is a conse- 
quence of the necessity for the larger community to maintain con- 
sistent standards. It may be commonplace to say that the world has 
become more interdependent, as is demonstrated by the fact that an 
increasing number of long-term international treaties and private 
contracts are being signed. But at  the same time, the poor countries 
signing the agreements may be aware of the cost in terms of the 
functioning of their own community, while the rich consider the 
agreement necessary to maintain the status quo. Ant iterrorism, 
arms reductions, the environment, telecommunications, trade, the 
resources of the sea, in order to reach agreement on any of these 
issues all parties must first agree on the fair principles for distribu- 
tive justice. In many of these cases, nonparticipation of some can be 
extremely costly to others, so that marginal pricing cannot provide 
guidance. For agreements to work, distributional principles that 
transcend the boundaries of individual agreements are required. A 
government that violates human rights or neglects starvation at  
home will lack the moral authority to use fairness arguments in 
international negotiations. 
In this way, the fair sharing of the benefits of an international 
agreement can be expected to affect domestic policies, and to gen- 
erate new international agreements. A trade liberalization agree- 
ment, followed by monetary coordination, calls at some point for the 
coordination of social policies. The finer the tissue of international 
conventions, the more unavoidable it becomes to apply and institu- 
tionalize common distributive standards. It is hard to foresee 
whether this will lead to the recognition of the individual's right to 
food in an absolute sense or only to a right to, say, paid employ- 
ment. All we can argue here is that an international order in which 
nations participate freely will have to operate with a minimum level 
of fairness, not because those nations have formally committed 
themselves to do so, as in 1948 with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, but because they cannot function efficiently without 
it. In this respect the free traders and the interventionists seem to 
agree. Fair competition, fair opportunities, and basic rights are 
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more than normative principles imposed from the moral sphere onto 
the system of international relations. They reflect the sustainability 
requirements of the system itself. 
6.2.6. Arguments and prospects for increased aid flows 
We have argued that willingness to help the hungry out of compas- 
sion should be viewed as an integral part of human behavior and 
therefore of economic reality. Aid is also given for selfish reasons to 
satisfy donors' policy objectives or to serve as an insurance pre- 
mium. Somewhere between compassion and self-interest lies the 
need for equitable sharing of benefits from international cooperation, 
and it is this need that gives the best reason for hope. A plea for 
more international aid to alleviate poverty is particularly relevant at 
this point in time, for several reasons. 
First, the negotiations on trade liberalization in the Uruguay 
Round will probably lead to a reduction of agricultural protection- 
ism worldwide and possibly eliminate altogether the food surpluses 
that currently provide an easy source of food aid. Once these 
surplus stocks have been depleted the donors will have to buy on the 
market the food they want to give as aid. To do so might increase 
their wage costs and inflation, and so they may prefer to invest in 
more rewarding projects. In the Uruguay Round, commodities and 
services were emphasized, and the protection of labor markets via 
migration constraints requires attention even if it is to be main- 
tained. The rent of the fence must be paid. Thus, the topic of 
international aid may well have a significant role to play on the 
international scene in the years ahead. 
Second, the move toward disarmament, if pursued, will free 
economic resources to serve other ends. Poverty alleviation may 
then be given greater priority. 
Third, the debt crisis experienced by developing countries in 
the 1980s has taught the donor nations that even the softest of loans 
may become an unbearable burden for recipients when expressed in 
currencies that keep on revaluating, or when the recipient regards 
them purely as grants until the day amortizations have to be paid. 
Aid grants pose fewer problems in this respect although even grants 
may burden the recipient with high recurrent costs for, say, the 
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maintenance of capit a1 goods. The arguments calling for larger 
flows of grant aid to reduce poverty in the years to come may, how- 
ever, not be strong enough to overcome forces tending in the other 
direction. One is that further integration of the European Commun- 
ity could lead to an inward orientation of the northern countries, 
focusing their development efforts on their southern partners within 
the region. The increased labor mobility inside Europe may create 
such serious internal adjustment problems that further migration 
from outside the EC would be out of the question for many years to 
come. Political changes in Eastern Europe will also draw resources 
away from the developing world. 
The case for aid is further, and perhaps most importantly, sup- 
ported by the possibility of increasing levels of food scarcity in many 
parts of the developing world. The objective of eradicating hunger 
is not the issue; rather, it is the way to achieving it. Should this be 
done in a world of mostly free markets, with only limited income 
transfers, or is the objective of such overriding importance that it 
justifies major transfers and interventions, even if this might imply a 
lower overall level of economic growth? 
Our problem is that the route of restricted aid flows implies an 
unacceptable delay in meeting the food needs of the poor, a delay 
extending probably over two or three generations, despite the 
world's capacity in physical terms to meet all food needs adequately. 
In principle, the hunger problem can be solved much faster as the 
means to that end are available. Waiting longer increases the 
chances that inability to cope with population growth and environ- 
mental constraints to food production will overtake the opportuni- 
ties that currently exist to eradicate hunger. 
Although these aspects were not covered in our study, food 
scarcity may increase as a result of environmental problems and cli- 
mate changes that may restrict the growth of agricultural produc- 
tion faster than demographic policies can contain the growth of the 
world's population. New technologies may provide some mitigation, 
but only where there is a minimum degree of water control, land 
development, and infrastructure. Many parts of the developing 
world, especially Africa, are deficient in this respect, yet the invest- 
ments needed to bring about improvements carry significant 
environmental risks. In that sense environmental problems can 
create a poverty trap. 
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In this respect it may be worth mentioning that IIASA has 
recently engaged in a study entitled "Implications of Climate 
Change for International Agriculture: Global Food Trade and 
Vulnerable Regions," utilizing an updated and adapted version of 
the BLS. 
CHAPTER 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
The BLS reference scenario, with relatively optimistic growth rates, 
shows that although the numbers of hungry in the world will fall 
still larger numbers of people are likely to remain hungry in the year 
2000. 
Increased food supplies on the world market are absorbed into 
the system as producers, consumers, traders, and governments 
adapt their behavior, with negligible improvement in the consump- 
tion of poor consumers in poor countries. 
Reduced meat consumption in the developed countries, as may 
be expected from a spread of vegetarianism, frees up resources from 
the production of animal feed that could, in principle, be directed to 
the provision of more food for the poor. However, this again has no 
significant impact on the levels of hunger in the world. 
Reduced agricultural production in the OECD countries will 
increase world market prices, increase export opportunities for 
developing country exporters, and increase domestic agricultural 
prices in those countries, thus stimulating their production, which in 
the long run would benefit the poor. However, the results show that 
although domestic agricultural production does increase as expected, 
the calorie intake as well as other utility measures suggest that poor 
consumers are worse off not only in the short run but even after 15 
years. 
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Agricultural trade liberalization does give incentives to 
increase domestic agricultural production in many developing coun- 
tries, and the agricultural GDP also goes up in several of them. Yet 
the higher agricultural growth is brought about by diverting 
resources from the nonagricultural sector, and the aggregate GDP 
changes little. When the developing countries liberalize their agri- 
cultural trade but the OECD countries do not, there is a small 
reduction in hunger. This gain disappears when the OECD coun- 
tries also liberalize. Thus, agricultural trade liberalization provides 
no solution to the hunger problem. 
Therefore solutions that attempt to deal with hunger through 
the market mechanism, either through increasing supply on the 
world market or through increased agricultural production in the 
developing countries do not work well enough. The existing world 
food system is shown to be resilient for the rich but stubborn for the 
starving. The policies that work, according to our findings, are 
those that supplement national development efforts and improve the 
efficiency of international exchange with increased flows of aid to the 
poor. This conclusion was reached in several independent scenarios. 
Food aid, although adequate and necessary when famines 
occur, is not a viable long-term solution to the chronic hunger prob- 
lem since it results in production disincentives and the increased 
dependence of developing countries on food imports. 
Obviously these are merely outcomes of scenario simulations 
using a model with distinct limitations. Technological break- 
throughs and other unforeseen changes may drastically alter the pic- 
ture. In spite of all this uncertainty the main conclusions seem 
robust and can also be understood on intuitive grounds. 
The decolonization process after World War I1 led to a com- 
partmentalization of the world into countries that have been 
expected to resolve their own difficulties. The diffusion of labor- 
saving technologies, fear of international terrorism, and improved 
capabilities to tighten national borders may lead to a further 
strengthening of this development where the rich may find that they 
can get by without the poor. The rich societies would turn into an 
interconnected network of fortresses. To avoid the "great migra- 
tion" the world would enter the modern Middle Ages. 
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This could make the hunger problem even more difficult to 
solve in the future than it is today. It will often be unprofitable for 
capital to move to poor regions; neither can people leave to offer 
their labor where it can be used most productively. This imposes a 
constraint on their political power domestically as well as on their 
ability to improve their lot through emigration. It also reduces the 
bargaining strength of the poor countries and reduces potential wel- 
fare in the world. 
The limitation of labor mobility can to a certain extent be 
justified on the ground that countries consist of communities with 
common cultures and identities. Communities have the right to res- 
trict their membership. But they are not free to do so at the 
expense of other, larger, communities without some form of compen- 
sation. Increasingly, those wanting to restrict admission only 
because of the wealth they want to maintain will also become aware 
of the need to take common measures on a global scale to preserve 
their way of life. International agreements are needed for that pur- 
pose, and it will be impossible to reach common policy ground 
without facing the need to compensate weaker communities whose 
cooperation is required. These weaker communities gain in bargain- 
ing strength as the need for a web of international agreements 
increases. Issues of a common stand against terrorism, of disarma- 
ment, of the global environment, and the like may become the levers 
by which larger flows of aid are brought about. Sharing the costs 
and benefits and ensuring the reliability of the agreements unavoid- 
ably leads to introducing ethical notions of fairness, both between 
and within countries. 
Moreover, agreements with respect to free trade often require 
their members to compensate outsiders for maintaining protection. 
The logic of these agreements implies that constraints on interna- 
tional mobility of labor must be compensated for by aid flows. The 
rent of the fence must be paid. 
All this increasingly forces the participants to behave as a com- 
munity with a common set of standards. The persistence of hunger 
conflicts with this need and market forces alone cannot be expected 
to solve the hunger problem. The creation of productive employ- 
ment opportunities for the poor - the only long-run solution - will 
take a long time and may often fail. Short-term palliatives may 
remain necessary in the meantime to alleviate the immediate hunger 
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problem. Still, as the problems are resolved for some, new and 
unforeseen poverty may emerge. There will always be winners and 
losers. But over time one may expect, if our simulations are reason- 
ably reliable, that winning and losing will take place at  a level well 
above the minimum food needs of all human beings. 
To alleviate the suffering of the present losers does not require 
much sacrifice on the part of the international community. Hunger 
may be beyond the reach of the invisible hand, but it is not beyond 
the reach of society. 
Summay and COTU~W~OM 
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